# Problems of Communism

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# Problems of Communism

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**MARCH-APRIL 1983 VOL XXXII**

*Problems of Communism* (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

*On all editorial matters,* communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, United States of America, 400 C Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 724-9801 (or 202 485-2230)

*On subscriptions,* communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

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*An annual index* for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

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Cover: Deng Xiaoping, member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo's Standing Committee and chairman of the party's Military Commission, reviews a military display in October 1981. Photo by Eastfoto.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

# Problems of Communism

## Articles

**Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy**
Harry Harding

In the three and a half decades since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, Chinese foreign policy has contained elements of both change and continuity. Change is evident in the ebb and flow of China's involvement with the rest of the world, and in Beijing's shift of alignment from East to West. But Chinese leaders have stressed the continuity of their policy: strategic independence, economic self-reliance, and opposition to hegemonism.

**Sino-Soviet Rapprochement?**
William E. Griffith

For the first time in nearly two decades, China is responding to Soviet overtures, as indicated in two new rounds of Sino-Soviet negotiations in October 1982 and March 1983. China's desire for a more "independent" foreign policy will probably encourage atmospheric improvement in relations. But continuing differences over Indochina, Afghanistan, and other issues should preclude decisive improvements in Sino-Soviet relations.

**Leadership in China: Rivalry, Reform, and Renewal**
Richard D. Nethercut

The 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was a milestone in the leadership struggle and reform process in China. The triumvirate of Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhao Ziyang that emerged as the dominant leadership group after Mao used this recent party forum to legitimize its power and to enact organizational and policy changes. Important developments included adoption of a new party constitution setting stricter requirements on party members and "retirement" of some veteran cadres.

**Yugoslavia's National Question**
Viktor Meier

Yugoslav Communist ideology has long had trouble in coming to grips with the country's national divisions. The federal state structure and successive constitutions have all formally recognized such divisions, in varying degrees. Yet national differences remain a major issue in Yugoslav politics, notably in Croatia and most recently in Kosovo.

**Crisis in Kosovo**
Mark Baskin

The March 1981 demonstrations in Yugoslavia's Autonomous Province of Kosovo triggered a "crisis" that has resisted central efforts at political and economic "normalization." At the same time, the conflict, with its strong ethnic overtones, does not seem to have gotten beyond the central authorities' control.

* * *

Essay-reviews (over)

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## Essay-reviews

**Brezhnev's Foreign Policy**
Joseph G. Whelan

The Soviet Union was able to exploit US foreign policy problems in the 1970's, particularly in the Third World. But local nationalisms in the Third World and even inside the Communist bloc now present Moscow with increasingly difficult problems in spreading its influence and maintaining its empire.

**Iran's Revolutionary Left**
Sepehr Zabih

Leftist groups played a significant role in Iran's revolution, though their influence is only now beginning to receive due attention. The Left was fragmented, and the pro-Moscow Tudeh party gained at the expense of the Fida'iyin and Mojahedin. The latter broke with Iran's Islamic regime in 1980–81, and the Tudeh may be forced to follow the same path.

* * *

## Notes & Views

**Estimating Soviet Defense Spending**
Donald F. Burton

There have been a number of critiques of the estimates of Soviet defense spending published by the US Central Intelligence Agency. This note by a participant in such estimating efforts responds to three of these critiques and suggests that they are based either on a misinterpretation of CIA methods or on unwarranted assumptions about Soviet data.

**Checklist of Communist Parties, 1982**
Robert Wesson

This list, published in cooperation with the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1983), identifies the major Communist party (or parties) in some 100 countries and regions. Data provided include the mid-1982 population of the geographic entity, estimated or claimed party membership, the most prominent party leader, any party congress held during 1982, the party's general orientation among Communist movements, its legal status, and its showing in the most recent national elections.

**International Communist Fronts, 1982**
Wallace Spaulding

This listing updates information on the major international Communist front organizations listed in the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981" (published in the March-April 1982 issue of *Problems of Communism*). It also discusses personalities and organizational trends in the fronts and highlights the major themes these fronts have focused on during 1982.

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# Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy

**By Harry Harding**

Seen through Western eyes, there has been great change and volatility in Chinese foreign relations over the past 30 years. Consider the following examples. During the early years of the People's Republic of China (PRC), China and the Soviet Union had an extremely close civilian and military relationship, with the Soviet Union providing extensive assistance to the modernization of both China's economy and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. Today, the two countries have terminated their treaty of friendship and alliance, the Soviet Union has deployed 50 divisions along the Sino-Soviet frontier, and the Chinese describe the USSR as a hegemonic power that is the greatest threat to world peace.

Also, for more than two decades China was locked in confrontation with the United States. The two countries fought a war on the Korean peninsula and engaged in two dangerous clashes in the Taiwan Straits. Each sought to undermine the other's position in international affairs. By the late 1970's, however, the two countries had established diplomatic relations, developed extensive commercial, scientific, and cultural exchanges, and found common ground on a wide range of international and regional issues. Some Americans—and even some Chinese—found it possible to consider Beijing as very nearly an ally of the United States, Japan, and NATO in a coalition against the Soviet Union, and as a possible recipient of Western arms.

There were also significant changes in China's attitude toward its role in world revolution. In the early 1950's, and especially in the 1960's, China called for an upsurge in armed struggle throughout the world, directed against "reactionary" governments aligned with the United States, and held up its own experiences in revolution and development as models for leftist groups in other countries. The Chinese also provided extensive rhetorical and material support to abet such struggles. Today, China has attenuated its links with most national liberation movements, foresworn attempts to "export revolution" to other countries, and warned that leftist revolutionary parties can expect to receive only moral support from Beijing.

Developments such as these have led most Western observers to emphasize the changes in Chinese foreign policy since 1949. In this view, China has shifted from an alignment with the Soviet Union to an alignment with the United States, and from a posture of rejecting the international order to one of basically accepting it.[1] Moreover, this shift has been viewed as one of the most fundamental transformations in the postwar era—and one of the most beneficial to the United States.[2]

In examining the same record, the Chinese, by contrast, usually stress the continuities in their foreign relations, pointing out the constancy of a number of basic principles in China's foreign affairs: opposition to what Chinese leaders term hegemonism and imperialism;

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[1] Richard Wich has described China's change in alignment as a "geologic shift in the international political environment." See his *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1980, p. 1. For similar views, see A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1977, esp. pp. 258–61; and Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs*, New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1978.

[2] See, for example, Donald S. Zagoria, "The New Equilibrium in East Asia," in Robert B. Hewett, Ed., *Political Change and the Economic Future of East Asia*, Honolulu, HI, Pacific Forum, 1981, pp. 4–5.



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support of the process of decolonization and opposition to the remnants of colonialism; preservation of sovereignty and independence; development of the PRC's economy and military strength through a policy of self-reliance; and pursuit of peaceful coexistence with other countries, even while expressing support, in the spirit of "proletarian internationalism," for progressive forces abroad. In short, Chinese leaders insist that their country's foreign policy has been unvarying in its basic orientation and goals.[3]

The differences between the Western and Chinese perspectives invite a closer examination of the issue of change and continuity in Chinese foreign policy since 1949. The basic thesis of this essay is that both viewpoints are correct—that China's foreign relations comprise both continuity and change—and that to understand China's contemporary foreign relations demands attention to both the enduring and the transient features. Similarly, predictions about China's future role in international affairs require an estimate of whether the changes of the past 30 years have now ceased or will continue, and whether the apparent continuities of past decades are enduring or ephemeral.

In analyzing China's evolving foreign relations, three aspects seem particularly important: (1) the degree to which China has been extensively involved in, or isolated from, the rest of the world; (2) the extent of China's alignment with either of the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union; and (3) China's assessment of the legitimacy of the prevailing international order. On this basis, it is possible to divide Chinese foreign policy since 1949 into five periods: the 1950's, when China, aligned with the Soviet Union, sought radical changes in the international balance of power; the early 1960's, when China became even more radical and asserted its independence from the Soviet bloc; the late 1960's, the most revolutionary period, when China effectively insulated itself from the rest of the world; the early and mid-1970's, when China abandoned its radical critique of the international order in favor of a more reformist approach; and the late 1970's, when China seemed not only to accept the international status quo, but also to move into alignment with the United States. Today, in the early 1980's, China appears to be moving in new directions, which may represent a new stage in its foreign relations.

## Radical Aligned State

In the 1950's, China could best be described as a country interested in defending its newly completed revolution against threats both at home and abroad. After extending its power nationwide in 1949, the most pressing tasks facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were the consolidation of political control over the world's most populous country and the initiation of a program of socialist transformation and sustained economic development. Both of these goals had significant international implications. The consolidation of political power required that the new regime ensure its security against the two external forces that seemed determined to eliminate it: the Nationalist government on Taiwan, and the Nationalists' ally in Washington. Socialist transformation and economic development required that Beijing seek capital, technology, and advice from abroad, particularly from the more advanced Communist nations.

These imperatives led China into an alliance with the Soviet Union. Under this arrangement, Moscow developed a program of economic and technological aid to China that one American scholar has described as "the most comprehensive technology transfer in modern history."[4] The USSR also provided extensive military assistance to Beijing, including the extension of its nuclear umbrella over China, the export of weapons and military doctrine to help modernize the Chinese armed forces, and the development of the PRC's capacity to produce its own conventional weapons.[5] The degree of trust between the two countries at the height of their alliance was reflected in a 1957 agreement on nuclear cooperation, in which the Soviet Union may have agreed to provide the PRC with a sample atomic bomb and the technical data concerning its manufacture.[6] In return, Beijing agreed to align China with the socialist camp, acknowledge (and, at crucial points, promote) the Kremlin's leadership of that camp, and coordinate China's foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union.

Yet, China never seemed completely comfortable with this alignment with the Soviet Union. For one thing, it was not the first choice of a number of leaders of the CCP, including both Zhou Enlai and, at least for a time, Mao Zedong. The relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communists during the CCP's struggle against the warlords and against the Nationalist government

[3] As party General Secretary Hu Yaobang put it in his report to the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982, "China follows an overall long-term strategy, and is definitely not swayed by expediency or by anybody's instigation or provocation." Hu Yaobang, "Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist Modernization," *Beijing Review*, Sept. 13, 1982, p. 29.

[4] Hans Heymann, Jr., "Acquisition and Diffusion of Technology in China," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 678.

[5] Raymond L. Garthoff, Ed., *Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945–66*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1966.

[6] John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, London, Oxford University Press, 1968, ch. 12.



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*A Soviet expert assists Chinese engaged in constructing a power plant at Zhengzhou in Henan Province in 1953.*

**—Eastfoto.**

had been quite strained, with Stalin repeatedly giving his Chinese comrades unwise and self-serving advice.[7] As a result, by the mid-1940's, some Chinese Communist leaders were hoping for some kind of accommodation with the United States that would allow a victorious Communist movement to take a more balanced position between Washington and Moscow, gain access to American capital and technology, and reduce the chances that the United States would take a hostile position toward a Communist government in China.[8]

Furthermore, while the Soviet Union was generous to China in many ways—particularly in its willingness to help the PRC develop nuclear weapons—Moscow also struck a hard bargain in its relations with Beijing. In exchange for the military alliance of 1950, Stalin demanded, and received, continued privileges in China, including the formation of four joint-stock companies and the retention of Soviet port facilities and naval bases in Dairen and Port Arthur. During the early 1950's, complained the Chinese, the Soviet Union gave China no economic grants, insisted that Beijing pay for all the economic and military assistance it received, interfered with China's economic plans, and sought to integrate the PRC into a "socialist international division of labor."[9] And once Nikita Khrushchev began to speak of "peaceful coexistence" with the United States at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Beijing began to worry that Moscow might choose to sacrifice Chinese interests for the sake of improving its relations with the United States.

Thus, even during this period of alliance, China gradually began to stake out a somewhat more independent foreign policy, focused on attempts to weaken the American strategic position in Asia by undermining US ties with the smaller developing states in the region. In the early 1950's, Beijing supported national liberation movements in Asian countries aligned with the West, providing large amounts of military and economic assistance to Viet Minh forces in French Indochina, and rhetorical support and small amounts of material aid to Communist movements in Burma, Malaya, and the Philippines.[10] Later in the decade, China sought to improve its relations with virtually all independent Third World governments, in the Middle East as well as in Asia. Through China's "Bandung Line," named after the conference of Asian and African governments in Indonesia in April 1955 at which it was announced, Chinese leaders tried to persuade Third World governments to adopt a position of neutrality in cold war rivalries and to attenuate their political and military ties with the United States.[11]

These actions, however, did not make China a truly revolutionary state. Essentially, Chinese foreign policy during this period was defensive: it aimed at discouraging the smaller countries of Asia from participating in the American strategy to isolate China diplomatically and economically and to encircle it militarily. China certainly did not accept the international status quo, but it had not yet launched a frontal challenge against it, as it would begin to do in the early 1960's.

## Radical Nonaligned State

By the end of the 1950's, serious tensions had emerged in Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese had become convinced that the model of development they were importing from the Soviet Union was inappropriate

[7] On Sino-Soviet relations before 1949, see Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists*, 2d ed., Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1963; Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China, 1924–1927*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1958; and Richard C. Thornton, *The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928–1931*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1969.

[8] On relations between the CCP and the United States in the 1940's, see James Reardon-Anderson, *Yenan and the Great Powers: The Origins of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 1944–45*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1980; and Dorothy Borg and Waldo Heinrichs, Eds., *Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947–1950*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1980.

[9] On Sino-Soviet economic relations in the 1950's, see Charles Thomas Fingar, "Politics and Policy Making in the People's Republic of China, 1954–55" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University, 1977), pp. 167–76. Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs give graphic examples of incidents that offended the Chinese. See Strobe Talbot, Trans. and Ed., *Khrushchev Remembers*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1970, pp. 463–44; and idem, Trans. and Ed., *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, Boston, MA, Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 249–50.

[10] Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements*, 2d ed., New York, NY, Praeger, 1976, passim.

[11] Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations since 1949*, 2d ed., New York, NY, Macmillan, 1972, ch. 3.



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to Chinese conditions, but their attempt to break away from the Soviet model, through the Great Leap Forward, led the Kremlin to order the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from China.[12] A Soviet proposal in 1958 for a joint naval fleet in the western Pacific[13] confirmed Chinese suspicions that Khrushchev wished to establish control over the Chinese armed forces. And lukewarm Soviet support for China in the Quemoy crisis of 1958 and the Kremlin's indecisiveness in the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1959 also seemed to justify Beijing's concern that the Soviet Union would compromise its support of basic Chinese territorial interests for the sake of either avoiding conflict with the United States or improving its relations with nonaligned states such as India.[14]

While the formal Sino-Soviet alliance would remain in effect until its expiration in 1980, the actual relationship between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. Trade between the two countries dropped markedly; the Chinese accepted no further credits from Moscow and spared no effort to pay off their outstanding debts ahead of schedule. While the Soviet Union continued for a time to sell some conventional military equipment to China, Khrushchev renounced his earlier agreement to assist China in developing its own nuclear weapons.[15]

The main arena of the Sino-Soviet split, however, was in the realm of polemics between the two Communist parties. Even though China continued to claim membership in the socialist bloc, it began to express its opposition to a wide range of Soviet initiatives, especially Moscow's "revisionist" package of domestic policies and its policy of peaceful coexistence with the United States, which Beijing claimed was nothing less than a disguised attempt by the two superpowers to share global hegemony. At the same time, each side vied for the leadership of the international Communist movement: the Soviets attempting to drum China out of the Communist camp and to extend their influence in the Third World; the Chinese trying to mobilize Communist parties against the USSR and to exclude the Soviet Union from participation in conferences of Third World states.[16]

Yet, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet dispute did not produce a rapprochement between China and the United States. Throughout the 1960's, and particularly as American involvement in the Vietnam conflict grew,

*Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence—epitomized in his 1959 visit to the United States to talk with President Dwight Eisenhower at Camp David—raised major concerns in Beijing over the reliability of China's Soviet ally.* —FPG.

Beijing still regarded Washington as the most dangerous imperialist power and the major threat to Chinese security. Thus, instead of shifting its alignment from the Soviet Union to the United States, China pursued an independent foreign policy. With relations with the United States frozen, and those with the USSR in decline, China sought to develop diplomatic ties with Western Europe, achieving success in 1964, when it established formal relations with Gaullist France—the first European nation to recognize the People's Republic since the early 1950's. In the security sphere, Beijing became convinced that it could take on both superpowers simultaneously by making preparations to fight a "people's war" against foreign invasion and by developing its own independent nuclear capability, which it achieved in minimal fashion with the explosion of its first atomic bomb in October 1964.

But the main theme of Chinese foreign policy in this second period was a radical attempt to mobilize the Third World to join an international united front against both superpowers, and against the international system they allegedly dominated. Accordingly, Beijing adopted a more strident and disruptive policy, encouraging Third World countries to support Indonesia's call for the creation of a new United Nations, organized around the "newly emerging forces" of the developing world; to refuse economic assistance from the Soviet Union and

[12] Gittings, op. cit., ch. 17.

[13] Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, R-2943-AF, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, August 1982, pp. 6–8.

[14] Yahuda, op. cit., ch. 4; Barnett, op. cit., pp. 32–39. The classic analysis of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute remains Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–61*, Princeton, NY, Princeton University Press, 1962.

[15] Gittings, op. cit., ch. 12.

[16] For overviews of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960's, see William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1967; and Gittings, op. cit.



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the United States; to support national liberation movements working against the remaining colonial and apartheid regimes in Africa; and to oppose the partial nuclear test ban treaty that had been negotiated by the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. China also began to provide greater support for revolutionary movements in countries whose governments refused to recognize the PRC, voted against Beijing's admission to the United Nations, or maintained close military and political ties with the United States.[17]

Chinese efforts, however, did not yield many results. China simply did not have the military or economic capability to provide large amounts of assistance to most national liberation or revolutionary movements, except the one in Vietnam. And the issues around which Beijing chose to construct its united front—opposition to the United States, to the Soviet Union, and to all pro-Western developing countries—were not attractive to many Third World governments. The failure of China's initiatives toward the Third World in the early 1960's was symbolized by three events: Zhou Enlai's ill-fated tour of Africa in 1963–64, during which he unwisely declared that the "revolutionary prospects" on the continent, including its already-independent countries, were "excellent";[18] the cancellation of a second Bandung conference in Algiers after a military coup in Algeria in 1965;[19] and the overthrow of the friendly Sukarno government in Indonesia by another military coup in the same year.[20]

## Revolutionary Isolationist State

With the advent of the Cultural Revolution in late 1966 and early 1967, Chinese foreign relations underwent a further radicalization, reflecting the heightened radicalism of Chinese domestic politics. That radicalization, which was reinforced by the chaos in China's foreign affairs bureaucracy, produced a nearly complete break of China's international diplomatic and economic ties. In the early part of the decade, China, though independent from the two superpowers, had been actively involved in world affairs; at the height of the Cultural Revolution, the PRC turned almost completely inward, isolating itself from the rest of the world.

[17] Yahuda, op. cit., ch. 5; and Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971.

[18] Bruce D. Larkin, *China and Africa, 1949–1970*, Berkeley, Ca, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 65–70.

[19] Yahuda, op. cit., pp. 161–62.

[20] Taylor, op. cit.; ch. 2; and J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977, ch. 4.



*Zhou Enlai shown with Guinean President Sekou Touré during the Chinese Premier's tour of Africa in early 1964.*

**—Eastfoto.**

At home, the Cultural Revolution reflected the resurgence of utopian populist and egalitarian impulses that have traditionally provided a counterpoint to the predominantly hierarchical and authoritarian cast of Chinese politics and society. In international affairs, the Cultural Revolution represented the revival of yet another submerged strain of thought: a strongly xenophobic Chinese nativism, similar in some regards to the antiforeignism of the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century. The avowed domestic purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the institutionalization of privilege and elitism; in foreign affairs, it was to safeguard the country against corrosive influences from abroad. The recall of every Chinese ambassador (save one in Cairo) during the Cultural Revolution was, in part, occasioned by the organizational chaos within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[21] But, to an equally significant degree, it was also a symbol of the radicals' desire to insulate China from the corruption of contact with foreigners. So, too, was the decline in China's trade with the outside world, from $4.2 billion in 1966 to $3.8 billion in 1968.[22]

Chinese policy toward the Third world was redefined in ways that made the qualifications for membership in

[21] Melvin Gurtov, "The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the Chinese Cultural Revolution," in Thomas W. Robinson, Ed., *The Cultural Revolution in China*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 313–66.

[22] *China: International Trade, 1977–78*, ER 78-10721, Washington, DC, National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency, December 1978, p. 11.



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the united front against the United States and the Soviet Union even more restrictive than in the early 1960's. Beijing thus stopped making appeals to established Third World governments, choosing to regard all of them as little more than political instruments of American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Even relations with North Korea became strained, as Red Guards accused Kim Il-song of "revisionism";[23] and practically the only governments with which China remained friendly were those of Albania and North Vietnam. Beijing encouraged Maoist insurgents to carry out armed struggle against the governments of virtually every developing country, in order to create "storm centers of world revolution" throughout the Third World.[24] In an analogue to China's own Communist revolution—and in accordance with the Maoist doctrine reemphasized by Lin Biao in 1965 in his "Long Live the Victory of People's War"—armed insurgents were to seize control of the "countryside" of the world, surround the developed "cities," and thus cause the collapse of both the Soviet Union and the West.[25]

## Reformist Semi-Aligned State

By the end of the 1960's, however, Chinese leaders concluded that the international isolation produced by the Cultural Revolution was becoming increasingly dangerous. Throughout the latter part of the decade, both China and the Soviet Union had reinforced the military forces deployed along their common frontier, thus introducing a military element into what had originally been a political and polemical conflict. Ultimately, in 1969, the two sides engaged in serious armed clashes over several small islands in the Ussuri River, which separates Chinese Manchuria from Soviet Siberia, as well as at other points along the Sino-Soviet frontier. Those clashes, plus the precedent of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, raised the possibility of a large-scale Soviet attack against China, in the name of preserving socialism in Beijing.[26]

At the same time, the Chinese also concluded that the changing tide in the Vietnam War was producing a major shift in the international balance of power, away from the United States and toward the Soviet Union. It was clear to the Chinese leadership that the United States was losing its struggle in Vietnam and had decided to disengage from the conflict. And a new American administration, under Richard Nixon, seemed willing to seek an accommodation with Beijing as a means to bolster what the Chinese considered a deteriorating US strategic position.

In this context, China began to redefine its foreign policy in the early 1970's, taking three initiatives that departed sharply from the isolation and radicalism of the Cultural Revolution.[27] First, over the opposition of some of China's military commanders as well as of the radicals who had come to prominence during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing began to explore the possibility of an accommodation with the United States.[28] The rationale for this policy lay in the need to stabilize the situation along the Sino-Soviet frontier and to create a new global alignment to contain the Soviet Union, which Chinese leaders viewed as rapidly becoming more ambitious and more powerful. Second, again over the opposition of leftist leaders at home, Beijing abandoned the radicalism that had served it so poorly throughout the 1960's, in favor of a kind of international reformism more in harmony with the thinking of most Third World governments.[29] Instead of an international revolution, China began to propose sweeping, but more moderate, changes in the international political and economic order, becoming, in short, a vigorous proponent of a "new international economic order" (NIEO).[30] Third, the PRC rejected the economic autarky characteristic of the Cultural Revolution period and began to resume active commercial transactions with the rest of the world, particularly with the West.[31] But largely because of the concern of radical leaders with the danger of economic dependence on foreigners, the types of economic relationships in which China was willing to engage remained

[23] Chun-tu Hsueh, "Korea in China's Policy," in Chun-tu Hsueh, Ed., *Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations,* New York, NY, Praeger, 1977, p. 134; and Robert A. Scalapino, "China and Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, Ed., *The China Factor,* Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1981, p. 185.

[24] "Excellent Situation: East Wind Prevails over the West Wind," *Renmin Ribao,* Sept. 30, 1967, in *Peking Review,* Oct. 20, 1967, pp. 26–28.

[25] Lin Piao [Lin Biao], *Long Live the Victory of People's War,* Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1965.

[26] Thomas W. Robinson, *The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,* RM-6171-PR, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, August 1970; and Wich, op. cit.

[27] On China's foreign policy in the 1970's, see Robert Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1977,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1978; and Golam Choudhury, *China in World Affairs: The Foreign Policy of the PRC Since 1970,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1982.

[28] On the domestic debate over the accommodation with the United States, see Thomas M. Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle,* R-1902-NA, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, November 1977.

[29] On the debate over the abandonment of radicalism in favor of a more reformist approach to the international order, see Harry Harding, "The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture, 1973–1978," in Thomas Fingar and the *Stanford Journal of International Studies,* Eds., *China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, pp. 93–146.

[30] China supported such measures as revision of the law of the sea, formation of international producers' cartels, regional economic cooperation among developing countries, and the regulation or nationalization of multinational corporations. For analysis of China's changing policy toward the Third World, see Harry Harding, "China and the Third World: From Revolution to Containment," in Solomon, op. cit., pp. 257–95.

[31] *China: International Trade, 1977–78,* p. 11.



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*Chairman Mao Zedong welcomes US President Richard Nixon to Beijing in February 1972.*

**—Magnum.**

severely limited. The PRC would never accept, it was said, foreign loans, foreign investment, or imported consumer goods.[32]

Chinese foreign policy in the early and mid-1970's was summarized in the "theory of the three worlds," formulated by Mao Zedong in February 1974 and presented publicly by Deng Xiaoping in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly two months later.[33] According to that doctrine, the main characteristic of international affairs was the growing resistance of the developing countries (the Third World), supported by the more developed countries of Eastern and Western Europe and Japan (the Second World), against the economic and political "hegemonism" of the two superpowers (the First World). All Second and Third World countries, regardless of their social or political systems, were welcome to join Beijing in a united front against these two superpowers. Opposition to hegemonism—rather than "people's war" or "armed struggle"—was now viewed as the essence of a "progressive" foreign policy.

Theoretically, therefore, China still considered both the United States and the Soviet Union as adversaries. But Beijing subtly incorporated its partial alignment with the United States into its formal foreign policy doctrine, first by reversing the order in which the two superpowers were listed so that the Soviet Union always appeared before the United States, and then by explicitly declaring that the Soviet Union represented the more "ferocious" and "treacherous" of the two.[34]

## Conservative Aligned State

Developments both at home and abroad led to the further moderation of Chinese foreign policy in the late 1970's. The purge of the "gang of four" in October 1976, one month after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong, removed the leaders of the opposition to alignment with the United States and to expanded economic relations with the West. The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Beijing and Washington in December 1978 seemed, at least temporarily, to eliminate the Taiwan issue as an obstacle to the further improvement of Sino-American relations. And the continuing expansionism by the Soviet Union and its allies—exemplified by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan one year later—raised the threat of a Soviet diplomatic and military encirclement of China. As a result, Chinese leaders introduced significant modifications into each of the three initiatives that had been adopted in the early and mid-1970's, in ways that produced a closer alignment between China and the United States, and that gave the impression that China had become, for all practical purposes, a status quo power.

For example, by the end of the 1970's, references to the new international economic order had virtually vanished from the pages of Chinese media and from the speeches of Chinese statesmen. Instead, Beijing seemed more concerned with preserving the existing international strategic balance against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. The model that the PRC presented to the developing world was not that of a self-reliant, independent China overcoming foreigners' attempts at embargo and intimidation, as had been the case in the early 1970's, but rather of a self-righteous China, waging a punitive war against Vietnam for invading Cambodia in the service of Soviet hegemonism.[35] Moreover, China seemed to drop the United States from its list of hegemonic powers, leaving in that category only the Soviet Union and such proxy states as Cuba and Vietnam. While Beijing never said so formally, some

[32] For representative press accounts stressing these limits, see Radio Peking, February 15, 1977, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), March 9, 1977, pp. E/9-14; and *Peking Review*, Feb. 25, 1977, pp. 16–18.

[33] "Speech by Teng Hsiao-p'ing [Deng Xiaoping], Chairman of Delegation of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review*, Apr. 12, 1974 (Supplement).

[34] See, for example, the most authoritative exegesis of the theory of the three worlds: Editorial Department of *Renmin Ribao*, "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," *Peking Review*, Nov. 4, 1977, pp. 10–41.

[35] Harding, "The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture," loc. cit.



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Chinese scholars implied that the United States had, in effect, been so weakened by its experience in Vietnam that it was no longer an active imperialist power, but had fallen, like Britain and France before it, into the ranks of the Second World.[36]

Whatever Beijing's informal assessment of American intentions and capabilities, it was clear that China was now willing to move into closer alignment with the United States on a number of issues. The two countries began to consult on a wide range of regional and global questions of common concern and to devise parallel or coordinated policies on such issues as Indochina and Afghanistan. They also initiated a limited cooperation on security problems, with the United States agreeing to relax its restrictions on the export of military technology to China, and China agreeing to establish a joint surveillance facility to monitor Soviet missile tests.[37] The United States noted its interest in a "secure and strong" China, and Deng Xiaoping spoke, just before his visit to the United States in early 1979, of the need for China, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe to build a strong anti-Soviet united front.[38]

Neither side expressed any interest in creating a formal military alliance comparable to the Sino-Soviet alliance of 1950, seeming satisfied to remain, in the words of the Carter Administration, "friends, rather than allies."[39] But the two countries began increasingly to speak of their parallel international objectives and common foreign policy interests and worked to narrow (or at least to tone down) their differences on remaining points of disagreement. All this amounted, if not to an alliance, at least to a reasonably close alignment between Beijing and Washington.

Finally, in the economic sphere, China significantly relaxed restrictions on commercial relations with the West, having concluded that its economic and scientific modernization could be promoted better by cooperation with the West than by self-reliance. The Chinese therefore began to explore a variety of economic relationships with the West that had previously been proscribed, including joint ventures with foreign investors; management consulting contracts and licensing agreements with foreign firms; technical assistance from intergovernmental organizations; and loans from commercial banks, foreign governments, and international financial institutions. By 1980, China's foreign trade turnover totaled US$37.6 billion, nearly 10 times what it had been a decade earlier;[40] and it had gained access to nearly US$30 billion in credit from Western financial institutions.[41]

## Reformist Independent Leanings

By the beginning of 1983, however, the policy of close cooperation with the United States seemed to be undergoing significant modification. Every available indication suggested that the foreign policy orientation that China had adopted between 1979 and 1982 might be one of the shortest-lived of all—as transient as the disastrous radicalism during the Cultural Revolution.

[36] For one full exposition of this view by a Chinese scholar then in the United States, see Hua Di, "Chinese Comprehensive Strategic Doctrine," in *The Role of Technology in Meeting the Defense Challenges of the 1980s*, Stanford, CA, Northeast Asia–United States Forum on International Policy, Stanford University, November 1981, pp. 67–104.

*Deng Xiaoping at the UN General Assembly session in the autumn of 1974.*

**—Biber/SIPA Press via Liaison.**

[37] For more details on the strategic relationship between China and the United States, see Harry Harding, "American Arms Sales to China and Taiwan: The Case for Caution," Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Congress, *The New Era in East Asia*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 285–300.

[38] *Time* (New York, NY), Feb. 5, 1979, p. 34.

[39] Richard C. Holbrooke, "China and the U.S.: Into the 1980's," Bureau of Public Affairs, US Department of State, *Current Policy* (Washington, DC), No. 187, June 4, 1980, p. 3.

[40] *China Business Review* (Washington, DC), November-December 1982, p. 52.

[41] A. Doak Barnett, *China's Economy in Global Perspective*, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 143–49.



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To begin with, serious strains developed in Sino-American relations. The immediate cause of the problems between Beijing and Washington, of course, was the reemergence of the Taiwan issue. The Chinese suspected the Reagan Administration of wishing to upgrade American relations with Taipei, which in effect was tantamount to following a "two China" policy. The PRC was also disappointed that recent developments—the normalization of Sino-American relations in late 1978; the publication of Beijing's position on the reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland;[42] and the termination of the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty at the end of 1979—had not persuaded Taipei to begin negotiations with Beijing over the future of the island. Thus, in the fall of 1981, China began to demand that the United States agree to a timetable for halting the sale of all weapons to Taipei.[43]

In early 1982, the Reagan Administration responded, announcing that it had decided not to sell an advanced fighter aircraft, the so-called F-X, to Taiwan.[44] Then, in August 1982, China and the United States issued a joint communiqué in which the United States pledged that its future arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed, in quality or quantity, the level that had been maintained since normalization, and that it intended gradually to reduce those sales over an unspecified period of time. For their part, while still refusing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, the Chinese described their proposals for a peaceful reunification of Taiwan and the Mainland as representing a "fundamental policy."[45]

But there were deeper problems in the Sino-American relationship, as each side became increasingly conscious of the limits on its relationship with the other. American business was becoming aware of the limits on trade with China; American bankers, of China's desire to minimize its foreign indebtedness; and the American academic community, of the restrictions on academic research in the PRC.[46] Chinese leaders were concerned with the effects of rising protectionist sentiments in the United States on the future of Chinese exports to the US, and with the remaining controls on the export of advanced American technology. And on issues ranging from the crisis in Poland to the stalemate on the Korean peninsula, both governments understood more clearly that there were differences in their national interests. As a result, unlike its predecessors—the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 and the normalization agreement of 1978—the agreement on arms sales to Taiwan did not restore much momentum to Sino-American relations. The spirit of euphoria that had characterized the relationship in the previous decade is simply no longer there.

*Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping and US President Jimmy Carter in Washington in January 1979, shortly after establishment of full diplomatic relations between China and the United States.*

**—James A. Parcell/*The Washington Post.***

Another factor also contributed to China's reassessment of its foreign policy in 1981–82. In the Chinese estimate, the Soviet Union's difficulties in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, coupled with the resurgence of American military power under the Reagan Administration, meant that Moscow was no longer capable of achieving the strategic breakthrough vis-à-vis the United States that Beijing had predicted in the late

[42] "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," Jan. 1, 1979, in *Beijing Review*, Jan. 5, 1979, pp. 16–17.

[43] For a summary of these early Chinese demands, see *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Nov. 20, 1981, pp. 8–9.

[44] *The New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1982, pp. 1, 8. For the Chinese reaction to the decision, see Xinhua [New China News Agency], Jan. 12, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 12, 1982, p. B/1.

[45] "US-China Joint Communiqué," *Current Policy*, No. 413, August 1982.

[46] American exports to China fell 4 percent between 1980 and 1981 (from US$3.8 billion to US$3.6 billion), and are projected to have fallen another 5 percent (to US$3.4 billion) in 1982. This was the result of an across-the-board reduction in Chinese imports, however, and the US share of China's overall trade continued to increase. See *China Business Review*, November-December 1982, p. 53. And while China received significant lines of credit from American and other Western banks, it drew down very little, maintaining one of the lowest debt-service ratios in the world. "The Benefits of Financial Conservatism," ibid., January-February 1983, pp. 48–49.



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1970's. In Chinese analyses, the Soviet Union remained the major threat to world peace and stability, but the threat of the "polar bear" was not described in as apocalyptic terms in 1982 as it had been a few years earlier. As a consequence, the need for a united front against Soviet hegemonism had somewhat declined.

Finally, Chinese leaders may well have been uneasy with their country's growing reputation as a status quo power closely aligned with the United States. In part, they may have realized that the PRC was beginning to lose sympathy in the Third World, as it reduced its support for the new international economic order, ordered its foreign policy around the single issue of opposition to the Soviet Union, and downplayed its differences with Washington on international issues.

The official reassessment of Mao Zedong at the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP in late June 1981 may have provided the occasion for an airing of such views. Chinese leaders were doubtless looking for positive contributions that the Chairman had made in his later years to offset their negative assessment of the Cultural Revolution, which had created a "crisis of confidence" among so many Chinese youth. The "theory of the three worlds" was a good candidate for such a role, and it was, accordingly, endorsed by the CCP resolution on party history adopted in mid-1981, as was Mao's desire to see China adopt an "independent and self-reliant" foreign policy.[47] But this could only highlight the extent to which China had, over the preceding years, departed from the spirit of Mao's original formulation.

As a result of these considerations, signs of a significant reorientation of Chinese foreign policy appeared in late 1981 and throughout 1982. First, there were repeated assertions of Chinese independence from the United States. China, General Secretary Hu Yaobang declared in his report to the 12th party congress in September 1982, adheres to an "independent foreign policy," and "never attaches itself to any big power or group of powers, and never yields to pressure from any big power."[48] Comprehensive statements of Chinese foreign policy began to refer to the United States once again as a hegemonic power and to list examples of American hegemonism alongside those attributed to the Soviet Union.[49]

Beijing also resumed its official dialogue with Moscow, which had been suspended since the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. China still insisted on major Soviet concessions as a prerequisite for progress in the negotiations, including the reduction of Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. But the atmosphere that surrounded the Sino-Soviet dialogue was more relaxed than on previous occasions. Hu Yaobang acknowledged that China had ceased its criticism of the Soviet Union's domestic affairs and suggested that the two countries look ahead toward the future rather than concentrate on the "minute details" of historical questions. And Vice Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, China's chief negotiator, suggested that the Soviet Union need not make concessions on all of Beijing's demands at once.[50]

These developments permitted China to strike an "independent" position between the two superpowers. As one Chinese journal put it, the PRC will

*totally oppose hegemony, no matter who seeks it or where it is sought. . . . On the Afghan and Kampuchean issues, both China and the United States oppose the Soviet Union and Vietnam. . . . In another case, both China and the Soviet Union oppose the United States in supporting Israeli aggression and the South African apartheid rule. This does not mean that China "allies" with the United States under some circumstances, or becomes a Soviet partner under other circumstances. [Instead,] this precisely proves that . . . China is independent of all the superpowers.*[51]

If China were to side with anyone, it would be with the Third World. "Socialist China," Hu Yaobang said, "belongs to the Third World," for it has "experienced the same sufferings as most other Third World countries, and . . . is faced with similar problems and tasks."[52] In addition to the customary reports on Soviet expansionism, media accounts of Chinese foreign relations began once again to emphasize problems of Third World development and to proclaim China's support for a restructuring of the international economic order. To symbolize China's identification with the Third World, Beijing has begun to describe the Taiwan question as an

[47] "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," June 27, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, July 1, 1981, pp. K/1–38, esp. sections 22 and 30(3).

[48] Hu, loc. cit., p. 29.

[49] Ibid. See also then Foreign Minister Huang Hua's speech to the 1982 session of the United Nations General Assembly: "China's Position on Current World Issues," *Beijing Review*, Oct. 11, 1982, pp. 14–18; and Wang Bingnan, "The Third World Is in the Ascendant and Full of Promise," *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 13, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 14, 1982, pp. A/1–4.

[50] For Hu's position and a general outline of China's position, see Xinhua, Oct. 17, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1982, pp. C/1–2. For Qian's statement on the easing of China's demands, see *Die Presse* (Vienna), Dec. 7–8, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 7, 1982, p. C/1.

[51] *Liaowang* (Beijing), quoted in Xinhua, "*Liaowang* Publishes Article on China's Independent and Initiatory Diplomacy," Oct. 20, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 21, 1982, pp. A/1–2.

[52] Hu, loc. cit., p. 31.



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example of the broader process of superpower intervention in the developing world: a case of American infringement on the sovereignty of a Third World country.[53]

Thus far, however, Chinese foreign economic relations have undergone less change than has its geopolitical posture. To be sure, Chinese leaders have become increasingly concerned about the effects of contact with the West on Chinese society. They blame the rise in political dissent at home, defections of Chinese to foreign countries, growing corruption within the Chinese bureaucracy, and even an increase in the crime rate at least partially on China's wider relationship with the rest of the world.[54] But they still seem eager to reap the benefits of China's new "open door." While placing increasing restrictions on unofficial and informal contacts beween Chinese and foreigners, and reducing some opportunities for Chinese to study abroad, Beijing has not limited the wide range of economic and commercial transactions with the West that were inaugurated in the late 1970's.[55]

The new directions in Chinese foreign relations, therefore, might tentatively be summarized as a kind of "independent reformism." In terms of its orientation toward the international system, China has decided to reassert its support for reform of the international economic and political order, although the practical steps it plans to take remain to be seen. In this regard, Beijing's foreign policy, rhetorically at least, will be similar to that of the mid-1970's.

China's relations with the two superpowers, however, may have little precedent. Unlike the late or even mid-1970's, indications are that China will seek to avoid the impression that it is closely "aligned" with, or a partner of, the United States, and will attempt to strike a more independent posture. But the independence of the early 1980's will probably be very different from that of the early 1960's, when it was China's position to vigorously oppose the initiatives of both superpowers. China may feel that it is now possible to engage in an active diplomatic dialogue with both the United States and the Soviet Union, and to pursue parallel policies with

[53] Radio Beijing, Nov. 30, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 9, 1982, pp. A/3–5.

[54] *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), No. 60, October 1982, pp. 12–13, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 5, 1982, pp. W/1–4.

[55] For a general overview of the restrictions, see *The New York Times*, July 31, 1982, p. 2. On the imprisonment of a Chinese journalist for passing "state secrets" to foreigners, see *Los Angeles Times*, Mar. 28, 1982. On the limitations on opportunities for study abroad, see ibid., May 27, 1982.

*Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang photographed in the People's Republic of the Congo during his trip to Africa in early 1983.*

—Eastfoto.



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Moscow on some issues and still join with Washington on others. As one Chinese writer has described this possibility:

*In the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States for world hegemony, China may adopt a similar attitude with this or that superpower on this or that issue, and have a certain "point of meeting." But its point of departure (in determining its position) is different.*[56]

What is more, it remains to be seen whether China will seek a true equidistance between the United States and the Soviet Union, or whether, as is more likely, its national interests will lead it to find "points of meeting" with Washington more frequently than with Moscow.[57] Much will depend on the policies that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt on issues of interest to the Chinese, as well as on the overall strategic balance between the two superpowers.

## Tactical Changes

This brief overview of the complex history of PRC foreign relations suggests that there have, indeed, been several major changes in Chinese foreign policy. One of these changes has been cyclical: a gradual rise, fall, and rise again in the level of China's involvement with the rest of the world. China was closely integrated with the socialist bloc throughout most of the 1950's, began to turn inward in the early 1960's, shut itself off from the rest of the world at the height of the Cultural Revolution, revived its basic trading and diplomatic relationships in the early 1970's, and then developed a wide panoply of economic partnerships later in the decade.

This cyclical pattern reflects the continuing impact of one of the most intense and enduring controversies in modern Chinese history. Ever since the mid-19th century, there has been vigorous debate among Chinese leaders and intellectuals concerning the degree to which modernization (or, to use the original Chinese term, "self-strengthening") required China to import technology, institutions, and values from abroad. To some during the late Qing Dynasty (1644–1911), such relations with the outside world were necessary if China were to strengthen itself to the point that it could resist foreign encroachment and regain its national dignity. To others, economic and cultural relations with foreigners would only contaminate Chinese society, disrupt the internal Chinese political order, and reduce China's independence and sovereignty. It would be better, this second group argued, to keep the foreigners away altogether and rely upon the restoration and rejuvenation of traditional Chinese culture to save the country.[58]

This debate between 'Westernizers" and "nativists" has had its counterpart in the People's Republic as well. More radical leaders, such as the "gang of four" in the late 1960's and early 1970's and, to a degree, Mao Zedong in certain periods of his life, have feared that economic relations with the West—or even with the Soviet Union, as a "revisionist" country—would bring with them "bourgeois" values and concepts that would gradually erode China's commitment to pure, revolutionary socialism. When radicals have been in power, as during the Cultural Revolution, they have implemented a policy of economic autarky and self-reliance. They have also tended to emphasize a militant and rigid posture toward China's adversaries, in the belief that such a stance would help maintain the levels of internal mobilization and commitment necessary to combat ideological decay.

More moderate leaders, in contrast, have considered economic cooperation with more advanced countries to be a prerequisite for the rapid modernization of the PRC's industry, agriculture, and military forces, thereby ensuring China's security and sovereignty in a hostile world. They believe that a strong central government can enable China to avoid becoming dependent on any foreign power and to resist cultural contamination from abroad. Thus, when more moderate leaders have been in power, as in the early 1950's, the late 1970's, and the early 1980's, they have actively and willingly imported technology, capital, and even institutions and culture from abroad.

The rise and fall of Chinese autarky and isolation in the 1960's and early 1970's, therefore, is the story of the rise and fall of radicalism and utopianism in Chinese domestic affairs. Here, more than on any other dimension of China's behavior in the international arena, there is a direct and immediate connection between China's domestic politics and its foreign policy.

A second change in China's foreign relations over the last 30 years has been Beijing's shift from East to West,

[56] *Liaowang,* loc. cit., pp. A/1–2. As one Communist newspaper in Hong Kong described Beijing's new foreign-policy posture, China would oppose the hegemonism of both superpowers, but also seek peaceful coexistence with each. "The Future of Sino-Soviet Relations Is Under Exploration," *Wen Wei Po,* Oct. 7, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* Oct. 13, 1982, pp. W/1–2.

[57] Indeed, by denying that they plan to pursue "equidistance" in foreign affairs, the Chinese seem to be signaling that they will tilt more toward the United States than toward the Soviet Union. See *Beijing Review,* Jan. 24, 1983. p. 4.

[58] For an overview of this long-standing dispute anc its continuing impact, see Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1974, pp. 1–13.



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*Part of a mass demonstration in Beijing on October 28, 1966, celebrating the successful launching of China's first missile equipped with a nuclear warhead.*

**—Paolo Koch/Photo Researchers.**

from alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950's to alignment with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan in the late 1970's, and to partial alignment with the West even today. Strategically, this reorientation of China's global posture involved a fundamental redefinition of China's friends and adversaries. Economically, it entailed major shifts in Chinese trading patterns: in the late 1950's, Beijing conducted about two-thirds of its trade with the socialist bloc; in the late 1970's, it directed more than 90 percent of its trade to the West.[59]

But this realignment did not occur by a direct route. China did not pass smoothly from alliance with the Soviet Union to alignment with the United States. Instead, it passed through a long intermediate period, during which it asserted its opposition to both superpowers and identified itself with the Third World.

While it is clear that Beijing's realignment was a reaction to specific developments in its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, it can also be understood as a reflection of the changing international balance of power since World War II. In the early postwar years, the United States enjoyed both economic and military preeminence and sought to use that power to contain and encircle its adversaries in Moscow and Beijing. By the end of the decade, however, Chinese leaders had concluded that the international balance had begun to shift. The launching of the Soviet sputnik led Mao to proclaim, in late 1957, that the "East Wind" was prevailing over the "West Wind."[60] And the increasingly large number of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa in the late 1950's and 1960's indicated, in Chinese eyes, the emergence of a potentially powerful counterweight to both superpowers.

Although the shift in the military balance between the Soviet Union and the United States since the early 1960's contributed to China's gravitation toward the West in the late 1970's, recent developments have led to a reappraisal of this position. Chinese leaders now believe that the international and internal difficulties of the Soviet Union, coupled with the increases in defense spending in the United States, have somewhat redressed the strategic imbalance.[61] Moreover, they believe that growing multipolarity is reducing the ability

[59] *China: International Trade, 1977-78,* p. 11.

[60] Mao made this assessment in a talk with Chinese students during his visit to Moscow in November 1957. See *Current Background* (Hong Kong), No. 891, Oct. 8, 1969, p. 26.

[61] In the 1980's, according to one authoritative Chinese analysis, "the rough balance of forces between the East and the West, especially between the Soviet Union and the United States, which came into existence during the 1970s, probably will be maintained." Zhang Zhen and Rong Zhi, "Some Observations on Soviet Détente," *Beijing Review,* Oct. 18, 1982, pp. 16–22.



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of either Washington or Moscow to dominate international affairs.[62] Accordingly, they perceive the international situation as being more conducive, once again, to a posture of independence from both superpowers.

A third change in China's foreign relations since 1949 has been a rise in China's international status. From a position of weakness three decades ago, China has become, in Jonathan Pollack's useful phrase, a "candidate superpower," both politically and economically.[63] In the early 1950's, for example, the PRC enjoyed formal diplomatic relations with only 12 countries outside the socialist camp and was denied representation in the United Nations. In the 1960's, however, many of the newly independent nations of the Third World chose to recognize Beijing rather than Taipei. As a result of this and of the signs of Sino-American rapprochement, by the fall of 1971, the People's Republic was able to gain a seat in the United Nations, thereby replacing Taiwan as China's representative to that body. By the end of 1982, Beijing had established diplomatic relations with 125 nations and claimed membership in most international economic organizations.

There has been a similar increase in China's economic activity. Since 1970, China's international trade has been rising rapidly, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the PRC's gross national product. In the 1970's, China's two-way trade increased nearly ten-fold, from around US$4 billion to about US$38 billion in current prices. Over the same decade, trade grew also from an estimated 3.5 pecent of China's GNP to approximately 9.4 percent.[64] Moreover, as its trade has grown, the PRC has become a significant trading partner of an increasing number of states. In 1981, China became the third largest importer of American goods in Asia (Japan and South Korea are first and second). And, in the same year, it was Japan's fifth largest trading partner, after the United States, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Australia.[65]

A related development has been the globalization of China's foreign policy. In the early 1950's, China was preoccupied with the two superpowers, with Asia, and, to a lesser degree, with the other Communist states. Later in the decade, Beijing showed a growing interest in the newly emerging countries of Africa and in the politics of the Middle East. In the early 1960's, as its split with the Soviet Union widened, China began to devote its attention to improving relations with Western Europe and Japan. Today, Beijing has even begun to show interest in Latin American and Caribbean states—a part of the world that is most remote from China's security concerns. In this way, the focus of China's foreign policy has steadily spread outward from Asia to include most of the world. In material terms, China may remain only a regional power, but in its foreign policy, the PRC has acquired a global scope.

How has China been able to transform itself from what Mao Zedong called a "semi-colony" to a "candidate superpower" in the space of 30 years? In part, it is the result of China's sheer size: the PRC has the world's largest population and, not coincidentally, the world's largest standing army, third largest navy, and third largest air force. The change is also due in part to the substantial economic development that has occurred since 1949, giving China, at about US$400 billion, the world's sixth largest GNP, an industrial sector equal to that of Japan in the early 1960's, and the world's third largest strategic nuclear force.[66] Moreover, these resources are at the command of a powerful central government, a situation in sharp contrast to the political fragmentation of the country before 1949.

Also, Chinese leaders have employed their available material resources with great skill. Despite the PRC's somewhat limited resources, China's leaders have throughout the years undertaken a surprisingly large foreign economic aid program.[67] Through their ability to impress and persuade both official and unofficial visitors, they have made their country a major commentator on world developments. On numerous occasions—in Korea, in the Taiwan Straits, along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian frontiers, and in Vietnam—they have shown a willingness and resolve to use their limited conventional military resources in active support of their foreign policy goals, even against more powerful adversaries. And, accurately or not, it is widely believed, both

[62] Xinhua, Dec. 20, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 20, 1982, pp. A/2–3; and Xinhua, Dec. 23, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*. Dec. 23, 1982, pp. A/1–3.

[63] Jonathan D. Pollack, "China's Potential as a World Power," P–6524, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, July 1980.

[64] For GNP and trade figures for 1970, see Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China: Economic Policy and Economic Results, 1949–71," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *The People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 5. The trade figures for 1980 are from *China Business Review*, November-December 1982, p. 51. Estimates of China's GNP in 1980 vary widely. Official Chinese figures place the country's GNP at US$259.9 billion (*China Business Review*, November-December 1982); US government estimates place it at US$552 billion (Arthur G. Ashbrook, Jr., "China's Economic Modernization and Long-Term Performance," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *China Under the Four Modernizations*, Part 1, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 104.) The first figure would produce a trade/GNP ratio of 13.3 percent; the second, one of 6.8 percent. Following Dwight Perkins ("The International Consequences of China's Economic Development," in Solomon, op. cit., pp. 114–36, I have used US$400 billion as an estimate of China's GNP, yielding a trade/GNP ratio of 9.4 percent.

[65] On the United States, see John Holdridge, "U.S. Relations with China," *Current Policy*, No. 297, July 16, 1981, p. 1. For Japan, see "Japan-China Trade Tops $10 Billion," *JETRO China Newsletter* (Tokyo), No. 37, March-April 1982, p. 29.

[66] On China's GNP, see the discussion in fn. 64. On the comparison with Japan, see Perkins, loc. cit., pp. 115–17.

[67] Harding, "China and the Third World," loc. cit. The most thorough study of China's foreign aid program is John F. Copper, *China's Foreign Aid*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976.



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in Asia and in other parts of the world, that China is likely to become an increasingly significant force in world politics over the rest of the century.

These trends, to be sure, should not be overstated. On many dimensions of national power, China remains a poor country, with a low GNP per capita, obsolescent industrial technology, and relatively primitive weaponry. There are, as well, real limits to the speed with which China can develop its economy and modernize its armed forces. For the foreseeable future, China will remain an Asian, rather than a global, power. Nonetheless, China has been able to attain—and is likely to maintain—a degree of influence in world affairs far beyond what one might expect, based on the PRC's actual material resources alone.

The rise in China's international status helps explain one other change in China's foreign relations: its transformation from a revolutionary into a reformist—even, for a brief period, a conservative—state. For most of its first two decades, China adopted a radical foreign policy, rejecting the international political and economic order dominated by the United States. Since the Cultural Revolution, however, China has emerged from its self-isolation and has gradually integrated into that order. The early 1970's marked China's full entry into the international political system, through its membership in the United Nations. By the end of the 1970's, China became an active participant in the international economic system, which gave the PRC access to foreign capital, technology, and markets.

Writing in *World Politics* in April 1974, the University of Chicago political scientist Tang Tsou suggested two preconditions for the deradicalization of the foreign policy of a revolutionary state such as China: first, it would have to come to perceive the existing international order as strong and enduring; and second, it would have to believe that it had acquired a "fair stake and a proper place" in that order.[68] Both of these conditions now obtain. This is not to say that the People's Republic will be a status quo power, for it sees much that should be reformed in international affairs. But China's rising international status, and its integration into the international community, does explain why Chinese foreign policy is not as radical or disruptive as it was in the past.

[68] Tang Tsou, "Statesmanship and Scholarship," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1974, pp. 428–50.

*Chinese border troops in the Vietnamese town of Loc Binh during the February 1979 fighting along the border between the two countries.*

—Eastfoto.



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*A Chinese demonstration in 1969 against the Soviet "invasion" of Zhenbao Island (known in the Soviet Union as Damanskiy Island).*

—Eastfoto.

## Strategic Continuities

As noted earlier, Chinese leaders tend to empahsize continuities, rather than change, in the PRC's foreign relations since 1949. And indeed, through all the transformations that have occurred over the last 30 years, four important basic continuities do emerge. Of these, none is more important than China's concern with its security and sovereignty. In part, this reflects the modern history of China—a country that was the victim of repeated military pressure from foreign powers from the Opium Wars of the 1840's and 1850's through the Sino-Japanese War of the 1930's and 1940's. Over the course of a century, this pressure resulted in numerous highly unfavorable developments: the extension of extraterritorial privileges to foreigners; the steady loss of territory around the periphery; the opening of China to foreign investment and to Western missionaries; the cession or lease of ports to foreign countries; and the division of China into informal "spheres of influence"—geographic areas in which individual nations claimed special privileges. Ultimately, the pressure culminated in all-out war with Japan, as Japanese troops invaded first Manchuria, then China proper, in an attempt to turn China into a semicolony.

After 1949, China continued to be concerned about its security and sovereignty. Territories that were once part of China, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, are at present ruled by authorities other than the government in Beijing. The two superpowers have, in succession, attempted to construct networks of bases and alliances in order to encircle China militarily and isolate it diplomatically: first the United States, through the system of bilateral and multilateral alliances, and then the Soviet Union, through its military relationships with Afghanistan, Outer Mongolia, and Vietnam, and its political links with India. China has, at various times, faced direct threats to its security from all four points of the compass: from Taiwan and the United States to the east, the Soviet Union to the north, Vietnam to the south, and India to the west. Few other major powers have felt so threatened, for such a long period of time, and by such powerful adversaries, as has China.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Chinese commentators would assign a high priority to Chinese security and sovereignty. "We do not tolerate any encroachment on China's national dignity or interests," Hu Yaobang stated in September 1982. "Having suffered aggression and oppression for over a century, the Chinese people will never again allow themselves to be humiliated as they were before."[69] Nor is it surprising that China would place high priority on such issues as the unification of Hong Kong and Taiwan with the Mainland.

A second continuity is the consistent image Chinese leaders have had of the underlying nature of international politics. It is an image of struggle: the rise of hegemonic powers; the formation of a united front of weaker powers against them; the eventual overextension of the hegemons' power base as they encounter the determined resistance of the opposing united front; and their gradual decline into passivity. It is, in a way, a volcanic theory of international affairs, dealing with the emergence, and ultimate extinction, of explosive threats to international peace and stability. Accordingly, Chinese leaders ask a consistent set of questions as they analyze international affairs. Which powers are rising, and becoming hegemonic? What are their strategies for global domination? What are their strengths and weaknesses? What united front can be mobilized against them?[70]

[69] Hu, loc. cit., pp. 29–30.

[70] The best analysis of the Chinese world view can be found in Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and John A. Kringen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case*, New York, NY, Free Press, 1979.



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As a result, the Chinese have always placed their own security and sovereignty in a global context. Rather than view their security concerns purely in regional terms, they have tended to see them as part of the broader global strategy of the hegemonic power(s) of the moment. Thus, according to the Chinese world view, once the United States lost its bid to maintain hegemony over the rest of Asia, Washington was ready to come to terms with Beijing. Similarly, Chinese leaders viewed the Soviet threat to China in the late 1970's and early 1980's as part of a global strategy: three southward thrusts—into the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia—that were designed to isolate China and place a stranglehold on the flow of strategic materials to Japan and Western Europe.[71]

The globalism of Chinese foreign policy doctrine can be traced to several mutually reinforcing sources. From traditional China comes the perception of a single world of "all under heaven," one that can be comprehended by a single doctrine of governance and organized through a single system of relationships. From Leninism comes the theory of global imperialism and the concept of a united front against it. And from the earliest days of Chinese Marxism comes the conviction that Chinese history represents not an exception to universal patterns of development, but rather a direct reflection of them.

China's concern with its own security has not, however, led it to seek allies in a continuous or unquestioning way. Indeed, a third continuity in Chinese foreign policy—one touched upon at several points in this article—is China's ambivalence about turning abroad for economic assistance, advanced technology, modern institutions, or military support. Even those Chinese leaders who have advocated doing so have often warned that China might lose its traditional cultural values, or become economically and culturally dependent upon its foreign patrons. In the same way, despite

[71] For one representative article, see Qi Ya and Zhou Jirong, "Expansionist Soviet Global Strategy," *Beijing Review*, June 22, 1981, pp. 22–25.



*Construction of a loading dock in October 1981 at the Shekou industrial district of the Shenzhen special zone created by China near Hong Kong to attract foreign investment.*

—Photoreporters.



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the ancient tradition of "using barbarians to control barbarians" (*yi-yi-zhi-yi*), contemporary Chinese leaders have often been skeptical about the reliability of using one foreign power as a diplomatic counterweight against another. As a result, China has tended to be a somewhat querulous ally, suspicious that its major ally might decide to reach an accommodation with the common enemy, sacrificing China's national interests in the process.

Thus, although China has undergone cycles of alignment and isolation, the center of gravity of modern Chinese politics is a commitment to strategic independence and economic self-reliance. These principles require that China, while engaged in economic and strategic relationships with stronger powers, take care to preserve the initiative, protect its sovereignty, and ensure its own independence of action. As one overview of Chinese foreign policy in late 1982 put it,

*our right to maintain independence and keep the initiative in our own hands is the fruit from ground irrigated with the blood of numerous martyrs. It is the most precious thing in the world. No one can damage it.*[72]

While mistrustful of stronger allies, China has sought to identify itself with what it considers to be weaker "progressive" forces abroad and to encourage these forces to join in a united front against the hegemonic powers of the moment. On occasion, as during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing has defined "progressivism" extremely narrowly, to include only a handful of radical Maoist insurgency movements. More commonly, China has believed all (or at least most) Third World governments to constitute this international progressive force. This reflects not only China's reading of Marxism-Leninism, but also its strong sense of a common experience with the other developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Together, China's mistrust of larger powers and its orientation toward the Third World have led it to identify itself more as one of the developing countries of the Third World than as a member of either the socialist bloc or the Western camp.

And yet, China has often appeared to be somewhat aloof and detached from the very causes it espouses. Even during the radicalism of the 1960's, China assigned relatively few resources to the support of friendly revolutionary movements abroad. As part of its support for a new international economic order in the 1970's, Beijing promoted the formation of producers' cartels and cooperation among Third World countries; at the same time, however, the PRC refused to join either OPEC or the "Group of 77" (a coalition of 120-odd developing countries that support the NIEO). China explains its reticence in terms of the PRC's limited material resources and a desire to avoid detailed involvement in contentious issues that might split the united front that the Chinese wish to form.[73] But perhaps the deeper explanation is China's underlying desire for independence of action. That same force that prevents Beijing from effecting too close an alignment with either superpower has also prevented it from forging too close a relationship with the Third World.

A final continuity worthy of note is China's toughness and self-confidence in its international behavior, even in dealing with more powerful adversaries. Indeed, the PRC is one of few countries that have been willing to declare their open opposition to both the United States and the Soviet Union. While showing flexibility in its day-to-day diplomacy, the People's Republic of China has displayed a rigid attachment to its basic principles and goals. It states forceful and well-articulated positions on virtually every major international issue, from Soviet-American relations to regional conflicts within the Third World. Whether this reflects pride in China's history and culture, faith in the innate strength of a billion people, or confidence in the accuracy of judgments made in accordance with official Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the Chinese government has usually conveyed a sense of determination and certitude that few other governments have matched.

## New Directions?

China's foreign policy since 1949, then, has contained elements of both change and continuity. Its degree of involvement with the rest of the world, its position in the ongoing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, its international status and influence, and its relative satisfaction with the present international system have all undergone significant change over the last 30 years. At the same time, Chinese leaders continue to view international politics as a struggle for hegemony among the superpowers—a view that has persistently impelled Beijing to seek ways of preserving China's security and sovereignty, to treat stronger allies with a good measure of mistrust, and to orient the PRC principally toward the other developing countries of the Third World.

What has remained relatively constant thus far, in other words, are the fundamentals of China's foreign

[72] Radio Beijing, Nov. 30, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Dec. 9, 1982, p. A/5.

[73] On China's aloofness from the Third World, see Samuel S. Kim, *China, the United Nations, and World Order*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979, ch. 9.



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policy: its basic organizing principles, its general goals, and its style. What has changed, in contrast, are China's policies toward specific issues and its relationships with particular countries.

The question for the future is not whether similar changes will occur, for they are certain to do so. Rather, the issue is whether the continuities will change. As Chinese politics continue to cast aside the constraints of doctrine and move toward greater pragmatism, will the basic organizing principles of Chinese foreign policy—the concern with hegemonism and united fronts—also be modified? As China attains greater international status, achieves stronger military power, and assumes an even more active role in the international economy, will its obsession with security and sovereignty gradually decline? If so, will these defensive goals be replaced by a more relaxed attitude toward the rest of Asia, or by more assertive, even expansionist, objectives? And, as a new generation of leaders comes to power—leaders who reached maturity after the birth of the People's Republic—will they maintain the same style as their predecessors: the same mistrust of stronger partners, the same empathy with the Third World, the same self-confidence?

No one can answer these questions with certainty. But the continuities are not superficial. They are deeply rooted in the historical experience of generations of Chinese. Change may come, but it will not come easily.



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# Sino-Soviet Rapprochement?

By William E. Griffith

For the first time since Leonid Brezhnev began making overtures to Beijing in 1964, China has begun to respond significantly.[1] The result has been a new set of negotiations—begun in October 1982 and resumed this March.[2] Why has Chinese policy changed? What are Soviet calculations? What is likely to result from the renewed talks?

## Toward Negotiations

In order to understand this latest phase of Sino-Soviet relations, one must go back briefly to 1979. In that year, Beijing refused to renew the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance but agreed to a Soviet proposal for general Sino-Soviet negotiations—that is, talks not limited to border issues. Since 1969, the Chinese had insisted that Moscow acknowledge certain islands—notably one across from Khabarovsk—and some land in the Pamirs to be "disputed territories," and also insisted that the USSR evacuate them, before Beijing would negotiate an agreed frontier on the basis of what it termed the "unequal" Russian-Chinese 19th-century treaties. (In fact, the Soviets had withdrawn their forces from all the islands in the Ussuri except the one across from Khabarovsk.)[3] According to a later official Soviet account,[4] not disputed by the Chinese, Beijing, citing the military threat "from the North and South," made the following demands in 1979: (1) a cutback of Soviet troop deployment on the Chinese frontier to the level maintained under Khrushchev; (2) withdrawal of all Soviet troops from the Mongolian People's Republic; and (3) the end of Soviet aid "in any form" to Vietnam. In sum, Beijing demanded that Moscow abandon all its geopolitical instruments of pressure on China without receiving anything in return.

The USSR, according to this Soviet account, rejected these Chinese demands and tabled a draft joint Sino-Soviet declaration, which (1) denounced "hegemony" (a favorite Chinese charge against the Soviets) by either side; (2) proposed a mutual end to unfriendly propaganda; (3) provided for regular Sino-Soviet meetings, including summit meetings; and (4) endorsed expansion of trade and of scientific, technical, and cultural exchanges.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979 stalled matters for a spell. On January 20, 1980, the Chinese declared that the invasion had made continued Sino-Soviet negotiations "inappropriate."

More than a year later, on March 7, 1981, Moscow proposed to the Chinese a series of "confidence-building measures," in which Japan, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States could all participate. Moscow stated that it had approached all these

[1] For background, see Herbert J. Ellison, Ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict. A Global Perspective*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1982, pp. 131–45 and 355–71; Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, R-2342-NA, July 1978; and Donald S. Zagoria, Ed., *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1982.

[2] *The New York Times*, Mar. 2, 1983.

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[3] Lieberthal, op. cit., p. 148.

[4] M. S. Ukraintsev (a pseudonym for Mikhail Kapitsa, then Chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now Deputy Foreign Minister), "Soviet-Chinese Relations: Problems and Prospects," *Problemy dal'nego vostoka* (Moscow), No. 2, 1982, pp. 15–24; a complete and accurate English-language translation was published in *Far Eastern Affairs* (Moscow), No. 3, 1982 pp. 15–24.



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*An officer of the People's Liberation Army stands in Manzhouli, a city on the Chinese border with the Soviet Union in 1980.*

—Howard Simons/*The Washington Post.*

countries, except South Korea, in this regard.[5] The Chinese did not reply officially, but the Chinese press made clear that this was unacceptable.

Nevertheless, in early 1981, Mikhail Kapitsa, then Chief of the First Far Eastern Department of the Soviet foreign ministry, twice visited Beijing privately and saw some officials in the Chinese foreign ministry.[6] The general level of Soviet polemics against China also declined somewhat, even though strong attacks against Beijing continued to appear in some important party and specialized journals.[7] Chinese athletes began to compete with their Soviet counterparts in various international sports events, and in November 1981, even participated in a Moscow meet. (Shades of "ping-pong diplomacy"!)

In late 1981, notably in an October 10 speech by Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a new ideological formulation of Chinese foreign policy began to appear, emphasizing its "independence." The new formulation contained the usual heavy criticism of "hegemonism" (read the Soviet Union), but it included some criticism of "imperialism" (read the USA) as well.[8] Thus, the interaction of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations, clear since 1971, was reversing direction, toward less unfavorable Sino-Soviet and less favorable Sino-American relations.

On September 25, 1981, Moscow proposed resuming border negotiations, and on December 16, Moscow proposed regular scientific and technological exchanges. On December 25, Beijing agreed to the latter in principle, but added that these exchanges should be postponed indefinitely.[9] However, on January 8, 1982, Li Xiannian, the number three Chinese leader, declared in an interview that Sino-Soviet differences were primarily about state, not ideological issues; that China posed no preconditions for Sino-Soviet negotiations, although the border, troop, Afghanistan, and Indochina issues would have to be discussed; and that the United States was "always an imperialist country," with whom China did not have "intimate relations."[10] That same month, a Soviet China specialist, Sergey Tikhvinskiy, visited Beijing as the guest of the Soviet ambassador.[11] On February 3, 1982, Moscow yet again proposed the resumption of border negotiations,[12] and on February 9, the Soviets suggested annual exchanges of students and teachers for language training.

The Chinese response was moderately forthcoming. Polemics against the Soviets continued, but with decreasing intensity.[13] Moreover, in March 1982, China played host to Maxime Gremetz, a leading official of the

[5] Ibid.

[6] Nayan Chanda, "Brezhnev breaks the ice," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Apr. 2–8, 1982, pp. 12–13, at p. 13.

[7] See, e.g., O. Borisov (a pseudonym for Oleg Rakhmanin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries), "Some Aspects of China's Policy," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, April 1981; B. Pyshkov and B. Starostin, "A Spiral of Treachery," ibid., No. 12, August 1981, pp. 73–82 (Pyshkov is a sector chief, dealing with France and Portugal, in the CPSU Central Committee's International Department); and O. Vladimirov, "The Sixth Plenum of the CC of the CCP and Beijing's Current Policy," ibid., pp. 84–91.

[8] Hu Yaobang speech in Beijing in commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 revolution, in *Beijing Review*, Oct. 19, 1981, pp. 14–21, at p. 19. For a broader historical analysis of "independence" as a theme in Chinese foreign policy, see the companion piece by Harry Harding in this issue.

[9] Ukraintsev, loc. cit., p. 22.

[10] In an interview in Beijing with a group of West European journalists; see *L'Unità* (Rome), Jan. 8, 1982.

[11] Kx. (Ernst Kux), "Brezhnev Courts Beijing," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Mar. 30, 1982.

[12] Ukraintsev, loc. cit., p. 22.

[13] See, e.g., Sun Fusheng, "Soviet Expansion in Southeast Asia," *Hongqi* (Beijing), Feb. 1, 1982, pp. 46–48, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), Feb. 18, 1982, pp. C/1–4; and Shu Gang, "The Characteristics of the Soviet Hegemonist Strategy of Expansion," *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 20, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 22, 1982, pp. C/1–3.



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French Communist Party (PCF).[14] This visit prepared the ground for a visit later that year by PCF head Georges Marchais, during which relations were resumed between the Chinese and French Communist parties.[15] This was the first time since the Sino-Soviet split that Beijing resumed party relations with a pro-Soviet Communist party. (The CCP had earlier resumed party relations with the Eurocommunist Italian and Spanish parties in part because of the fact that by 1982 the Soviet and Italian parties were increasingly involved in mutual polemics.[16])

Brezhnev renewed his overtures to Beijing on March 24, 1982, at Tashkent. He declared that Moscow did not deny that China was socialist, indicating that ideological differences were no longer an important issue. He again proposed border negotiations and confidence-building measures. But Brezhnev still insisted that these not be "to the detriment of third countries," i.e., he would make no concessions on Mongolia, Afghanistan, or Indochina.[17] The Chinese rejected his overtures a week later.[18]

[14] Manuel Lucbert from Beijing in *Le Monde* (Paris), Mar. 7–8, 11, 1982.

[15] Lucbert from Beijing in ibid., Oct. 19, 1982; Hu Yaobang in Xinhua in English, Oct. 17, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 18, 1982, p. C/1.

[16] Joan Barth Urban, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute in Western Europe," in Ellison, op. cit., pp. 295–324, and her more detailed treatment in "Moscow and the PCI in the 1970s: Kto Kovo?" *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Summer-Autumn 1980, pp. 99–167, and Kevin Devlin, "The Challenge of the 'New Internationalism,'" in Ellison, op. cit., pp. 146–71. For recent CPSU–PCI polemics, see the statement by the PCI Direzione in *L'Unità*, Dec. 30, 1981; various subsequent statements in ibid., translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-WEU*), Jan. 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, and 25, 1982; articles from *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Kommunist*, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Jan. 25 and Feb. 16, 1982; "Once Again Concerning the Positions of the PCI Leadership," *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1982; S. I. Vasil'tsov, A. A. Galkin, and T. T. Timofeyev, "Italian Problems," *Rabochiy klass i sovremennyy mir* (Moscow), No. 3, 1982. See also Pyshkov and Starostin, loc. cit., p. 81 (re normalization of relations between Beijing "and some Communist parties" serving the interests of US imperialism). I have profited from conversations in Rome in May 1982 and in Moscow in September 1982 and from many discussions with Professor Urban, who is now finishing a history of CPSU–PCI relations.

[17] Moscow television in Russian, Mar. 24, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 25, 1982, pp. R/1–7, at p. R/7; for analysis, see Kx. (Ernst Kux), loc. cit.

[18] Qian Qichen in Xinhua, Mar. 26, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 26, 1982, p. C/1.

*A Soviet military unit in Afghanistan.*

**—TASS from Sovfoto.**



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*Georges Marchais, Secretary General of the French Communist Party, is received in Beijing by Premier Zhao Ziyang during an October 1982 visit in which relations between the Chinese Communist Party and the pro-Moscow French party were returned to a friendly basis.*

**—Thierry Campion/Gamma-Liaison.**

However, the trend toward Sino-Soviet détente continued. In March, Chinese athletes again competed in Moscow.[19] In May, Kapitsa made another "private" visit to Beijing.[20] On May 20, *Pravda* published a highly authoritative article by the pseudonymous "I. Aleksandrov," which echoed at length Brezhnev's strong advocacy of Sino-Soviet rapprochement.[21] A group of Chinese economists visited the USSR.[22] In June, a group of Soviet athletes competed in Beijing.[23] Several new groups of Chinese athletes competed in Moscow. The volume of Sino-Soviet trade began to increase.

Although Soviet policy increasingly emphasized détente with China, two articles published in early 1982 by leading Soviet officials concerned with Sino-Soviet relations suggested some internal Soviet differences on this question. The articles were written, under pseudonyms, by Mikhail Kapitsa and by Oleg Rakhmanin. The former took a more positive view of Sino-Soviet relations than did the latter, and differentiated, as the latter did not, between Deng Xiaoping and his (unnamed) less anti-Soviet opponents within the CCP leadership.[24]

By this time, the long, hard Sino-American negotiations in Beijing over the Taiwan issue were reaching their climax. The result was an August 17 Sino-US communiqué. The United States declared that it looked forward to reduction and "resolution" of arms sales to Taiwan, but set no date for this. China indicated that it strove for a "peaceful" resolution of the Taiwan issue. However, Beijing and Washington thereafter interpreted the communiqué differently on those issues.[25]

That the Sino-US communiqué did not reverse, or even arrest, the gradual improvement in the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations was made clear by the August visit of Kapitsa's Chinese opposite number, Yu Hongliang, to Moscow, as a "guest of the Chinese ambassador."[26] This visit probably concluded preparations for resumption of general Sino-Soviet negotiations.

The advent of negotiations was further indicated by the September 4 speech of Hu Yaobang to the 12th CCP Congress, which set forth at the most authoritative level the new "independent" Chinese foreign policy line: concentration on the Third World, although not on Chinese leadership of it; and condemnation of both the USSR and the US as "hegemonic" powers.[27] The speech demanded deeds, not only words, from the USSR; at the same time, it strongly criticized US policy toward Taiwan. Beijing's tilt toward the United States, at least in terms of ideological formulae, seemed to have ended. (As we shall see, however, this is probably not the case.)

In a September 26 speech at Baku, Brezhnev again repeated his overtures to Beijing.[28] At this juncture, however, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang was telling Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki that "Soviet

[19] Xinhua from Moscow in English, Mar. 27, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 29, 1982, p. C/3.

[20] AFP from Beijing, May 20, 1982 and May 21, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 21, 1982, p. C/2.

[21] During 1982, *Kommunist* and other authoritative Soviet organs largely ceased publishing violent polemics against China. For an exception, see a strong attack on Chinese policy in Vietnam, in S. Afonin's review of a Soviet history of the Vietnam Communist Party, *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1982, p. 117.

[22] Radio Moscow in Mandarin to China, Mar. 5, 1982, *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 9, 1982, p. B/1.

[23] Xinhua in English, June 7, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, June 10, 1982, p. C/1.

[24] For Kapitsa, see Ukraintsev, loc. cit.; for Rakhmanin, see O. B. Borisov, "The Situation in the PRC and Some Tasks of Soviet Sinology," *Problemy dal'nego vostoka*, No. 2, 1982, pp. 3–14 (a complete and accurate translation was published in *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 3, 1982, pp. 3–14). Rakhmanin was presumably also the senior author of *Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya*, Moscow, Mysl', 1971, trans. as *Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945—1970*, Bloomington, IN, University of Indiana Press, 1975.

Previous articles by Kapitsa also gave detailed Soviet accounts of the progress of Sino-Soviet relations, but showed no signs of differentiating among the Chinese leaders. See M. Ukraintsev, "An Act that Runs Counter to the Interests of Peace and Socialism," *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 2, 1980, pp. 12–29, and "Entering the Fourth Decade (Notes on the PRC's Foreign Policy)," ibid., No. 4, 1981, pp. 46–66. Other articles by Rakhmanin were equally anti-Chinese. See O. Borisov, "The Chinese Revolutionary Forces' Mighty Bridgehead," ibid., No. 4, 1980, pp. 26–38, and "The 26th CPSU Congress and Some Problems of Studying the History of China," ibid., No. 4, 1981, pp. 3–11.

[25] For the text, see *Beijing Review*, Aug. 23, 1982, pp. 14–15, and *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), October 1982, p. 20. For the continuing Sino-US controversy on the communiqué's interpretation, see Robert A. Scalapino, "Uncertainties in Future Sino-US Relations," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Fall 1982, pp. 681–96, at p. 690.

[26] *The New York Times* from Beijing, Sept. 22, 1982.

[27] For the text, see *Beijing Review*, Sept. 13, 1982, pp. 11–40, at pp. 29–33. See also Huan Xiang, "Adhere to Independent Foreign Policy," ibid., Nov. 15, 1982, pp. 21–23.

[28] Radio Moscow in Russian, Sept. 26, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 27, 1982, pp. R/8–13.



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hegemonism has not changed."[29] In his last major speech, delivered to a group of high military officials on October 27, 1982, Brezhnev again repeated his desire for Sino-Soviet normalization. This time he spoke of nuanced changes in Chinese policy: although there had been no "radical changes," he said, "the new things which appear must not be ignored by us."[30]

Sino-Soviet negotiations began in October 1982 in Beijing at the level of deputy foreign ministers: Leonid Il'ichëv and Qian Qichen. The substantive differences remained the same as in 1979, except that the Chinese now also demanded Soviet evacuation of Afghanistan. Indications were that the Soviets were more likely to make some concessions on the border troop issue than on Indochina. Conversely, Beijing seemed more interested in Soviet concessions on the latter issue.[31]

In early November 1982, Brezhnev's funeral provided the opportunity for the highest public level of Sino-Soviet cordiality since 1963. The then Chinese foreign minister, Huang Hua, attended. He was ostentatiously welcomed by Andropov and thereafter by Andrey Gromyko; Soviet and Chinese press items about these meetings were almost friendly.[32] On November 16, the day that Huang met with Gromyko, a senior Soviet official—V. G. Afanas'yev, editor-in-chief of *Pravda* and a full member of the CPSU Central Committee—told Japanese journalists in Moscow that the USSR and China might agree to mutual troop reductions on their borders.[33] Huang—who before leaving for Moscow, had praised Brezhnev's contribution to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations—declared upon returning to Beijing that he was "optimistic" about future Sino-Soviet negotiations.[34] (That Huang was replaced as foreign minister shortly thereafter was not, in retrospect, a sign of change in Sino-Soviet relations.)

Yet in January 1983, *New Times,* a Moscow foreign propaganda organ, published a long criticism of the Chinese position on the border issue.[35] Moreover, Moscow continues to reject any discussion of "third country" issues: i.e., Soviet relations with Afghanistan, Mongolia, Kampuchea, or Vietnam. Since 1979, Moscow has consistently told Beijing that any Chinese demands concerning these countries should be discussed directly with them, since Moscow would not discuss them bilaterally with Beijing. In general, however, Andropov seems to be pursuing détente with China at least as much as Brezhnev was. Hence, the resumption in March of Sino-Soviet negotiations at the deputy foreign minister level.

*Huang Hua (then Chinese Foreign Minister) confers with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko in Moscow in November 1982 at the time of Leonid Brezhnev's funeral.*

**—TASS from Sovfoto.**

On the eve of this new round, the Chinese played host to US Secretary of State George Shultz. This visit did not produce any substantial change in Sino-US relations, although both sides—the US more so than China—initially tried to paint it in positive colors.[36] Thus, the Chinese now seem intent to conduct discussions simultaneously with both Moscow and Washington.

## Chinese Motives

This effort to maneuver between the two superpowers reflects both past traditions and present political calculation. Historically, China always tried to have an independent foreign policy, and the Chinese Empire did until its final decline. China has never trusted foreign barbarians. Only weakness led the Kuomintang to ally with the United States, and Mao to ally with Stalin. As

[29] Christopher Wren from Beijing in *The New York Times,* Sept. 28, 1982.

[30] Quoted from excerpts in ibid., Oct. 28, 1982.

[31] Conversations in Moscow and Beijing in August and September 1982.

[32] *Beijing Review,* Nov. 22, 1982, pp. 8–9; TASS in Russian, Nov. 16, 1982, and Xinhua in English from Moscow, Nov. 16, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV,* Nov. 17, 1982, p. B/1; Lawrence Sherwin, "Significant Developments in Sino-Soviet Relations Following Brezhnev's Death," *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 467/82, Nov. 22, 1982.

[33] Kyodo in English from Moscow, Nov. 16, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV,* Nov. 16, 1982, p. B/1; *The New York Times,* Nov. 18, 1982.

[34] Xinhua in English, Nov. 18, 1982, in *FBIS-SOV,* Nov. 18, 1982, p. B/1.

[35] Observer, "What Is the Purpose?" *New Times* (Moscow), No. 3, January 1983, pp. 12–14.

[36] *The New York Times* from Beijing, Feb. 3, 1982, and subsequent issues. At the end of the month, however, an interview by President Reagan on the Taiwan issue evoked a strongly critical Chinese response. For text of the interview, see *Human Events* (Washington, DC), Feb. 26, 1983, p. 19. For Chinese criticism, see "A Serious Retrogression," Xinhua in Chinese, Feb. 25, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 28, 1983, p. B/1; and a press briefing by Qi Huaiyuan, Director of the Information Department of the PRC foreign ministry, in Xinhua in Chinese, Mar. 1, 1983, in ibid., Mar. 1, 1983, p. A/1.



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China has become stronger, and especially as its nuclear deterrent has become more effective,[37] why should one be surprised that China is again moving toward a more independent foreign policy?

Post-Mao China has chosen to stress economic modernization, which—given the country's limited resources—generally precludes a rapid military buildup to counter constantly rising Soviet military power. Modernization does, however, require a reduction of this foreign threat. It also favors imports of Western and Japanese—and perhaps even of some Soviet—technology. From Beijing's perspective, therefore, Sino-Soviet relations should ideally be less tense, but Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations should remain sufficiently good so that technology transfer is not seriously impeded. Maoist concentration on ideology, especially vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, was replaced by Chinese pragmatism at home and Realpolitik abroad. Thus, previous Chinese concern with fighting Moscow for influence in the Communist world was subordinated to China's interest in the capitalist sphere and the Third World.[38]

Contributing to this shift in Chinese perceptions has been Soviet preoccupation with new problems, notably Afghanistan, Poland, and growing economic difficulties. The US, by contrast, is perceived as growing stronger militarily. Thus, China can feel somewhat less insecure in negotiating with the Soviet Union. At the same time, the great Soviet military buildup on the Chinese frontier, and Soviet support for (and bases in) Vietnam, have probably convinced Beijing that it cannot intimidate Moscow, no matter how close the Sino-US relationship may be. Sino-Soviet negotiations might, however, lower Soviet troop deployment in the Far East, improving Chinese security, and might even cause problems between Moscow and Hanoi, again to Beijing's advantage.

As to the United States, the Chinese—and probably Deng's opponents even more than he—have been greatly irritated by the Reagan administration's policy toward China. Specific irritants included: the pro-Taiwan speeches of Reagan and his associates in the 1980 presidential campaign; the initial post-inauguration talk, inside and outside the administration, about selling F-16's to Taiwan (Reagan's eventual concession on this issue probably only encouraged the Chinese to press further); the strong ideological anticommunism of Reagan and many of his associates; the Chinese convic-

[37] *The Military Balance, 1982-1983,* London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982, pp. 80–81.

[38] For analyses of the most recent Sino-Soviet developments, see Scalapino, loc. cit.; Allen S. Whiting, "Sino-American Relations: The Decade Ahead," *Orbis,* Fall 1982, pp. 697–720; and Donald S. Zagoria, "Gauging the Sino-Soviet Thaw," *The New Leader* (New York, NY), Nov. 29, 1982, pp. 3–5.



*A convoy of Soviet armor at rest along the road from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk in June 1969.*

—Taieb/Gamma-Liaison.



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tion that Reagan was limiting technology transfer to China; and the unsettled Sino-US controversy on Chinese textile exports to the United States. Still another looming concern, in view of the great sensitivity of the Chinese Communist elite about Taiwan, is the rapid rise to power on that island of native Taiwanese who have less interest in "reunification" than does the Kuomintang.[39] All this, added to the other factors described above, exacerbated Sino-US relations, and therefore made at least atmospheric improvement in Sino-Soviet relations more attractive to Beijing. Moreover, the very fact that Reagan was so much more anti-Soviet than his predecessors seemed to diminish the chances of a Soviet-American rapprochement, and therefore Beijing's risk in improving relations with Moscow. Finally, the Chinese Communist elite has been concerned about the recent impact of Western "bourgeois liberalism" and materialism in China—especially among its youth—and determined to contain and reverse these tendencies. This has contributed to greater domestic repression and greater concern about getting too close to the US.[40]

More generally, why, after all, should China indefinitely want to remain so closely tied to the United States that its freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was minimal? Why should the United States be the only one of the three that has good, or at least adequate, relations with the other two? Why should it be in China's interest to be the object, not the subject, of triangular maneuvering? Given the fact that the Reagan administration had worsened US relations with both Moscow and Beijing, why should China not have better relations with Moscow than does the US? Bismarck knew how to play off Russia against Austria-Hungary; his disciple Kissinger balanced Moscow and Beijing; why should Deng (and Andropov) not play the power triangle as well?

## Soviet Calculations

Andropov's Chinese policy is essentially the same as Brezhnev's: partial Sino-Soviet rapprochement without any surrender of Soviet gains or chances of further advantage. However, Soviet policy toward China has undergone a subtle evolution over the last decade or so. In 1964, Brezhnev probably did not expect that China would respond to his general foreign policy line: "united action to aid Vietnam." In fact, this policy divided rather than united the Soviet Union and China.[41] Brezhnev's posture of rapprochement toward China was thus initially more tactical than genuine. More recently, Moscow's China overtures have seemed somewhat more genuine. The massive Soviet Far Eastern military buildup has given Moscow much greater confidence in dealing with Beijing. Soviet ICBM and SS-20 deployment has more than compensated for the Chinese nuclear buildup.[42] Brezhnev also came to give lower priority to his intermittent, and always unsuccessful, attempts to mobilize the "international Communist movement" against the Chinese. He may have realized (although the late Mikhail Suslov probably did not) that these attempts pushed China further away, and also played into the hands of other Communist parties—notably the Italian—who used them to get more autonomy from Moscow.

Andropov has even stronger Realpolitik reasons for pushing a partial Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Because of the unfavorable military consequences for the Soviet Union of the US rearmament program and the US-Japanese leap forward in the microelectronic revolution, Moscow needs now more than ever to detach China as much as it can from the United States. Moscow is also motivated by increasing (and exaggerated) fears about the rising industrial and anticipated military power of Japan,[43] which give greater urgency to securing the Sea of Okhotsk bastion for Soviet nuclear SLBM deployment. In this connection, the USSR is reportedly increasing its Far Eastern military deployment against Japan, including use of bases in Vietnam that could threaten Japanese sea routes.[44]

The bases at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay could also permit Moscow to obstruct US naval and air communications from the Philippines through the Indian Ocean to Diego Garcia and the Persian Gulf, and contribute to Soviet encirclement of China from the south. Moscow

[39] Robert A. Scalapino, "China and Northeast Asia," in Richard H. Solomon, Ed., *The China Factor: Sino-American Relations and the Global Scene*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., for the American Assembly, Columbia University, and the Council on Foreign Relations, 1981, pp. 207–08.

[40] Conversations in Beijing, August 1982.

[41] William E. Griffith, *Sino-Soviet Relations 1964–1965*, Cambridge, MA, The M.I.T. Press, 1967, pp. 70–76, 106–09.

[42] Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Far East Buildup and Soviet Risk-Taking Against China*, Santa Monica, CA, The Rand Corporation, R-2943-AF, August 1982; and Paul F. Langer, "Soviet Military Power in Asia," in Zagoria, *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, pp. 255–82.

[43] For an early and authoritative indication, see I. Ivkov, "Japanese Militarism Rears Its Head," *Far Eastern Affairs*, No. 4, 1978, pp. 43–55. Ivkov is identified as a pseudonym for I. I. Kovalenko, Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, in John J. Stephan's "Asia in the Soviet Conception," in Zagoria, *Soviet Policy in East Asia*, pp. 29–56, at p. 31. For a later, but still relatively moderate Soviet attack (written, however, before Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Washington, and before the latest US-South Korean military maneuvers), see I. Latychëv, "Soviet-Japanese Relations at the Current Stage," in *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1983, pp. 27–36, esp. p. 31.

[44] Langer, loc. cit.; Alain Jacob, "Chinese/Soviet Relations: Accommodation in Key Issues," *Le Monde*, Nov. 19, 1982, trans. in *The Guardian Weekly* (London), Nov. 28, 1982. See also a Washington-datelined analysis in *The New York Times*, March 13, 1983.



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would presumably like to lower Sino-Vietnamese tension to safeguard the regional and global gains it has scored in Vietnam.

Finally, and perhaps most important for Sino-Soviet rapprochement, by the mid-1970's, the USSR felt itself the target of a Chinese attempt to encircle it, in conjunction with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Moscow has every incentive to break out of this "encirclement": by trying to limit the US military buildup; by fostering renewed Soviet-US détente; by intimidating Japan; by attempting to strain US-West European relations; and by pursuing détente with China.[45]

## Limits on Sino-Soviet Rapprochement

The improvement of Sino-Soviet relations has so far remained limited to peripheral matters: trade, scientific and cultural exchange, and so on. If relations improve further, progress is more likely on bilateral than on multilateral issues—for example, on mutual troop reductions, rather than on the more contentious issues of Mongolia, Afghanistan, and especially Vietnam. But in early 1983 no rapid substantive progress seemed in the cards.

Despite Beijing's current classification of both Moscow and Washington as "hegemonic," the Soviet Union is, and will remain, a greater potential military threat, and a far less attractive source of technology, than either the United States or Japan. China is not likely to return to imitation of the Soviet economic model. Moreover, the recent increase in official US advocacy of arms control may revive Chinese fears of Soviet-US collusion at Beijing's expense. The likely Soviet intractability on Afghanistan and Vietnam, and the slow pace, at best, of any Sino-Soviet troop reductions (think of the Soviet-US talks on conventional force reduction in Europe) will probably keep alive Beijing's fear of Soviet encirclement. Unpredictable but likely Third World instability, from which Moscow will not resist the temptation to profit, will continue to fuel Chinese suspicions. Compared to all these factors, changes in the Chinese leadership should be less important, and unlikely to shift China's Soviet policy decisively.

[45] See William G. Hyland, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Search for New Security Strategies," *Strategic Review* (Washington, DC), Fall 1979, pp. 51–62.

*Chinese refugees from Vietnam photographed in July 1979 in the Chinese province of Guangxi.*

—Eastfoto.



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Major limits on Soviet willingness to compromise will also probably remain. First, the Soviets are determined to protect their gains in "third countries"—above all Vietnam and Kampuchea. Why should Moscow abandon its gains there when it does not need to? Second, Moscow will keep demanding that China abandon its position on the "disputed territories," but Beijing is unlikely to do so soon. Moscow will therefore continue to fear long-term Chinese territorial irredentism. Third, the Soviets will be all the less likely to cut back their Far Eastern military deployments, because of their rising fear of Japan.[46] Finally, the historic Russian fear of the "eastern hordes," so successfully cultivated by Moscow for the past two decades, will remain an obstacle to better Sino-Soviet relations.

There are also international limits on a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Indochina and Afghanistan also involve Soviet-US relations. Because Soviet gains in these two areas are at least as important for Moscow vis-à-vis the United States as vis-à-vis China, the USSR is unlikely to make concessions about them without some counter-concessions—not only from Beijing but also from Washington. This is not soon likely to occur.

Unlike Afghanistan and Mongolia, Vietnam (and therefore Laos and Kampuchea) are not completely under Soviet influence. Kampuchea has historically wanted to be independent as well, but Vietnam has wished to dominate it and has largely achieved that goal by conquest. Vietnam, in turn, has historically wanted to be independent of China, and China has historically wanted to dominate it. These historical factors, along with anti-US motives and a need for Soviet arms and economic aid, drove Vietnam after 1968 first to tilt toward Moscow and then to ally with it. China refuses to accept this. But Moscow's military assets in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay are of such global importance that Moscow will not soon, if ever, sell Vietnam out to China. Soviet-Vietnamese relations, like Soviet-Cuban ones, will continue to harbor hidden irritants, but the ambitions and fears of the partners condemn them to each other. China is likely to continue harassing Vietnam (primarily by providing aid to the Kampuchean guerrillas) and trying to use its relations with Moscow to worsen Soviet-Vietnamese relations. In this latter objective, however, China had not succeeded as of early 1983.[47]

North Korea, unlike Vietnam, should not be a major bone of contention between Moscow and Beijing. The North Korean interest is to remain on good terms with both, in order to increase the chances of aid against a challenge by South Korea or the US.[48] For the most part, Kim Il-song has achieved this objective, though his relations with China are somewhat better than relations with the USSR.[49] In this regard, two visits by Soviet officials to Seoul for regional conferences in late 1982 caused grave concern in Pyongyang.[50] Thus, while North Korea has sometimes tried to play the two Communist giants against each other, on the whole it should welcome signs of Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

Finally, in early 1983, China began officially to express concern (as did Japan) that any agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European theater might mean that Soviet SS-20's would be "merely transferred to another area" (i.e., the Far East), which would "bring about a new factor harmful to world peace and security" (i.e., to China). The PRC has not, at least as yet, made this another issue in Sino-Soviet (or Sino-American) negotiations, but, like Toyko, Beijing was clearly, and publicly, concerned about it.[51]

## Conclusion

At a minimum, the great power Far Eastern triangle—or rather quadrilateral, for Japan is fast becoming a participant—is now more active. The US, the USSR, and now China all seem to be maneuvering against each other. Only Japan remains firmly allied

[46] Japan's present anti-Soviet attitude arises largely from Moscow's refusal to return the four southern Kurile islands, while increasing Soviet fortifications there—a situation unlikely to change.

[47] Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics,* Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press for the Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1980; David W. P. Eliott, Ed., *The Third Indochina Conflict,* Boulder, CO, Westview, 1981; Douglas Pike, "The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Dispute on Southeast Asia," in Ellison, op. cit., pp. 185–205; Donald S. Zagoria and Sheldon W. Simon, "Soviet Policy in Southeast Asia," in Zagoria, *Soviet Policy in East Asia,* pp. 153–74.

During the last two years, there has been some controversy about irritants in Soviet-Vietnamese relations, centering on whether Penn Sovan, a high official of the Heng Samrin government in Phnom Penh, was removed by Hanoi for being pro-Soviet. My own conclusion is that there are irritants between Moscow and Hanoi, centering on Soviet criticism of Vietnamese use of Soviet aid; resentment in Hanoi over Soviet methods and fear that Moscow might sacrifice Hanoi to Beijing; and irritation in Phnom Penh about Vietnamese control; but that Hanoi has no real alternative to Moscow, and Phnom Penh has no real alternative to Hanoi.

I have benefited from many conversations on this subject in Southeast Asia and Australia in July and August of 1982, especially with Timothy Carney in Bangkok and Nayan Chanda and Milton Osborne in Canberra. See also Carney's article on Cambodia in the January 1982 issue of *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), and Chanda's articles in the *Far Eastern Economic Review.*

[48] See Paek Han Gi, "Sino-Soviet Thaw and International Relations," in the pro-Pyongyang publication *The People's Korea* (Tokyo), Dec. 18, 1982.

[49] For signs of warm North Korean–Chinese relations, see the Pyongyang coverage of Kim Il-song's visit to Beijing, *Nodong Sinmun,* Sept. 15, 16, 22, and 26, 1982.

[50] "Why Visit South Korea? Strange Behavior Beyond Comprehension," *The People's Korea,* Oct. 23, 1982.

[51] Li Luye, head of the PRC delegation to the UN Disarmament Committee in Geneva, Xinhua in English, Feb. 8, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 9, 1983, p. A/1. For Japanese opposition, see Ryukichi Imai, head of the Japanese delegation to the same committee, in Kyodo in English, Feb. 10, 1983, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, DC), Feb. 10, 1983, p. C/1; and a letter from the Japanese Democratic Socialist Party to the CPSU CC in ibid., Feb. 11, 1983, p. C/1.



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with the United States, on good terms with China, and on increasingly bad terms with the Soviet Union. The Chinese and Soviet positions have improved, for each has more maneuverability in relation to the other and to the United States. The US position has worsened, for it has less. Whether Washington will regain some of its lost flexibility is not the least of the open issues in Sino-Soviet relations.

Moscow and Beijing do seem to have entered a different phase in their relationship. No substantive issues have been solved, yet both powers see it as in their interest to lower the temperature of their conflict, for the reasons presented above. Such attempts have been often made in the past, usually by the Soviet Union. China has only rarely reciprocated. These attempts at rapprochement have always failed, because neither side has been willing to move toward substantive compromises and because external events—primarily Soviet exploitation of such opportunities as Indochina and Afghanistan—have repoisoned the atmosphere. Yet, because Sino-Soviet relations are now based predominantly on Realpolitik with the negative dynamic of ideological polemics pushed to the background, the current atmospheric rapprochement may last for some time. That it will lead to major substantive compromises, however, remains doubtful.[52]

[52] Chinese official statements on the eve of the current round of Sino-Soviet negotiations support this assessment. For example, on Feb. 19, 1983, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang was reported to have told a visiting Japanese official that "Sino-Soviet relations will never again be based on the unconditional alliance of the 1950's," and that "China's policy toward the Soviet Union was on one hand based on opposition to all hegemony and on the other on the pursuit of normalisation of relations"; and on Feb. 21, Chinese CP General Secretary Hu Yaobang was reported to have told this Japanese official that "the situation did not warrant particular optimism"; see AFP (Hong Kong) in English, Feb. 19, 1983, and Kyodo (Tokyo) in English, Feb. 21, 1983, both in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 22, 1983, p. C/1. The best (and in some respects prophetic) detailed review of the prospects and problems of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement remains, in my view, Lieberthal, op. cit., pp. 145–87.



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# Leadership in China: Rivalry, Reform, and Renewal

**By Richard D. Nethercut**

The 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held on September 1–11, 1982, marks a significant milestone in the political struggle for power among Chinese elites and provides a unique opportunity to examine the key relationships and incidents that have figured prominently in the evolution of the current leadership. The general outline of the struggle for power in China since Mao's death on September 9, 1976, is well known: the confirmation of Hua Guofeng as Mao's successor as party chairman; the denunciation and subsequent elimination of the "gang of four"; the second resurrection of Deng Xiaoping; the demotion and subsequent removal of Hua; and the ascendancy of Deng and his supporters, especially Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Somewhat less known, however, is the political process by which this contest for power took place and how the three skeins of rivalry, reform, and retirement/replacement were intertwined in that process.

This essay focuses on the events that began to unfold at the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977 and led to Deng's consolidation of control in September 1982. During this period, in terms of real power, the triumvirate of Hua, Ye Jianying, and Deng has been replaced by the trio of Hu, Deng, and Zhao, loosely representing, or symbolizing, the party, military, and government, respectively. What follows is an attempt to sketch the important features of this transition—the setting, the players, the strategies—and to review the current status of Chinese leaders. This presentation concentrates on leadership developments, giving less attention to policies and public reaction and attitudes, except as they affected the course of the struggle for control.[1]

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## The Setting for Struggle

The circumstances and deliberations that shape CCP policy and determine the power standing of its leadership are closely held secrets. Enough can be gleaned, however, from Chinese media, from official leaks and other disclosures, and from personnel and policy decisions themselves to get a sense of the atmosphere and tactics at the apex of the Chinese political pyramid. Although factionalism and *guanxi* (personal connections) tend to be pejorative terms in China, used to discredit the opposition, they remain essential facts of Chinese political life. Despite denials by Chinese officials, it is clear that factional ties, personal grudges, and *guanxi* have figured importantly in the removal and replacement of personnel in China's leadership struggle. In fact, a principal purpose of Chinese factions, concludes Lucian Pye in his seminal study, is to provide security for the individual in a political environment where personal connections and loyalty count for more than professional qualifications and performance.[2]

While it is evident that factions play an important role in Chinese politics, it is necessary to qualify any iden-

[1] For a comprehensive review of ideology and policies during the past decade, see Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972–82," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1982, pp. 1–19.

[2] Lucian W. Pye, *The Dynamics of Chinese Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, 1981, chs. 1 and 11.



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

*The Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party elected at the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982, from left to right: Li Xiannian, Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and Chen Yun.*

—Eastfoto.

tification of the major factions or constellations of party leaders. Functional responsibilities may conflict with personal loyalties, and specific issues may produce realignments or subgroups with contending points of view. Nonetheless, it is useful for the purposes of this analysis to identify the three main contending forces within the CCP leadership that have, or have had, a significant power base within the Chinese polity: the neo-Maoists, headed by Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing, but now in decline; the Old Guard, led by Ye Jianying and Li Xiannian, and still a formidable force; and the pragmatist/reformers, headed by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang.

The neo-Maoists, who had acquired power during the Cultural Revolution and claimed legitimacy under Mao's Delphic designation of Hua Guofeng as his successor, were particularly strong in the propaganda and public-security domains.[3] Although they had worked together, however uneasily, with the more radical Maoists during the Cultural Revolution, members of the Hua/Wang coalition helped purge these radical extremists after Mao's death and tried to distance themselves ideologically by labeling that group "ultrarightists." The potential grass-roots support for the neo-Maoists was substantial, since it can be presumed that most of the approximately 18 million persons who joined the CCP during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) identified with the Hua/Wang forces. Because of its members' propensity to cite whatever Mao had instructed or written as justification for their policies, opponents labeled this contingent the "whatever" faction.[4]

Members of the Old Guard faction, on the other hand, had gained prominence in the formative years of the consolidation of CCP control and managed to hold on to power, though sometimes tenuously, during the Cultural Revolution. This group of survivors—ex-marshal Ye Jianying is the senior military figure—sided with Mao, Defense Minister Lin Biao, and Premier Zhou Enlai and implemented Mao's call for the People's Liberation

[3] Mao's words to Hua reportedly were: "With you in charge I am at ease." See ibid., pp. 23 and 217. Both Hua and Wang Dongxing had extensive public-security connections—Hua as minister of public security (before he replaced Zhou Enlai as premier), and Wang, who was Mao's long-time bodyguard, as head of the powerful Unit 8341, an elite public-security contingent stationed in Beijing which protected the leadership. For Wang's role as head of Unit 8341, see Parris H. Chang, "The Rise of Wang Tung-hsing: Head of China's Security Apparatus," *China Quarterly* (London), March 1978, pp. 122–37.

[4] The resolution of the 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee specifically charged Hua with promoting the erroneous "two whatevers" policy; see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-CHI*), July 1, 1981, p. K/22.



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Army (PLA) to "support the left," i.e., the "revolutionary masses," in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. The Old Guard coalition, however, is not as cohesive as either of the other two factions, except on military matters. There are internal divisions within the group, which are based in part on field army affiliations forged during the Civil War. Although Old Guard supporters have had to weather considerable adversity, most notably Lin Biao's defection in 1971 (which implicated a few veteran commanders and raised questions about PLA loyalty), they have proved adept at maintaining their influence and positions. Members of the coalition were prominent in the removal of the "gang of four" in September 1976 (in cooperation with the Hua/Wang forces), and most of them probably tried to remain neutral in the second ouster of Deng and the campaign against him in the spring of 1976. With the declining fortunes of Hua's coalition, this group has emerged as the principal opposition to the less ideological, though more focused, Deng/Hu coalition.

The pragmatist/reform, or restoration, faction, which consists primarily of veteran party administrators who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution, has steadily increased its prominence through the step-by-step "reversal of verdicts" and reinstatement of its members to key party and government posts. The hallmark of the Deng/Hu coalition has been its emphasis on organizational, rather than ideological, orthodoxy, namely, the restoration of the primacy of the party. Although authoritarian in outlook, these reformers and innovators have been flexible on policy and tactics and adept at compromise in their rise to power. By de-emphasizing ideology and class struggle and emphasizing production, efficiency, and a return to normalcy, this coalition (which encompasses some contrasting viewpoints, especially on economic policy) has attracted support from many diverse sectors of the party and the general population, including peasants, technocrats, and intellectuals. The group has encountered some resistance, of course, and there have been some defections. Nonetheless, the Deng/Hu coalition is clearly dominant at this time.

While the contest for power has been far more complex than is suggested by this categorization, there does seem to have been a triangular configuration to leadership rivalries, with Deng's party reform group seeking not only to topple Hua and his supporters but also to rein in the military establishment and diminish the political power of the Old Guard. There has apparently been much tactical maneuvering. Under the banner of collective leadership and consensus, the leaders of the various coalitions have taken advantage of slogans, labels, and media campaigns to stake out platforms of contending political groups and to identify or attract supporters. Thus, policy issues, while important, have been modified by considerations of power.

## Rivalry

The shift in power among the contending groups occurred incrementally at major party conclaves. At the 11th party congress in August 1977, Hua was acknowledged as the supreme leader of China. As party chairman, head of the party's Military Commission (and hence commander in chief), and premier, Hua was successor to both Mao and Zhou. His position at the head of the CCP seemed secure: he presided over a Politburo Standing Committee—the top party council composed of Hua, Ye, Deng, Li, and Wang—that had unanimously endorsed his candidacy, and he clearly ranked "first among equals" in the de facto triumvirate leadership that included Ye and Deng.

Hua's dominance was short-lived, however. Although hailed by Ye as the leader who would guide China into the 21st century and acknowledged by Deng as the head of the party (reportedly a condition for Deng's reinstatement), Hua was outmaneuvered and eventually overpowered by the more experienced and charismatic Deng.[5] In August 1977, Deng was the sole representative of his group on the Politburo Standing Committee; by February 1980 he had been joined there by three others: Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang.

Deng skillfully orchestrated his coalition's ascent to power, employing a four-pronged strategy to dislodge Hua and decimate the strength of his coalition. First, Deng's forces indirectly, but publicly, challenged the legitimacy of Hua's succession and his concurrent holding of multiple posts by publishing a series of allegorical and theoretical articles critical of personality cults, the personal designation of successors, and precipitate accessions to power (the so-called helicopter promotions).[6] Second, Deng sought to eliminate Hua's allies from key posts and replace them with his own supporters, or, if necessary, with temporary compromise choices.[7] Third, Deng challenged Hua on policy programs and slogans, making use of pro-Deng press

[5] For fuller accounts, see Dorothy Grouse Fontana, "The Fall of Hua Guofeng," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), March 1982, pp. 237–60; and Pye, op. cit., pp. 244–57.

[6] See Pye, op. cit., pp. 176–77, 215–20, 253–54.

[7] At the Politburo level, the most telling blow came at the 5th plenum of the Central Committee in February 1980 when four of Deng's opponents, including Wang Dongxing, were removed. All four, including a veteran PLA commander, had been involved in the suppression of the pro-Deng demonstration in Tiananmen Square in April 1976 or the subsequent party campaign against him. See June Teufel Dreyer, "Limits of the Permissible in China," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1980, pp. 51–52.



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organs to launch slogan campaigns that undercut Hua's position and subsequently gained the endorsement of the party leadership.[8] Finally, despite Hua's efforts to avoid association with the discredited Cultural Revolution extremists and to close off the campaign against them, this issue was kept alive by the Deng/Hu forces.[9]

All these moves prepared the way for a frontal attack on Hua, an attack that included the removal of his multiple hats of authority, the downgrading by steps of his party rank, and the administering of public party criticism. At the National People's Congress (NPC) in September 1980, Hua resigned as premier in favor of Zhao Ziyang, citing as his reason the need to abide by the principle of collective leadership. Two months later, he was obliged to step down as party chairman and chairman of the party's Military Commission, although this action was not formalized, or at least not announced, until the 6th plenum of the 11th Central Committee in June 1981. Desite losing these two hats, Hua remained on the Politburo Standing Committee, albeit as the last-ranked member. However, the plenum, in its lengthy "Resolution" evaluating Mao, also evaluated Hua's performance, finding more to criticize than to praise. Hua was charged with obstructing the reinstatement of veteran cadres, fostering a cult of personality, propagating erroneous policy lines and slogans, and opposing correct ones.[10] The Resolution concluded: "Obviously, under his leadership it is impossible to correct

[8] For example, *Guangming Ribao* (Beijing), May 11, 1978, published a special commentator article on "Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth," a Dengist thesis that was subsequently endorsed by the 3rd plenum in December 1978. Also, *Anhui Ribao* (Hefei), Feb. 14, 1980, published an article on criticism and self-criticism that appeared just prior to the 5th plenum, at which Deng's rivals were criticized and removed. Toward the end of the plenum, the article was carried prominently in the national press in *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), Feb. 27, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 28, 1980, pp. L/1–3. An ally of Deng's, Wan Li, was CCP first secretary of Anhui at the time.

[9] The highly publicized show trials in the winter of 1980–81 served this purpose admirably. Not only were the defendants in the dock, but so were the Cultural Revolution and the "leftist" policies associated with it and subsequently with Hua. For an account of these trials and the link to Hua, see Pye, op. cit., pp. 231–33 and 244–45; and Fontana, loc. cit., p. 251.

[10] See the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," *Beijing Review*, July 6, 1981, p. 26; also in *FBIS-CHI*, July 1, 1981, p. K/22.



*Hua Guofeng, Mao's heir designate, reads a funeral oration honoring the late Chairman; to the left is Ye Jianying; to the right three members of the "gang of four" (soon to be disgraced and publicly tried)—Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Mao's widow, Jiang Qing.*

**—Gamma-Liaison.**



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'left' errors [and] restore the Party's fine traditions."[11] In traditional Chinese terms, the party leadership was publicly withdrawing its trust in Hua (a modern-day revocation of the Mandate of Heaven) and signaling his supporters to drop their allegiance to him.

At the 12th party congress in September 1982, the Deng/Hu coalition applied the finishing touches. Hua was dropped from the Politburo and relegated to the Central Committee. Most of his presumed supporters were removed from the Politburo and Central Committee, although a few, such as Wang Donxing, were retained as low-ranking CC alternates.[12] And, in potentially the most fundamental step of all, party General Secretary Hu, in his report to the congress, announced a three-year party rectification campaign to begin in the second half of 1983 and culminate in the re-registration of all party members (nearly 40 million), with the intent of removing those not up to standard:

*To achieve a fundamental turn for the better in the style of our Party, the Central Committee has decided on an overall rectification of Party style and consolidation of Party organizations. . . . The key link in accomplishing this work must be thoroughgoing ideological education throughout the Party. . . . In the final stage, there will be a re-registration of all Party members and, in strict accordance with the provisions of the new Party Constitution, those who still fail to meet the requirements for membership after education shall be expelled from the Party or asked to withdraw from it.*[13]

The prospects for Hua and the neo-Maoists to retain a power base within the party at the conclusion of this campaign are extremely remote.

The contest for power between Deng's group and the Old Guard has been less clear-cut. Although the bottom line in this competition—which tends to occur in the military sector where pro-Mao conservatives are well entrenched—is still power and position, the tactics and strategies employed by both sides are less coercive and confrontational than those evident in the struggle against the neo-Maoists. There are several reasons for this. The contending groups share associations and relationships that go back many years, and they profess respect for one another; they also have a common concern that leadership rivalries not affect the stability, unity, or security of the PRC. Moreover, both groups recognize the power of the gun and express concern for the continued loyalty and responsiveness to authority of the PLA.[14]

Deng Xiaoping is no stranger to the PLA. He served as PLA chief of staff from 1975 to 1976 and again from 1977 to 1980, as well as vice-chairman of the party's Military Commission (MC) during these same periods. As a result, he has forged personal and organizational ties within the military, and his advocacy of certain defense policies (e.g., military modernization) has given him a substantial base of support within the PLA.[15] With his formal appointment in June 1981 as MC chairman, Deng became de facto commander in chief of China's armed forces—a new status that was symbolized by his donning uniform to review troops at large-scale military exercises in October. And since his appointment, Chinese media, including the PLA press, have been replete with praise for the new military leader.

Nevertheless, behind the scenes there has been obvious resistance to Deng's policies from more traditional and orthodox elements in the PLA, usually Mao loyalists, and this has included the very leaders who supported Deng in his second political comeback in 1977. The grounds for disagreement and controversy are obvious when one examines what seems to comprise Deng's agenda for the PLA: reassertion of firm party and government control over the military forces; restriction of the PLA to an essentially military role; professionalization of military ranks, thereby eliminating the over-aged, unskilled, and unqualified; and modernization of national defense but only as a function of the modernization of the economy as a whole.[16]

Deng's critics have objected to many of his military policies: the predominance of pragmatism over ideology to the detriment of troop discipline and morale; the diminished role and prestige of the PLA, reflected in the trial of veteran PLA cadres and the criticisms of the PLA's role during the Cultural Revolution; and the attempts to implement personnel reforms in the PLA—especially the retirement of over-age cadres—and to decrease revenues allocated to the PLA. Critics have also, apparently, objected to Deng's handling of related foreign policy and security issues such as the tilt toward the United States and the conduct of Sino-Soviet relations.[17]

A hallmark of the relationship between the two coali-

[11] Ibid.

[12] According to the PRC-owned *Ta Kung Pao* (Hong Kong), the retention of Wang and others who had links with the "ultraleftists" was in the party's tradition of having some "different viewpoints" in its leadership. See *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 16, 1982, pp. W/1–2.

[13] Hu Yaobang, Report to the 12th National CCP Congress, Sept. 1, 1982, in *Beijing Review*, Sept. 13, 1982, p. 38.

[14] For a fuller account, see Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military Relations in the PRC," *Asian Survey*, August 1982, p. 697.

[15] During his second ouster from power (1976–77), Deng was protected and supported by several key military figures, most notably Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing, considered leaders of a "Southern" military faction. See Fontana, op. cit., pp. 241–42.

[16] Nethercut, loc. cit., pp. 692–93.

[17] Ibid., pp. 695–700.



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tions has been the capacity of the pragmatist faction to shift ground–to make policy concessions or at least temporize—when it needed the support of its military critics or faced changing circumstances. For example, when Hua was stripped of key posts at the party work conferences in late 1980, the Deng/Hu forces must have had the tacit concurrence of the Old Guard, formerly Hua's staunch allies.[18] Also at the same work conferences, Deng signaled a harder, more ideological line in national policy, a change in course that met some of the military critics' grievances and even accorded the PLA a role as national model for the new morality (known as "socialist spiritual civilization").[19] Another example of a policy concession occurred in the spring of 1981 in connection with the Bai Hua incident, which pitted the PLA General Political Department (GPD) against critics of Mao.[20] Although the GPD's campaign against a play bitterly critical of Mao and the Cultural Revolution appeared to represent a challenge to Deng and Hu's policy toward intellectuals and an embarrassing setback for them, the two leaders endorsed the GPD's criticism and took a tough line against "bourgeois liberalization" in literature and art.

Another particularly significant characteristic of the competition between the Deng/Hu coalition and the Old Guard has been the combination of compromise and courtesy on both sides. At the 6th plenum in June 1981, for example, the Central Committee adopted a lengthy resolution containing inter alia the definitive evaluation of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution.[21] The resolution deftly handled the contentious issue of PLA involvement in the Cultural Revolution, noting that while it had had some "negative consequences," some PLA actions had been "absolutely necessary."[22] To add a note of grace to the occasion, Ye sent a letter to the plenum expressing agreement with the views in the resolution and with the proposed personnel changes made by the Central Committee.[23] He also asked to be listed after Deng in the ranking of party vice-chairmen, but Deng gave his "opinion" that the order should remain unchanged.[24]

## Reform

Reforms in policy, organization, and work style have had a significant impact on the leadership struggle in the PRC. During the five-year tenure of the 11th Central Committee (1977–82), Deng and his associates were able to orchestrate numerous rule changes and reforms by successfully packaging policy programs that were generally portrayed as a reversion to previous party practice and in keeping with Mao Zedong Thought. While the stated goal of these reforms and changes was to achieve "stability and unity" and to restore party discipline and standards, these measures clearly benefited Deng and his supporters in their bid to regain political power.

Even though Deng championed collective leadership and attacked the personality cult in his campaign against Hua, it was Deng's personal stature, charisma, and policy platform—not Hua's performance—that evoked the image of the confident, competent, all-powerful leader. The effectiveness with which Deng's veteran cadre group used slogans and presented policies spurred its political comeback. Repeal (of Cultural Revolution policies), reform, and restoration (of pre-1966 forms, practices, and officials) became the three hallmarks of Deng's campaign. At the 3rd plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978, Deng's pragmatic policy approach (with a concomitant de-emphasis on ideology) prevailed, to be applied subsequently both at home, especially in the countryside, and abroad. Normalization of relations with the United States and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan in the summer of 1978 were personal triumphs for Deng and no doubt bolstered his prestige and power.

Perhaps even more important to Deng's ascendancy, however, were his major speeches at party gatherings following the 3rd plenum. In these speeches, which were studied throughout China by party elites, Deng set

[18] The reported absence of Ye from some or all of the work conferences, and a self-criticism at the December session by Li Xiannian when he was in charge of economic work under Hua (see *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 2, 1981, p. U/15), may help explain the lack of support for Hua in his hour of need, despite the ringing endorsement of his leadership a few years earlier by Old Guard stalwarts. For a fuller account, see Pye, op. cit., pp. 255–56.

[19] Deng Xiaoping, speech of December 25, 1980, at CCP Central Work Conference, in *Issues and Studies* (Taipei, Taiwan), July 1981, pp. 101–19. Ironically, it was apparently Hua who first issued a call for "socialist spiritual civilization" in his April 1980 speech. See Nethercut, loc. cit., p. 697.

[20] In April 1981, the PLA press organ, *Jiefangjun Bao* (Beijing), criticized a film called "Bitter Love" (also known as "Unrequited Love") by Bai Hua, a prominent writer who works for a PLA unit in the Wuhan Military Region. Initially, the PLA charges received little support elsewhere in the national or provincial press, and Bai Hua was awarded a national prize in June. However, after the 6th plenum, the campaign was revived, this time with broad party and press support. Bai Hua subseqently apologized for his mistakes.

[21] See the 6th plenum resolution, loc. cit. For an interesting overview of the resolution, see David S. G. Goodman, "The 6th Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP: Look Back in Anger?" *China Quarterly*, September 1981, pp. 519–27.

[22] See the 6th plenum resolution, loc. cit.

[23] Goodman provides a brief list of the important personnel changes enacted by the plenum, including Hua's resignation as chairman of both the Central Committee and its Military Commission, and Hua's replacement by Hu and Deng, respectively. See Goodman, loc. cit., pp. 518–19.

[24] From a September 22, 1981, speech by Guangdong CCP First Secretary Ren Zhongyi, reported in *Wen Wei Po* (Hong Kong), Sept. 22, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 2, 1981, pp. W/1–3. See also the text of Ye's letter, and the Li and Hu speeches at the 6th plenum in *Issues and Studies*, December 1981, pp. 71–78.



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guidelines for national and party policies for the 1980's and beyond, proposing—among other things—the reform of the party organization and work style.[25] Deng's proposals were further detailed in the media in the course of 1980, and a party historian optimistically, and prematurely, dubbed them the "1980 reforms."[26]

While Deng may rightly be viewed as the primary architect, various individuals associated with him played prominent roles in specific areas of reform: Chen Yun (economy, party affairs and discipline); Hu Yaobang (party work and organization); Zhao Ziyang (government, economy); Peng Zhen (legislative and judicial systems); Wan Li (agriculture, government); and Hu Qiaomu (ideology, party history, intellectuals). Other individuals and organizations were also involved in the planning and implementation of the party's programs. Increasingly, policy research offices and academies have served in the capacity of think tanks and speech writers for top party and government leaders, and the heads of these offices have moved up steadily in influence and power along with their mentors.[27]

The reforms cover the gamut of national concerns and responsibilities, but the focus has been on the repair and revival of the Chinese Communist Party—its organization, operations, and work style. This has been a vital concern of the pragmatists from the start and is no doubt influenced by their traumatic experiences during the Cultural Revolution. Accordingly, Deng orchestrated a series of modifications in party organization. For example, the 3rd plenum (1978) voted to establish the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC) to "enforce party rules and regulations and develop a good party style"[28]—which is similar to the role that had been performed by the former Control Commission. The 5th plenum (1980) re-established the Secretariat (which had been in eclipse since the early days of the Cultural Revolution in 1966) and adopted regulations on the "Guiding Principles for Inner Party Political Life";[29] and the party work conferences in late 1980, warned by the specter of civil strife in Poland, called for intensified political and ideological work within the party and authorized a crackdown on antiparty actions and sentiments.[30] These actions made it clear that the "socialist democratization" aspect of Deng's August 1980 "reform" speech referred primarily to party life and was intended as an antidote for (and preventive against) the type of chaos and indiscipline that had developed within the party organization during the Cultural Revolution.

The progress of the reform process has been uneven, however. If 1980 marked the unveiling and launching of the pragmatist reform movement, then 1981 witnessed a countertide of ideological orthodoxy; and while 1982 began with a renewed surge in reform activity, the movement seemed to lose some steam—or perhaps the interest of its captain—as the year progressed. During this three-year period, the degree to which the reforms have been modified or deferred is striking. This can be attributed in part to the continued influence of the Old Guard/Cultural Revolution survivors, who concentrated their forces in specific areas such as economic policy and military/security affairs.[31] This influence presumably increases as reform programs strike snags or are found wanting.

In January 1982, Deng disappeared from public view, and it was subsequently revealed that a Central Committee work conference was held to address questions of party/government operations and work style.[32] A three-pronged program was formulated to (1) eliminate corruption and oppose "bureaucratism" in the party and government (the CDIC has principal responsibility for this task); (2) streamline party and government operations by reducing the number of offices and officials, thus reducing overlaps and inefficiency; and (3) raise the standards of personnel by retiring elderly and redundant personnel (or making them advisers), selecting and promoting younger and better qualified successors, and educating and training, by rotation, both the new cadres and those already in place. Although many of these programs were already in existence, the January conference, which Deng addressed, served as the inaugural for a concerted collective effort. When he reappeared in Beijing in February, Deng referred to these programs and declared that the present situation

[25] Deng speech of Jan. 16, 1980, in *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), Mar. 1, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 11, 1980, pp. W/1–27. See also Deng's speech of Aug. 18, 1980, to an enlarged Politburo meeting, in *Chan Wang* (Hong Kong), Apr. 16, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI*, Apr. 22, 1981, pp. W/1–14.

[26] The speaker actually labeled them the "Gengshen (Year of the Monkey) Reforms," i.e., 1980 reforms. See the speech by Liao Gailong at the CCP party school in October 1980, trans. in *Issues and Studies*, December 1981, Part 3, pp. 84–85.

[27] For example, Hu Qiaomu, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a former aide and speech writer for Mao, was elected to the Politburo in September 1982; and Deng Liqun, director of the CCP Policy Research Office, became concurrently director of the Propaganda Department in spring 1982 and a member of the Secretariat in September. See *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 6, for a comprehensive list of the members of the Politburo and the Secretariat. See also Fox Butterfield, *China: Alive in the Bitter Sea*, New York, NY, Times Books, 1982, pp. 416–17.

[28] *Peking Review*, Dec. 29, 1978, p. 16.

[29] *Beijing Review*, Mar. 10, 1980. For a useful chronology of events that took place during the tenure of the 11th CCP Central Committee, see ibid., Aug. 30, 1982, pp. 18–25.

[30] See, for example, ibid., Dec. 15 and 22, 1980.

[31] A close observer of the Chinese scene has discerned three competing groups in economic affairs: two within the Deng coalition ("reformers" under Premier Zhao; and "readjusters" under Chen Yun) and a third (the "conservers" under Yu Qiuli) in the Ye/Li coalition. See Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Fifth NPC and the Process of Policymaking," *Issues and Studies*, August 1982, pp. 63–106.

[32] Zhao Ziyang report to the 22nd session of the NPC Standing Committee, New China News Agency (Xinhua), Mar. 8, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 9, 1982, p. K/4.



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*Chen Yun, member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo's Standing Committee and First Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee, at the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982.*

**—Eastfoto.**

in China was "one of unprecedented stability."[33]

Because these movements all have relatively long time frames and are to proceed sequentially from the national to the provincial and local levels, it is difficult to assess their progress at this early date. However, one characteristic is already apparent, namely, the differentiated progress within the government, the party, and military sectors. The government, through the State Council, has formulated a program to streamline operations, with specific timetables at both national and provincial levels. Accordingly, government officials have already eliminated or merged various ministries and commissions and have extensively reshuffled senior personnel, reducing both the number and average age of vice-premiers, ministers, and vice-ministers.[34] Recommended age limits have been introduced for ministers and vice-ministers, and the new state constitution imposes a limit of two consecutive terms (normally five years each) for the most senior government positions.[35] Considerable attention has been accorded to campaigns to reduce bureaucratism and combat corruption, and the cases of several errant government officials have been widely publicized.

Within the party, there have been similar campaigns aimed at reorganization and streamlining, but there have been few public pronouncements on the subject. In May, the party issued a report indicating that the restructuring of the 30 departments of the Central Committee had been proceeding smoothly and that a number of top personnel had been changed; it was claimed that the number and average age of senior cadres had been reduced through this process.[36] At the 12th party congress in September, there was limited progress in reducing age levels and removing elderly and inactive leaders at the party center (primarily in the Central Committee and the Secretariat). On some senior councils, however, there was little change. Moreover, tenure and age restrictions that had been proposed in an earlier draft (1980) were not included in the final version of the party constitution adopted at the congress.[37]

In the military, while there have been some high-level personnel and organizational changes, there is little information on the implementation of Deng's three-pronged reform program. Several developments may have had an impact on current efforts at reform of the armed forces. In April 1981, Military Commission Secretary General Geng Biao, a civilian, was appointed Minister of Defense (in place of ailing ex-marshal Xu Xiangqian), a move that was interpreted as a promotion for Geng and a step toward greater government involvement in military affairs. However, several months later Geng was replaced as MC secretary general by Yang Shangkun, a long-time Deng confederate and party administrator, who had previously held that post from 1945 to 1949.

The position of MC secretary general has increased in importance and power while that of the defense minister seems to have declined. At the 12th party congress, Yang was elevated to the Politburo while Geng was dropped from that body and moved to the Central Advisory Commission. Yang was also appointed permanent vice-chairman of the Military Commission, presumably running MC operations on Deng's behalf. Geng was subsequently replaced as defense minister by a military man, Zhang Aiping, who is concurrently subordinate to Yang as deputy secretary general of the Military Commission. In an apparent further strengthening of the secretary general's position, the heads of the

[33] See Deng's conversation with Prince Sihanouk, *Beijing Review*, Mar. 1, 1982, pp. 5–6.

[34] Zhao Ziyang report to NPC Standing Committee, loc. cit., pp. K/1–7.

[35] For a report on the draft of the new state constitution, see *Beijing Review*, Dec. 13, 1982, pp. 9–23, esp. p. 19. For the full text of the constitution, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1982, pp. 10–29.

[36] According to the report, the total staff had been reduced by 17.3 percent and the average age of departmental heads and deputy heads lowered from 64 to 60. See Xinhua, May 15, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, May 17, 1982, pp. K/1–4.

[37] For the full text of the April 1980 draft of the party constitution, see *Issues and Studies*, September 1980, pp. 81–109. For the party constitution as approved at the 12th party congress, see *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, pp. 8–21.



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*Yang Shangkun, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and Permanent Vice-Chairman of the party's Military Commission.*

**—Photoreporters.**

three PLA departments (General Staff, General Political, and Rear Services) were also identified as concurrently MC deputy secretaries general in a January 1983 news release.[38] Thus, Deng seems to be more interested in strengthening his position on the MC, the real policy-making body, than in building up the Defense Ministry's role in military affairs. Nevertheless, the three other vice-chairmen of the Military Commission are ex-marshals—Ye Jianying (85), Xu Xiangqian (80), and Nie Rongzhen (83), all of whom had been expected to retire from both the Politburo and the Military Commission but did not do so.[39] Xu and Nie have been less active and less identified with the military opposition than has Ye, but all three have great prestige and influence within the PLA and thus may counterbalance Deng and Yang.

There has also been a restructuring of two other principal links between the PLA and the party center. Under previous party constitutions, the PLA's General Political Department was responsible for party work in the PLA under the supervision of the CCP Central Committee, and the role of the Military Commission was not mentioned. Under the new constitution, the GPD is subordinate to the Military Commission.[40] The other link between the PLA and the party center has been the Secretariat, which was reestablished in February 1980. PLA Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi was named to the original body, and when promoted to the Politburo in September 1982, his place on the Secretariat was taken by Vice-Chief of Staff Yang Yong, who has since passed away. Both men, as well as the new defense minister, have long been associated with Deng and have been well-regarded as military commanders.

There are also some indications of a growing civilian *government* role in military affairs, although it is difficult to separate shadow from substance and to discern the real significance of these indications. For example, the new state constitution provides for a Central Military Commission (CMC) which "directs the armed forces of the country" (Articles 93–94).[41] But, as an authoritative party spokesman has implied, when the CMC is formally set up (at the new NPC to be held in 1983) it will probably be a mirror image of the party's Military Commission, with the same persons holding analogous positions and the CMC serving as a government front for the party body.[42] A more meaningful role, however, has been assigned to the State Council under Article 89, which empowers it to "direct and administer the *building* of national defense."[43] Thus, the State Council will be responsible for apportioning resources to the PLA and integrating its production requirements into those of the whole economy. In this connection, it appears significant that the new defense minister is a defense production specialist and had previously headed the PLA's National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission. This suggests that the Defense Ministry will concentrate on defense production and military modernization and in this connection will work closely with the PLA Rear Services Department, which is responsible for logistics and procurement and for the training of logistics personnel. The PLA General Staff and General Political departments, which are both headed by Politburo members, will tend to deal directly with higher-level *party* authorities—presumably the Military Commission or the Secretariat—on policy matters.

## Retirement and Replacement

Although there is little disagreement among top leaders on the need to rejuvenate leadership ranks, retirement has generally proved to be the one reform

[38] See Xinhua, Jan. 6, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Jan. 7, 1983, pp. K/11. Moreover, there have been reports that Deng Xiaoping's wife, Cho Lin, heads the MC General Office directly under the secretary general. See Butterfield, op. cit., p. 169.

[39] A fourth ex-marshal, Liu Bocheng, had resigned from the Politburo, Military Commission, and other posts shortly before the convening of the 12th party congress. See *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 6, 1982, pp. K/1–2.

[40] *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 16.

[41] See the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, in ibid., Dec. 27, 1982, p. 24.

[42] Xinhua interview with Hu Qiaomu, Sept. 13, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 14, 1982, p. K/7.

[43] *Beijing Review*, Dec. 2, 1982, p. 23.



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that has made the least observable progress in China in the past several years. One reason for this lack of progress, ironically, is that veteran cadres were reinstated in former positions, thereby displacing younger cadres who had been promoted rapidly during the Cultural Revolution. Another reason is simply the question of power. One can infer that retirement or "moving to the second line" has become a major ingredient of the present phase of the power struggle between the Deng/Hu coalition and the Old Guard, with individuals in both camps—plus those in between—equally reluctant to relinquish power.[44] In this context, the pragmatist/reform group has a clear advantage over the Old Guard in terms of replenishing ranks and preserving influence from the sidelines. One of Hu Yaobang's greatest political strengths, in addition to being relatively young by Chinese standards (only 67), may well be his ties to a younger generation of party cadres through his long (pre-Cultural Revolution) stewardship of the Young Communist League, and his resulting ability to place trusted supporters in key positions and influence the direction of policy for years to come. Premier Zhao Ziyang, 63, in his capacity as head of the State Council, is also in a strong position to influence future policy.

Numerous Chinese leaders have emphasized the importance of finding a "satisfactory solution of the problem of the smooth succession from older cadres to younger ones."[45] Ye Jianying and Chen Yun both belabored this point in remarks at the 12th party congress but, for whatever reason, neither set a personal example.[46] Deng illustrates a similar ambivalence. For the past several years, in various contexts, Deng has called for the retreat of the veterans to the "second line" and the "bold promotion" of younger, more energetic, and better-qualified replacements.[47] He called for the establishment of advisory councils to facilitate this process, deferred to Hu Yaobang as CCP head on grounds of age and vigor, and indicated a desire to retire by 1985 (when he will be 80).[48] Moreover, in January 1982 he reportedly unveiled a detailed retirement program at the party work conferences.[49] The emphasis, however, has been on voluntarism, inducing officials to become advisers, or to retire completely, not only through the example of prominent leaders and appeals to loyalty and patriotism, but also through material incentives and continued privileges and prestige.[50] While details have not been made public, there apparently was a Central Committee directive in the spring of 1982 on retirement arrangements, which indicated that the pay and living conditions of retirees would be at least as good as before.[51]

In March 1982, however, a countertheme was sounded in the Chinese media: "several dozen world-famous" veteran cadres with particularly rich experience and great prestige were required to continue to serve in leadership positions.[52] Commentators also made favorable mention of the concept "enter first, depart later," meaning that successors should be brought in and trained before older cadres retire. These themes were reflected in the subsequent actions (or inaction) of the party congress, which validated an earlier Deng prediction that the congress would not definitively resolve the problem of retirement.[53] Thus, it appears that another deal was struck with the opposition, and Deng is perforce biding his time.

The party congress did implement the concept of advisory councils for veteran cadres that Deng had been advocating. The new party constitution defines in some detail the role and authority of these bodies, which are to be set up at the national and provincial levels.[54] The congress duly elected 172 persons to the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), which then met and chose Deng as its first chairman.[55] Nonetheless, the CAC did not attract the high-powered participation that had been widely anticipated by outside observers. In fact, only about 50 former CC members, including four who had been on the Politburo at one time, were named to the new advisory body. Some of the elderly, less-active Politburo members may have changed their minds about retiring—or were prevailed upon by their supporters not to retire—perhaps because they viewed the

[44] Chen Yun, in April 1979, reportedly commented at a party meeting that the fear of Chinese leaders, including Mao, of losing power had caused them to form factions to secure their power and positions indefinitely. See Chen's speech at the CCP Central Work Conference, April 1979, in *Issues and Studies,* April 1980, pp. 81–83.

[45] Speech by Chen Yun, Xinhua, Sept. 6, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* Sept. 7, 1982, p. K/18.

[46] For the texts of their speeches, see ibid., pp. K/17–20.

[47] Deng interview with *Ming Pao* director in *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), Aug. 25, 1981, in *FBIS-CHI,* Aug. 25, 1981, pp. W/1–7.

[48] Deng Xiaoping article for the *Bangkok Post,* Feb. 10, 1980, p. 5, in *FBIS-CHI,* Feb. 12, 1980, p. L/5.

[49] *Tokyo Shimbun,* Feb. 11, 1982, p. 1.

[50] For example, an article by Liu Xiaoqi's widow, Wang Guangmei, in *Hongqi* (Beijing), May 1, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* May 13, 1982, pp. K/14–15; see also *Renmin Ribao,* Mar. 15, 1982, on the 1956 resignation of a PLA general for reasons of ill-health, in *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 25, 1982, pp. K/7–8. Of course, it is entirely possible that some of the "voluntary" retirements have been induced by political pressure and perhaps the threat of investigation and exposure of previous improprieties. This would tie in well with the concurrent anticorruption and antibureaucratism drives and provide a face-saving solution.

[51] Xinhua, May 15, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* May 17, 1982, p. K/2.

[52] *China Daily* (Beijing), Mar. 18, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 18, 1982, pp. K/1–2; and *Zhongguo Xinwen She* (Beijing), Mar. 16, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* Mar. 17, 1982, p. K/3.

[53] Deng interview with Tanjug (Belgrade), Jan. 5, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI,* Jan. 6, 1982, pp. K/9–11.

[54] See, for example, the full text of the party constitution in *Beijing Review,* Sept. 20, 1982, pp. 8–21, esp. Article 22, pp. 15–16.

[55] For an overview of the various tasks undertaken at the congress, see ibid., pp. 4–6. In fact, Deng was the only eligible candidate. None of the other 172 members of the CAC met the essential criterion for the chairmanship as stipulated in the new constitution; namely, that the chairman be a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.



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**Key figures in the CCP**

| | |
|---|---|
| Chen Yun | member of Politburo and of its Standing Committee, First Secretary of Standing Committee of the Central Discipline Inspection Commission. |
| Deng Xiaoping | member of Politburo and of its Standing Committee, Chairman of the Military Commission, Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. |
| Hu Qiaomu | member of Politburo, principal drafter of new party constitution. |
| Hu Yaobang | General Secretary of CCP, member of Politburo and of its Standing Committee. |
| Li Xiannian | member of Politburo and of its Standing Committee. |
| Nie Rongzhen | member of Politburo, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission. |
| Peng Zhen | member of Politburo. |
| Wan Li | member of Politburo, member of Central Committee Secretariat. |
| Yang Shangkun | member of Politburo, Permanent Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission. |
| Ye Jianying | member of Politburo and of its Standing Committee, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission. |
| Yu Qiuli | member of Politburo, Director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army, member of the Central Committee Secretariat. |
| Zhao Ziyang | member of the Politburo and of its Standing Committee. |

CAC as a Deng-dominated body in which they would have little influence.[56] Deng himself subsequently noted the "transitional" nature of the CAC "organizational form," predicting a short life of 10 to 15 years for the advisory body, after which it would disband.[57] (This speaks volumes about the expected durability of the new constitution which, interestingly, does not provide for electing new members to the CAC or replacing its chairman short of convening a new party congress.)

Retirement is clearly a major bone of contention in party-military relations. Although some 40 senior PLA veterans did join the CAC, the most influential military leaders did not. And the PLA, most conspicuously, has neither imposed a mandatory age limit for military personnel nor promoted younger officers to the top echelons of the military leadership. Nonetheless, rumors persist. There have been reports in the Hong Kong press of a number of retirements among the leaders of the Guangzhou Military Region,[58] a pattern that could be occurring in other military regions as well. Another Hong Kong newspaper claimed that Deng had vowed to streamline the military organization before his death, but had agreed to a transitional period for the replacement of leading military cadres.[59]

The retirement process thus has proved to be the reformers' biggest obstacle. It is the loss of power, not of pay or perquisites, that poses the most serious problem. The resistance experienced at the party center no doubt inspires foot-dragging all along the line. This is especially true in the armed forces, where the most senior policy and operational positions are still encumbered by veteran cadres in their seventies, or older.[60]

## Aftermath of the 12th Party Congress

The power struggle and reform process in the PRC crystalized at the 12th party congress. The congress afforded the dominant leadership groups an opportunity not only to consolidate and legitimize their power but also to enact organizational and policy changes. It may also have marked a new phase in the competition for power, one that will be carried out under somewhat different rules and with somewhat different players. Yet the results of the congress and the tortuous path leading to it testify not only to the continuing divisions within the leadership, but also to a propensity to compromise or defer changes and to a continued reluctance of aging leaders to relinquish power.

The 12th party congress is notable, among other things, for the significant changes it made in the legal

[56] For example articles in the PRC press or PRC-controlled press in Hong Kong had separately portrayed ex-marshals Ye, Nie, and Xu as inactive or planning to retire. See, respectively, *FBIS-CHI*, May 5, 1982, pp. W/2; July 30, 1982, pp. K/1–5; and July 26, 1982, pp. K/2–4. Also of interest is "Why Did Ye Jianying Not Retire to the Second Line," *Cheng Ming*, Nov. 1, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 3, 1982, pp. W/3–4.

[57] *Zhongguo Xinwen She*, Oct. 22, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 27, 1982, pp. K/5–6.

[58] *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), Nov. 6, 1982, p. 5.

[59] *Ming Pao*, Mar. 22, 1982, p. 5, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 24, 1982, pp. W/4–5.

[60] Nethercut, loc. cit., pp. 700–02.



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*Hu Qiaomu, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and principal drafter of the new party constitution adopted at the 12th CCP Congress.*

**—Eastfoto.**

framework of the party constitution. The new document is lengthier and more comprehensive than its recent predecessors, which had stressed the central role of Mao and his ideology.[61] It contains expanded sections on membership requirements, party life and discipline, and the new or revived party organizations (e.g., CAC, Secretariat, and CDIC). Moreover, the constitution effects various changes in the "organizational system of the party at the central level" that are designed to promote collective leadership and prevent the recurrence of a personality cult (which is specifically proscribed under Article 12).[62] The new party constitution also abolishes the offices of party chairman and vice-chairmen, but it retains the six-member Politburo Standing Committee (described by Hu Qiaomu as the "core" of the party leadership) and stipulates that the general secretary and the heads of the CDIC, CAC, and MC be members of it.[63] The general secretary presides over the Secretariat and is responsible for convening meetings of the Politburo and its Standing Committee.

The party's Military Commission—whose membership is "decided on," i.e., not elected, by the Central Committee—is specifically referred to in the new constitution, unlike earlier ones, and its authority and role defined (Article 23). Prior to the 12th party congress there had been speculation that the Military Commission would be dissolved by the congress. In interviews with foreign visitors in the summer of 1982, one leader (Wan Li, since elevated to the Politburo) refused to predict what would happen, while another leader (Peng Chong, since removed from the Politburo) was reported to have indicated that the party's commission would be disbanded in favor of the proposed governmental Central Military Commission (CMC).[64] Hu Qiaomu subsequently clarified the expected relationship between the two commissions. Stressing that the PLA has always been led by the party, he stated that members of the party MC would hold similar positions on the CMC, thereby continuing the party's leadership of the government commission as well as of the PLA.[65]

Hu, the principal drafter, indicated that the preparation and revision of the constitution was a protracted process, with some final unspecified changes made at the congress in early September. Many of the provisions described above were not in the original draft that had been prepared in early 1980 when it was anticipated that the 12th party congress would be held later that year or in early 1981.[66] Numerous reforms that had been incorporated in the earlier draft were either deleted from or substantially diluted in the final version, including provisions that had specified average ages for party committee members at various levels (between 55 and 65 for the CC), limited the number of consecutive terms of members, abolished lifetime tenure, required those incapacitated for work to vacate their positions, and stated that, in principle, leading officials should not hold concurrent posts. Hu explained that "after repeated deliberations," it was decided to set no strict restrictions on tenure for leading cadres and that party organizations "at all levels" would have "old, middle-

[61] See *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, for the text of the party constitution. The previous constitution, which had been adopted at the 11th party congress, had five chapters and 19 articles; the new party constitution has 10 chapters and 50 articles. See also the interview with Hu Qiaomu, Xinhua, Sept. 13, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 14, 1982, pp. K/3–11, for an authoritative interpretation of the new constitution and a brief history of its drafting.

[62] Interview with Hu Qiaomu, loc. cit.

[63] Ibid., p. K/7. The official rank-order of the Politburo Standing Committee elected by the 12th Central Committee at its first plenum is: Hu Yaobang, Ye Jianying, Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, Li Xiannian, and Chen Yun.

[64] Interview with Wan Li in *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 6, 1982, p. 3; Peng Chong allegedly made his statement about the demise of the Military Commission in a meeting with a French parliamentary delegation visiting Beijing. See AFP (Hong Kong), Aug. 30, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 30, 1982, p. K/5.

[65] Interview with Hu Qiaomu, loc. cit., p. K/7.

[66] Communiqué of the 5th plenum of the 11th party congress, Feb. 29, 1980, in *FBIS-CHI*, Feb. 29, 1980, p. L/2.



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aged, and young cadres" so as to "realize the succession of the new cadres to the old."[67]

In addition to adopting the constitution, the party congress elected a new Central Committee, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, and the first Central Advisory Commission. There was substantial turnover and some reduction in CC ranks. About half of the 210 full Central Committee members and over 80 percent of the 138 alternates were new. The PRC claimed that two-thirds of the new members were under 60 and that only 16 persons over age 71 remained on the new Central Committee.[68] However, no detailed statistics were provided, and the ages previously given for some of Beijing's leaders bear a resemblance to Hollywood data on fading film stars.[69] Other biographical sources indicate that on the new Politburo alone, there are 18 members in their seventies or older, and that the average age of the Politburo increased rather than decreased as a result of the changes.[70] The Military Commission and CDIC are veritable gerontocracies. The average age of the MC chairman and four vice-chairmen is 80, while the top three leaders of the CDIC are, respectively, 77, 82, and 74.[71] By contrast, some of those sidelined to the CAC are in their late sixties or early seventies and had been active in public life, underscoring the possibility that considerations other than age and health may have been involved in their selection.

In terms of background, the new Central Committee includes the rising figures in the party, government, and military hierarchies and is said to comprise increased numbers of women, minority nationalities, scientists, and intellectuals.[72] There are as well several holdovers on the Central Committee who are model workers or trade union representatives, including the head of the trade union federation, Ni Zhifu, who also remains on the Politburo. These individuals are useful as symbols but presumably have little political power; they may be able to retain their party rank provided they do not get out of line. In terms of factions, it is difficult to analyze the Central Committee elections except to reiterate that only a few persons in Hua Guofeng's camp, including Hua himself, remain on the Central Committee, mostly as low-ranking alternates.[73]

Much more indicative of the true power standing within the leadership, however, was the Central Committee's election of the Politburo, its Standing Committee, and the Secretariat, and its appointment of the Military Commission leadership, all for five-year terms. Nine new members were elected to the Politburo (of whom two are alternates) and seven dropped (including one alternate); one member (Hua) was dropped from the Standing Committee; six of the Secretariat's 11 members, two of whom are now alternates, were changed; and a vice-chairman was replaced on the Military Commission. Of the new Politburo members, six had been on the secretariat (three of them retain positions there), two others have party organization backgrounds, and the other provides additional military representation. The new members are not young (most are in their early seventies); all have had extensive previous association with Deng and are considered to be his supporters. The same is true (with perhaps one exception[74]) of the Secretariat, where some younger blood has been added (three under 60), including two Hu Yaobang protégés.[75] The MC change involved the retirement of an old ex-marshal (Deng's wartime commander) and the appointment of the MC secretary general (a Deng confederate) as a "permanent" vice-chairman.

Those removed from the Politburo were dropped for political or health reasons, and sometimes a combination of the two. Hua and two presumed supporters (believed already inactive) were dropped; three others with military ties either moved to the CAC or retired. The most intriguing departures were Peng Chong from the Politburo and Secretariat and Wang Renzhong from the Secretariat. Both had been purged during the Cultural Revolution and, originally at least, had been considered Deng supporters. On the Secretariat, Peng and Wang

[67] Interview with Hu Qiaomu, loc. cit., p. K/11.

[68] *Renmin Ribao*, Sept. 11, 1982, p. 4, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 15, 1982, pp. K/8–10; *Ta Kung Pao*, Sept. 11, 15, and 16, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 14, 1982, pp. W/1–3, Sept. 17, 1982, pp. W/1–2, and Sept. 16, 1982, pp. W/1–2.

[69] While reliable age statistics for veteran party and PLA leaders are often hard to come by, a review of Western and Hong Kong biographical sources suggests the following discrepancies in age (the official PRC figure is in parentheses): Fang Yi, 72–73 (66); Hu Qiaomu, 74 (70); Song Renqiong, 78 (73); Wan Li, 70–75 (66); Xi Zhongxun, 74–79 (69).

[70] An unpublished statistical analysis prepared by Jürgen Domes, of The Saar University, for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (Cambridge, MA) in October 1982 concludes that the average age of Politburo members (full and alternate) is now 72.5 compared to 71 before the 12th party congress.

[71] Chen Yun is the first secretary of the CDIC, and Huang Kecheng and Wang Heshou are second and permanent secretary, respectively. See *Beijing Review*, Sept. 20, 1982, p. 6.

[72] For a list of the full and alternate members of the 12th Central Committee, with identification by principal positions, see *Issues and Studies*, November 1982, pp. 25–46.

[73] It is interesting to note that one new alternate is Ye Jianying's son, a deputy governor in Guangdong Province. Children of senior cadres have frequently proved to be both placement and discipline problems. This has led the CDIC to issue a stern admonition to parents and other cadres not to show favoritism or to try to protect these individuals when they have committed illegal acts. Hu Yaobang on an inspection trip told local cadres that they should not try to pass their positions on to their children when they retire (see *FBIS-CHI*, July 15, 1982, p. K/4). In the case of Ye Jianying's son, however, collegial favoritism was obviously condoned.

[74] Hao Jianxiu, age 47, an alternate, was clearly a Cultural Revolution beneficiary. Although she originally was only a textile worker, she rose quickly through the party ranks and mass organizations to become the minister of textile industry and a CC member at both the 11th and 12th party congresses. At present, her age, sex, status as a former worker, and ministerial rank probably all work in her favor.

[75] Hu Qili, 53, and Qiao Shi, 58, were close associates of Hu in party youth work.



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had responsibility, respectively, for public security/intelligence and propaganda—areas that had been neo-Maoist strongholds. Now, although both remain on the Central Committee and Peng is an NPC vice-chairman, neither is known to hold a key substantive post. Peng, who is in his late sixties or early seventies, had appeared to be a rising power within the leadership. However, both Peng and Wang may have taken positions opposed to the Deng/Hu group in party conclaves or in discharging their responsibilities, which involved sensitive areas.[76] Both had ties with Li Xiannian. But, more fundamentally, Peng, in particular, may have been regarded as a potential rival to Hu and therefore a threat to Deng and Hu's carefully laid plans.

The recent changes, and non-changes, in the leadership suggest that several senior party figures are largely inactive, for reasons either of health or lack of assigned responsibilities.[77] Politburo member Wei Guoqing, a leading military conservative, may have joined the latter category when he was removed as director of the PLA General Political Department immediately after the congress.[78] Wei's replacement, General Yu Qiuli, is a close associate of Li Xiannian, which indicates the continuing influence of the Old Guard, although there may be fringe benefits for the reformers in this switch.[79]

In the larger sense, what may be occurring is a major shift in the locus of real power within the Chinese leadership. The Politburo, the Standing Committee, and the top leadership of the party military and discipline commissions will, at least temporarily, represent the "second line" (along with the advisory commissions); and the party Secretariat, the State Council, and the working levels of the Military Commission and CDIC—all of which are directly or indirectly under Deng, Hu, or Zhao Ziyang's control—will become the "first line." In such a configuration, Deng is also the dominant force in the "second line," through his chairmanship of the Military Commission and the Central Advisory Commission, the presumed backing of influential senior figures such as Chen Yun and Peng Zhen, and the respect even of those customarily in opposition to him. This strong position is fortified by the power accorded Hu Yaobang, as General Secretary, to convene and direct meetings of the Politburo and Standing Committee. Moreover, the delegates to the 12th party congress, in effect, have been decommissioned, decreasing the likelihood of a subsequent session of the congress, and Hu has indicated that the next Central Committee plenum will not be held until the summer or fall of 1983.[80] These developments would seem to increase the degree to which Deng and Hu are in control of the party's operational and decision-making processes, even though a number of constraints will limit their range of options.

The basic guidelines under which the party will operate (in addition to those prescribed in the constitution) were spelled out in the report delivered by Hu, as General Secretary, to the congress.[81] The influence of Deng and Chen Yun seemed clearly evident in this lengthy document, which covered the spectrum of national and party concerns. The report reaffirmed and reinforced the policies and programs adopted since the landmark 3rd plenum of December 1978, when the pragmatist/reform group first prevailed. Hu gave testimony to the correctness of the plenum's policies, reiterating the charges that, up to that time, the "principal leading comrade" (i.e., Hua) had continued to make "left" mistakes on important issues. In terms of party affairs, Hu announced a three-year rectification program and identified five categories of persons who should not be promoted and who should be removed from the party if they do not reform.[82] A commitment to the goal of socialist modernization (and its amorphous political counterpart "socialist spiritual civilization") will be a prerequisite to advancement in the future. Hu also stressed the special role of intellectuals in China's modernization process and added that, in assigning and promoting cadres, importance should be attached to academic background and achievements as well as to work experience and performance.[83] Thus both in Hu's report and in the constitution, the congress adopted policy platforms and rules that conform to the viewpoint

[76] Additionally, Peng conceivably could have been penalized for his public prediction of the demise of the Military Commission (see fn. 64) or for advocating its abolition within party councils.

[77] The lack of an assigned responsibility for senior officials is not unprecedented. See Chen Yun's speech at a CCP Central Work Conference, April 1979, loc. cit.

[78] While the cause of Wei's removal was not stated, it is presumably linked to an ideological commentary that appeared in the PLA/GPD press organ on the eve of the 12th party congress. This commentary was subsequently attacked as contrary to General Secretary Hu's report to the congress. The original August 28 commentary and subsequent refutations in *Jiefangjun Bao* and *Jiefang Ribao* (Shanghai) on September 27 and 28 are in *FBIS-CHI*, Sept. 29, 1982, pp. K/3–6, and Oct. 4, 1982, pp. K/1–8.

[79] Yu is both a Politburo and Secretariat member and has had responsibilities in the industrial sector, an area that Hu Yaobang had singled out for criticism in a speech at the 1st plenum of the 12th Central Committee on Sept. 13, 1982, *Renmin Ribao*, Oct. 22, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Oct. 22, 1982, pp. K/1–6. As GPD director, Yu may now have to devote most of his time to military affairs—under the watchful eye of the Military Commission—and therefore have less time for involvement in economic affairs (see fn. 31.)

[80] Interview with Hu Qioamu, loc. cit., pp. K/10–11; see also speech by Hu Yaobang at the 1st plenum of the 12th CC, loc. cit.

[81] The full text of this report is contained in *Beijing Review*, Sept. 13, 1982, pp. 11–40.

[82] The five categories are: those who rose to prominence by "rebellion"; those who are seriously factionalist; those who have indulged in "beating, smashing, and looting"; those who oppose the line followed since the 3rd plenum of the 11th CC; and those who have seriously violated the law and/or party discipline (see ibid., p. 36). These categories were apparently originally formulated by Chen Yun.

[83] On October 3, 1982, the party Central Committee and the State Council approved a detailed program for the education of cadres of central party and government organs. See Xinhua, Oct. 13, 1982, in *FBIS-CHI*, Nov. 2, 1982, pp. K/5–9.



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of the pragmatist/reform coalition, and that should facilitate its continuing dominance.

The 5th Session of the 5th National People's Congress (NPC), held November 26 to December 10, 1982, echoed the policy line of the party congress, focusing on the economy and other governmental concerns. A new state constitution was adopted, only slightly revised from the draft that had been circulated six months earlier and widely discussed.[84] The state constitution restores the post of chairman (and vice-chairmen) of the PRC and establishes a Central Military Commission. The NPC did not elect personnel to these new posts nor did it change its own leadership, leaving these tasks to the new 6th NPC which, according to Hu Yaobang, will hold its first session in mid-1983.[85] (In a letter dated February 25, 1983, Ye Jianying, China's titular head of state and chairman of the 5th NPC, asked the Standing Committee of the NPC not to submit his name for re-election to the new National People's Congress. "I am old, failing in health and unable to do as much as I wish," he said. The Standing Committee approved his request.)[86]

New constitutional provisions concerning the structure and authority of the State Council seem already to have been put into effect. As mentioned earlier, the State Council, under Premier Zhao, has undertaken a program to streamline and consolidate governmental units, reducing both the number and the average age of senior personnel. At the party congress, cabinet ministers fared well in elections to the new Central Committee, and the premier and the two vice-premiers are on the Politburo. In the interim between the party congress and the NPC, the foreign and defense ministers were replaced. The new foreign minister is closely identified with Hu Yaobang, while the defense minister is a former vice-premier, a general, and an advocate of defense modernization. The former meets the age desideratum for ministers (under 65); the latter, not surprisingly, does not. However, both meet the two essential criteria: they are politically acceptable, and are technically qualified for their posts. In keeping with the increasing emphasis on education, vice-premier Wan Li has stated that the goal of the leadership was eventually to raise the cultural level of State Council personnel to that of university or college graduates.[87] With only a few exceptions, State Council and NPC Standing Committee members are expected to devote full time to their respective executive and legislative responsibilities. Whether, over time, this will spawn separate functional specializations and hence parochial tendencies and interests, with implications for factional groupings, remains to be seen.

## Prospects

Before addressing what may lie ahead in the contest for power in China, it is useful to sum up the salient points of this interpretive assessment. Basic changes have occurred within the leadership over the past five years. Hua and his supporters have been effectively removed from the top leadership; and in the course of the forthcoming rectification program, they will presumably lose any significant base of support in the party. Overall, the military elite has retained its proportional strength in the party leadership, but military representatives moving up in the party and in the PLA are almost exclusively those identified with the Deng/Hu forces. The Old Guard/Cultural Revolution survivors are hanging on and have not retired in significant numbers, especially at the most senior levels. Their continued presence on the Politburo and on the party's Military Commission, despite obvious physical infirmities in most cases, may affect the operation of these bodies. The civilian Old Guard, headed by Li Xiannian, have retained their party ranking and some significant posts, but their influence over economic policy is probably diminishing. In terms of real power, Hu, Deng, and Zhao have emerged as the triumvirate representing the party, military, and government.

Thus, the party veterans who had been victimized during the Cultural Revolution have regained power, have instituted reforms designed both to prevent the recurrence of one-man rule and to increase the stability and efficiency of the political process, and have fashioned a more balanced, pragmatic policy program aimed at eventually building a modern, prosperous, strong socialist nation. While the struggle for power will continue to be influenced by factional groupings and personal relationships, leadership changes will be made by constitutional, formalized processes, rather than by purge and media attack—unless things go seriously awry.

There have also been institutional winners and losers in this contest, and this may have a significant impact on

[84] The text of the PRC constitution adopted at the NPC is in *Beijing Review*, Dec. 27, 1982, pp. 10–29. The earlier draft is in ibid., May 10, 1982, pp. 27–47.

[85] See Hu's speech at the 1st plenum, loc. cit., p. K/2.

[86] The text of Ye's letter is in Xinhua, Mar. 2, 1983, in *FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 2, 1983, p. K/1–2. For a commentary and brief analysis, see *The New York Times*, Mar. 3, 1983.

[87] See interview with Wan Li, loc. cit., p. 3. This comment was clearly the precursor of the Central Committee/State Council decision of October 3, 1982, that established goals (and timetables for their achievement) for the educational levels of party and government cadres and indicated that academic levels and achievements would be considered in future assignments and promotions (see fn. 83).



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future developments in the leadership struggle in China. For example, within the CCP, the Secretariat is now a major locus of power (and the springboard to top party rank), and the Central Discipline Inspection Commission has the potential to exert great influence behind the scenes. Within the government, the State Council, under an effective and energetic premier, is increasing its executive authority and role. Within the military, the General Staff Department (formerly headed by Deng) seems to have augmented its power, albeit under the guidance of the party's Military Commission. The institutional losers would seem to be the public-security apparatus, the propaganda apparatus, and, in the military, the General Political Department. In the past, these institutions have tended to be strongholds of opposition to the Deng/Hu forces, and, therefore, will probably be closely scrutinized and cleansed to assure political reliability. Even then, they may be destined to play a less important role in the scheme of things than under Mao and Hua.

One is struck by a number of contradictions that have arisen in the course of the power struggle. A central contradiction concerns collective leadership. Deng has preached collective leadership and consensus, but triumphed in part because he was a more credible surrogate of Mao than was Hua. While Deng can direct and protect his protégé Hu Yaobang, he cannot even try to transfer his power *in toto* to Hu without making a mockery of the collective leadership principle that he has so ardently endorsed.

Related to this is the matter of factions. Factionalism remains a cardinal sin of party life, and those charged with practicing it will be one of the five main targets of the party rectification program. At the same time, Hu, Zhao, and any other top leaders who emerge will be able to secure their positions of power only by placing trusted associates in key slots and by fashioning a workable coalition with others who have a factional base of power. Despite the pejorative label and the efforts to outlaw their existence, factions are likely to increase rather than decrease in importance as more and more younger leaders emerge with a narrower range of experience and associations and a more limited power base than the veteran cadres have had.

*Hu Yaobang, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, casts a ballot during the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982.*

—Eastfoto.



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A third contradiction involves the reformers' rise to power and the various structural, procedural, and policy reforms they have advocated. A reform platform clearly helped the Deng/Hu group recapture power. Now, however, some reform measures have been diluted, deferred, or abandoned; others have become bogged down in midcourse. Is it because problems (such as bureaucratism, corruption, and abuse of power) are intractable and defy correction? Is it because compromises with opposing groups are necessary in order to secure agreement? Or is it that the reforms have served their purpose and are now inconvenient to the reformers themselves?

Within the broad rubric of reform there is also the nettlesome question of retirement and replacement. Top leaders have pinpointed it as the most pressing leadership issue and have devised ways to facilitate the transfer of power from older to younger cadres and to ease out the veterans while continuing to utilize their experience and prestige. But many of the advocates are not practicing what they preach, and the process seems to be ensnared in the power struggle. Deng views it as a specific one-time problem—that of phasing out the Red Army generation—and he sees the CAC as a temporary institution, fading away with the passing of the old cadre. But will it be so? Will the emerging, somewhat younger leadership (some of whom may have been assisted statistically to appear younger) voluntarily relinquish power at a specified time, or will they ape their predecessors and retire primarily, and reluctantly, because of poor health or political pressure? And what about their successors?

Another contradiction, or concern, relates to military issues. In the recent struggle for power, the focus of competition has been between the group of ideologically orthodox, Maoist traditionalists in the PLA and the Deng/Hu coalition, a coalition that has considerable and growing strength within military ranks, especially in the central commands and among military professionals. However, there are a number of issues on which the military elite appears united, and these may soon come to the forefront. Primary among these is the allocation of resources to defense. Pressures to modernize the PLA are building up, and Deng may be less successful at resisting the pleas of his supporters (such as Chief of Staff Yang Dezhi and new Defense Minister Zhang Aiping) than he has been at resisting the arguments of his military critics, especially since Deng himself has long advocated military modernization. And when Deng and Chen Yun are no longer factors, will Hu and Zhao, who have much less clout with the military, be able to prevail on this critical economic issue?

This raises the fundamental question of whether Hu Yaobang and his close associates will continue to work harmoniously with the other active leaders in the pragmatist/reform coalition once the powerful, cementing influences of Deng and Chen Yun have been removed. In this regard, the relationship between Hu and Zhao is the most pivotal. Of equal importance, of course, is how the heirs to Deng and Chen Yun handle the opposition.

While these questions defy conclusive answers, some interesting indicators will be provided in the short term in the handling of future appointments in two areas: the position of chairman of the PRC, and the senior slots on the Military Commission. Li Xiannian and Hu Yaobang each have the requisite party rank and prestige to be PRC chairman, but the selection of either one could have serious shortcomings. Li's selection could undermine Hu and Zhao's authority; and Hu's appointment would be widely viewed as a step back toward one-man rule. On the MC, will the three ex-marshals be replaced when they expire or retire, and if so by whom? Presumably their replacements would be military leaders already on the Politburo, but potential candidates who fit the bill vary in political persuasion. The key question concerns Deng's replacement as MC chairman (possibly by 1985), and the impact this may have on party-military relations and on the cohesiveness and stability of the leadership.



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# Yugoslavia's National Question

## By Viktor Meier

At the end of March 1981, disturbances broke out in the Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo, inhabited primarily by Albanians but part of the Republic of Serbia. Since that time, the Kosovo region has effectively been subject to combined military and police rule under the control of the federal authorities. The cause of the disturbances in Kosovo is alleged to have been "Albanian nationalism." Thus, the nationality question in the multi-national state of Yugoslavia erupted once again in a sensitive area, approximately 10 years after the national crisis in the Republic of Croatia. The events in Kosovo in turn stimulated nationalist reactions in Serbia. One gets a strong impression that the situation is turning into a traditional Balkan nationality struggle and that it will be waged in the traditional way. Communists in Yugoslavia have been claiming in their propaganda for years, even decades, that they had solved the nationality problem in Yugoslavia thanks largely to socialism and socialist self-management. Yet, today they are confronted by national problems that are hardly less serious than those of the interwar Yugoslav state.

## Ideological Background

One may well ask whether a movement like communism can by its very nature arrive at real solutions to the nationality question in a multi-national state. The Yugoslav Communists could find little encouragement in the ideas of their ideological mentors. Multi-national states were an abomination for Lenin. Agreeing with Karl Kautsky, he postulated in 1914 that "both the example of all progressive mankind and the example of the Balkans" demonstrated that the national state is the rule and norm under capitalism. "The state of diverse composition is something backward or an anomaly."[1] For the proletariat, Lenin continued, national demands are generally subordinate to the interests of the class struggle; for the proletariat it is important "to ensure the development of its class."[2]

Communist Yugoslav writers admit now that it was not easy for their party to arrive at adequate solutions for the nationality question, probably due in part to such concepts as Lenin's. Gavro Altman writes that in the Yugoslav as in the other Communist parties the idea had prevailed that "the national question was in substance a peasant question." From this it was tempting to conclude "that this problem was peculiar to capitalist countries and that under socialism it would tend to disappear by itself."[3] Sima Marković, the first leader of the Communists in Yugoslavia, believed that he was doing justice to Lenin's precepts by opposing a federal solution for Yugoslavia and by displaying complete indifference about whether the three peoples making up the state at that time—the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—*were three nations or three branches of a single nation.*[4] Thus, contrary to Tito's remarks at the 8th Congress of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia in 1964, it is not accurate to say that the party had a correct "Leninist" position toward the nationality question since 1924—when it stipulated the principle of "equal rights up to secession" for every nation.

Such declarations mean little. At the time they were proclaimed, the Comintern found it useful to favor the

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[1] V. I. Lenin, "Concerning the Right of Nations to Self-determination," *Ausgewählte Werke* (Selected Works), Vol. I, Berlin, Dietz, 1953, p. 676.

[2] Ibid., p. 685.

[3] Gavro Altman, *Yugoslavia, a Multinational Community,* Belgrade, Jugoslovenska Stvarnost, 1978, p. 8.

[4] Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question,* New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 25.



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dissolution of all existing states in the Balkans and their replacement by one or more federations.[5] This position could even be traced to the ideas of the old Serbian socialist, Svetozar Marković.[6] Nevertheless, some Yugoslav observers have claimed that these prewar federative concepts led to the adoption of a federal structure for the postwar Yugoslav state.

On the other hand, there have always been—and continue to be—Yugoslav Communists who cling as a matter of principle to Lenin's original thesis that multinational states are awkward and backward. Their beliefs led them either to try to form separate Communist parties and toy with the idea of dismembering the country, or to advocate an integral Yugoslav nation, such as King Alexander had proclaimed in 1929, and thereby leap over the national contradictions in Yugoslavia. In 1937, independent Communist parties arose in Croatia and Slovenia; for Macedonia, the same was at least contemplated. At the same time, in view of the dangers on the European horizon in the 1930's, other Yugoslav Communists became prey to patriotic impulses in the sense of advocating the integrity of the Yugoslav state.[7] Yet, after the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Germans in April 1941, the Comintern, as well as wide circles of the Yugoslav party itself, leaned toward accepting the dissolution of the state, not only in Macedonia but also in Croatia. In Zagreb in July 1941, an agent of the Comintern named Kopinić was promoting the creation of an independent Communist party for the "Independent State of Croatia."

For a long time there was only vague knowledge of this interlude. Vladimir Dedijer was the first to publish details in his "new contributions" to the biography of Tito that was published in 1981.[8] As a result of these efforts, which could have been interpreted as treason, the agent Kopinič in no way lost Tito's friendship. He extricated himself from the situation by claiming communications problems, and merely had to be content with subordinate posts after the war. Separatism evidently was not a transient phenomenon in Croatia. Even in 1944, Milovan Djilas noted "little prominence for Yugoslavia and an overemphasis on Croatian peculiarities" in the headquarters of the Communists of Croatia.[9] Dedijer claims that his portrayal of the activities of the Croatian party during the war made Vladimir Bakarič and other high Croatian party functionaries hostile toward the publication of his book.[10]

[5] Ibid., pp. 30 ff.

[6] See Svetozar Marković, "Serbia in the East," in *Sabrani Spisi* (Collected Works), Vol. III, Belgrade, Kultura, 1965.

[7] Shoup, op. cit., p. 47.

[8] Vladimir Dedijer, *Novi Prilozi za Biografiju Josipa Broza Tita* (New Contributions for a Biography of Josip Broz Tito), Vol. 2, Rijeka, Liburnija, 1981, pp. 425 ff.

## Evolution of Yugoslav Federalism

Prewar Yugoslavia did not have autonomous territorial sub-units. There were merely administrative districts in various forms, although the nations—at least the three leading nations—were recognized as constituting the state. This was expressed in the very name of the country adopted in 1918, "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." Politically, the nations were represented by parties in prewar Yugoslavia. The more important ones succeeded in becoming "national" parties with leading roles among the nations concerned: the Radicals and their auxiliary and successor organizations among the Serbs; the Croatian Peasant Party among the Croats; and the clerical People's Party among the Slovenes. Even the Bosnian Moslems had a kind of national representation at certain times. These parties received recognition even in public law. For example, the so-called *sporazum* (agreement) of August 1939 that was to resolve the Croatian question was concluded between Yugoslav Prime Minister Dragiša Cvetković and the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, Vladko Maček.

The new Communist Yugoslavia that was conceived at the second session of AVNOJ—the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia—in November 1943 at Jajce was based on the principle of federalism. The territory of the country was to be divided into six republics, according to both historic and ethnic considerations. Within the Republic of Serbia two autonomous regions, Kosovo-Metohija (later called just Kosovo, or in Albanian, Kosova) and Vojvodina, came into being. The relations of the Yugoslav nations and nationalities were put under the slogan "unity-brotherhood"—a description which lends itself well to papering over problems.

The federal constitution of postwar Yugoslavia, following the Soviet pattern, was probably supposed to have a primarily declarative character in the eyes of the Yugoslav Communists. In Article 1 of the constitution of 1946, the member republics even received the formal right to secede from the federation. One of the ideological pillars of the "Croatian Spring" of 1968–71, Zagreb University professor Sima Djodan—later sentenced to a long prison term at Tito's insistence—said with regard to this conception: "For us the federation was first created as a state and assumed exclusive competence

[9] Milovan Djilas, *Der Krieg der Partisanen, Memoiren 1941–1945* (The Partisan War, Memoirs 1941–1945), Vienna and Munich, Molden, 1978, p. 413.

[10] Interview with Gustav Chalupa in *Europäische Rundschau* (Vienna), No. 3, 1982, pp. 123 ff.



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*A scene from the second session of AVNOJ—the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia—in November 1943 at Jajce, where the federal structure of postwar Yugoslavia was conceived: in the top row, fifth from the right, Vladimir Bakarić; and the lower row, third from left, Aleksandar Ranković, and fourth from left, Edvard Kardelj.*

**—EUPRA.**

over all spheres it deemed important for state sovereignty and for socioeconomic life. The republics, as a kind of ethnic form, were left with the less important and the local communities with the least important functions."[11]

Djodan is not entirely correct in this definition of Yugoslav federalism. In one sense, and perhaps the most important one, the republics quickly grew into considerable and to a certain extent autonomous power centers, namely in regard to the Communist party and its apparatus.[12] As we shall see, the relative independence of the republic party apparatuses was to prove of great importance for the subsequent development of Yugoslavia. (In the Soviet Union, where similar tendencies were bloodily liquidated by Stalin, matters were different.)

The republics in Yugoslavia, however, are not coterminous with the nations. Of all the republics, only Slovenia is ethnically homogeneous. Croatia has a large Serbian minority. Many Croats live in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Vojvodina. Macedonia too has large ethnic minorities within its boundaries, as does Serbia, above all in the two autonomous regions. Similarly, Serbs live in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia. Montenegro is not clearly defined from an ethnic standpoint, and Bosnia-Hercegovina is a historically determined unit inhabited by Moslems, Serbs, and Croats. Of the two autonomous regions created in Serbia, Kosovo has an Albanian majority while Vojvodina has a large Hungarian minority, although in Vojvodina the Serbs predominate numerically and politically.

The lack of congruence between the republics and the nations has occasionally led to situations whereby ethnic animosities found outlets within the boundaries of a specific republic and did not affect the state as a whole. Furthermore, despite the federal state, the nations remained an additional category, separate from the republic structure. As nationalist impulses were expressed once again in Yugoslavia, the old irritation of the Communists with this phenomenon that they could not master also returned.

Moreover, from the very inception of Communist rule in Yugoslavia, the category of nation contained politically conditioned ambiguities. There were what might be called "good" and "bad" nations and even "good" and "bad" nationalisms. The newly created Macedonian

[11] *Kolo* (Zagreb), No. 11, 1968.

[12] Ernst Halperin, *Der Siegreiche Ketzer* (The Victorious Heretic), Cologne, Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1957, p. 45.



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




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nation with its ethnic consciousness has been favored: this new nation has been allowed to pursue irredentism abroad, in Bulgaria as well as in Greece. In the same way, the ethnic feelings of the Slovenes have enjoyed understanding and support. The Slovenes are permitted to bring up continuously the issue of their fellow nationals in Carinthia (Austria) and in the area around Trieste (Italy). Serbian and Croatian national aspirations, on the other hand, have long been regarded negatively; the former are equated with "hegemonism" and the latter with "separatism."

Nevertheless, eventually it seemed advisable to accord greater recognition to the nations under constitutional law. In the new "basic principles" preceding the revised constitution of 1963, "the nations of Yugoslavia," without being expressly enumerated, were called the constituent parts of the country; they—and not the republics—were granted the fictitious right to secede. This construction has been retained in all subsequent revisions of the constitution including that of 1974, now in effect. However, the "nations and nationalities" (formerly "national minorities") are neither enumerated nor recognized as legal subjects. Articles 245–247 simply set forth the principle of equal rights for the nations and nationalities, including the right to use their various languages. The difference between nations and nationalities is also not specifically defined. In practice, it seems that the nations of Yugoslavia are those that have their ethnic center within the boundaries of Yugoslavia, while the nationalities have their center outside the borders.[13] Thus, in the census results of 1981, the 577,000 Montenegrins are listed as a "nation," while the over 1.7 million Albanians are considered a "nationality" ("national minority" according to previous usage).[14]

## National Tensions, 1957–1980

In the second half of the 1950's, nationally related tensions made themselves felt in Yugoslavia, particularly among the individual republics. At first, the tensions were economically conditioned. The separate power centers of the Communist leadership in the individual republics had an impact for the first time. Their economic interests had come to coincide with those of the population, including the non-Communists, within the individual republics. For example, general dissatisfaction prevailed in Slovenia because large funds were channeled from this developed republic via the federal budget to the less developed parts of Yugoslavia. The Slovenes felt threatened by stagnation and feared that their republic might fall behind the neighboring Western countries with which it was compared. At the 7th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1958, therefore, Slovene politicians called for a compromise that would guarantee further advances for the developed parts of Yugoslavia.[15] The economic discussions arising from this issue led many Yugoslavs, including many Communists, to the conclusion that a new nationalism based exclusively on unresolved economic problems could arise. From this it followed that acceptable economic solutions would dampen ethnic stirrings. Such views were still being voiced when the so-called "Croatian Spring" of 1968–71 was already under way in Zagreb.

This diagnosis proved to be another Communist mistake. While it cannot be denied that economic problems and a sense of economic backwardness played a large role during the onset of the malaise in Croatia, and came up again and again in discussions at that time,[16] it was also apparent that in the final analysis these economic discussions were actually only a starting point for the articulation of a much more general and deeply felt emotional current. In other words, at issue was classical nationalism with all its ramifications. Furthermore, the polemics which broke out among the historians of the individual republics and regions coincided with, rather than followed, the discussions about the distribution of the national income.[17]

The uncertainty of the Communists in the face of the revival of national movements and conflicts caused the party to look for theoretical concepts that might resolve these contradictions in the multi-national state of Yugoslavia. Somehow, it was felt, a "Yugoslav consciousness" must be created that could appeal to both patriotic and ethnic feelings. In 1957, Edvard Kardelj attempted to direct this search into politically acceptable channels. In the foreword to the second edition of his work on the Slovenian national question, written before World War II, he spoke in favor of a socialistically determined "Yugoslavness" (*Jugoslovenstvo*) that should form a "consciousness" above national feelings among the different peoples of Yugoslavia. According to Kardelj, national conflicts could arise only if a "nationalistic" position was adopted, if "Yugoslavness" was

[13] Altman, op. cit., p. 15.

[14] All of the data on census results in Yugoslavia, unless otherwise noted, are derived from the official publication *Facts about Yugoslavia*, published by the Federal Secretariat for Information, Belgrade. The editions of these publications before 1982 contain the census results of 1971, and the new 1982 edition contains the results for 1981.

[15] Shoup, op. cit., p. 235.

[16] See Hrvoje Sosić, *Za ciste racune* (For a Clean Accounting), Zagreb, Matica Hrvatska, 1970.

[17] Shoup, op. cit., p. 195.



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

*The first Yugoslav nuclear electric power plant shown under construction in 1976 in Krško, located near the border between Croatia and Slovenia.*

**—Eastfoto.**

understood as national integralism (as King Alexander had understood it in 1929), or if a "bureaucratic" standpoint was taken.[18]

This was a very complicated definition. It is no wonder that some party members simply took Kardelj's "Yugoslavness" to mean overcoming particular nationalisms by cultivating a new Yugoslav national feeling, that is, precisely by promoting Yugoslav national integralism. This interpretation corresponded also with Lenin's view on how to overcome the "backward" multi-national state. The Zagreb sociologist Dušan Bilandžić recalled in a 1982 interview with the Zagreb *Vjesnik* that at the 7th Congress of the League of Communists in 1958, some delegates had spoken out "for the formation of a Yugoslav nation and the abolition of the republics."[19] Tito, too, was apparently influenced by such views. In 1963, out of the blue, he advocated Yugoslav integralism, at least in the cultural sense: "If we want to create a socialist culture," he said in an address to the Yugoslav journalist's association, "we must also have a common program. It must be Yugoslav. Not every republic or every nationality can create its own socialist culture, for this would again mean separation."[20] Such theses were soon dropped since they encountered resistance. In 1967, Tito stated before the Communists of Belgrade that the term "Yugoslav" meant "membership in our socialist community but not a nationality."[21]

Nevertheless, it is probable that the attempts to stimulate a renewed Yugoslav integralism played a large role in the rise of the national movement in Croatia during 1968–71. In part, this movement consisted of a very emotional reaction against "unitarism" and "centralism" in any form. It stressed the independence and equal rights of the nations within the federal structure to the

[18] Edvard Kardelj (Sperans), *Razvoj slovenackog nacionalnog pitanja* (The Evolution of the Slovene National Question), Foreword to 2nd ed., Belgrade, Kultura, 1957, p. 53.

[19] Dušan Bilandžić, "High Tide of Declared Yugoslavs," interview in *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), May 8, 1982.

[20] *Politika* (Belgrade), Feb. 14, 1963.

[21] Bilandžić, op. cit.



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point of reviving the "right to secede," which the constitution had granted first to the republics and later to the nations. There were proposals to transform the federation into a confederation.[22] In this connection, the principle of statehood for the individual republics was also advocated. This demand was important because it basically involved, at least for Croatia, the revival of the idea of national sovereignty within Yugoslavia and its linkage to the republic. The Croatian crisis was a crucial turning point in the evolution of the nationality question in Yugoslavia. It spelled the end of propagandistic slogans and Leninist flourishes, as well as of notions that socialism made nationalism inconceivable.

Although Tito ordered a thorough crackdown on nationalist manifestations in 1971, national aspirations were accorded more consideration in the ensuing years. The principle of statehood for the individual republics became accepted and adopted first in the constitutional amendments of 1971 and then in the constitution of 1974. Even the autonomous provinces within Serbia were recognized as constituent elements of Yugoslavia and were granted autonomous rights, recognized in the constitution. The difference in comparison to the republics lay in the fact that the statehood of the regions was not recognized. Article 4 characterizes the regions simply as "autonomous, socialist, self-managed, democratic, socio-political communities"—in which, to be sure, "the nations and nationalities realize their sovereign rights." This is the point on which the authorities of Kosovo and Vojvodina base their claims in the struggle against centralizing tendencies in the Republic of Serbia.

It is often asked why federalism in Yugoslavia came to be especially emphasized and anchored in the constitution in a veritably "bourgeois" manner after the crisis in Croatia. The explanation can only lie in Tito's belief at the time that he had discovered a new political concept for Yugoslavia. He apparently thought it possible to accommodate the new realities on the *state* level through a federalism solidly anchored in the constitution and the legal system, while a more disciplined and centralized *party* would buttress both the state and the regime. In two speeches in Split and Zadar as early as the summer of 1970, Tito characterized as an error the attempt (at the 6th Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists in 1952) to obliterate the centralist organizational principle of a Leninist Communist party.[23] The 10th party congress in 1974 emphasized, as had not been done for a long time, the centralist and Leninist nature of the party; it took an explicit stance against the party's "federalization."[24]

This concept of Tito's—which, like Kardelj's, sought to mix "socialist internationalism" with an unclearly defined "Yugoslavness"—failed, since it aggravated national and federal problems in the post-Tito period. Because the Communist party apparatuses in the individual republics constitute relatively independent power centers, a centralist conception of the party could not prevail over them. While Tito did succeed, in conjunction with the purge in Croatia, in ousting from their posts in the Serbian, Slovenian, and Macedonian republics proponents of policies that he disliked, he was forced to rely even in the Croatian case on alliances with the various republic leaderships. Aside from the fact that these purges caused the Yugoslav party to lose many outstanding personalities, whose absence is still felt today, Tito's actions precipitated a general decline in the authority and prestige of the party as an institution.

## Post-Tito Developments

These developments—the further strengthening of the republics and the decline of the party's importance in the spectrum of Yugoslav institutions—continued at an accelerated pace after Tito's death. They reached their high point thus far at the 12th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1982.[25] Both developments were closely linked to growing economic difficulties, which could not be overcome by party resolutions alone. It also became clear that all the problems, including the Kosovo problem, did not lead to strong solidarity within the Yugoslav party but rather to an intensification of conflicts. In September 1982, the new party chairman, Mitja Ribičić, spoke openly about the lamentable state of cohesion within the party and threatened his listeners with "democratic centralism."[26]

As far as the Republic of Croatia is concerned, Tito's crackdown in the early 1970's left it in an unsatisfactory state, indicative of Communist inability to cope with the phenomenon of nation. The new leadership was of second-rate quality. While they did defend the economic interests of the republic,[27] the new leaders in Zagreb

[22] Ivan Perić gives a summary of the concepts that came to light in the so-called "Croatian Spring" with numerous quotations in *Ideje Masovnog Pokreta u Hrvatskoj* (The Ideas of the Mass Movement in Croatia), Zagreb, Narodna Sveučiliište Grada Zagreba, 1974. (The document is written from the standpoint of the leadership that was newly installed in 1971.)

[23] *Politika*, Aug. 23 and 30, 1970.

[24] Dennison Rusinow. *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*, London, C. Hurst, 1977, pp. 332 ff.

[25] For example, the main speaker on the Yugoslav economy had to rely on data prepared by a commission under the authority of the State Presidium. *Materials from the 12th Congress of the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, June 1982.

[26] *Borba* (Belgrade), Sept. 15, 1982.

[27] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nov. 11, 1981.



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

*Mitja Ribičić, pictured in June 1982, after his election as President of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.*

**—Eastfoto.**

could not bring about an identification between republic and nation. This left the mounting Croatian national consciousness without an outlet. The situation was not improved by the fact that the roughly 15 percent Serbian minority within the republic has been accorded preferential treatment. These Serbs live in the economically more backward areas and favored strong Yugoslav centralism as far back as the pre-war period. They were afraid—as it turns out justifiably—of Croatian nationalism. In 1941, these Serbs were driven into the arms of the Communist partisans by the operations of the Croatian Ustaše, and it is probably no exaggeration to say that after 1945 and again after 1971, the Serbs behaved like conquerors. The share of Serbs in the membership of the Croatian Communist party was around 28 percent in 1958 and was still 24 percent in 1978.[28] This is far more than their proportion of the population. One also gets the impression that the Serbs are overrepresented in the political police of Croatia.

The Catholic church was able to fill the national vacuum in Croatia. It succeeded in making itself the guardian of the historical traditions of the Croats. The massive gathering of about 200,000 participants in Nin (Dalmatia) on September 1 and 2, 1979, to celebrate the Croats' 1,100 year-old affiliation with Roman Christianity constituted the high point of this effort.[29] The success of this celebration and of other activities by the Church made the regime nervous and led to an anti-clerical campaign in 1980 and 1981, including police harassment of the clergy extending even into Bosnia-Hercegovina. Jakov Blažević, then president of the Presidium of the Croatian Republic and the chief procurator in the 1946 trial of the Archbishop of Zagreb, Aloys Stepinać, reopened old wounds by publishing his memoirs in January 1981.[30] At the same time, nationalistically inclined Croatian intellectuals such as Franjo Tudjman, Vlado Gotovac, Zlatko Tomičić, Dobroslav Paraga, and Marko Veselica were put on trial. To this day, many expressions of national feeling that have long been a matter of course in the other republics of Yugoslavia are apparently taboo in Croatia.

The percentage of party members among the individual nations or nationalities seems to have become more and more the measure of the tolerance and understanding that the Communist regime is ready to display in specific instances, including on the issue of nationality. The percentages of party membership were long secret, but in June 1982, official statistics were published.[31] With a "Communist density" of only 4.62 percent, the Albanians are the black sheep among the Yugoslav nations, even if one takes into account that the proportion of minors among this nation is especially high. The Croatians, with 7 percent, are not much better off. As for the Slovenes, only 6.4 percent belong to the party. However, in addition to the strength of Catholicism there, low party membership is probably due to a higher living standard and relatively tranquil conditions, which make political involvement seem rather superfluous. Among the Montenegrins, on the other hand, almost 20 percent are Communists, and among the Serbs over 12 percent. Of the Macedonians, 10.5 percent are Communists. Of those who designate themselves ethnically as "Yugoslavs," more than 11 percent belong to the party.

This last-named ethnic designation gave rise to many comments and discussions in the spring of 1982, and

[28] *NIN* (Belgrade), Dec. 16, 1979.

[29] In the year 879, Prince Branimir had received from the Pope the recognition of the independence of the Croatian church. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 9, 1979.

[30] *Politika*, Jan. 29, 1981.

[31] Ibid., June 24, 1982, p. 7.



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*Marko Veselica, inside the cathedral in Zagreb, prior to being tried for Croatian nationalism.*

**—Ost Dienst.**

brought the dilemma of the Yugoslav Communists vis-à-vis the nationality question back to its starting point. When the results of the 1981 census were published, it turned out that a surprisingly large number of Yugoslav citizens—around 1.22 million or 5.42 percent of the total population—designated themselves as "Yugoslavs" by national affiliation. This was 4.3 times as many as in 1971. It is interesting to note how this phenomenon manifested itself in different parts of the country. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, the number of "national Yugoslavs" rose in comparison to the 1971 census from around 44,000 to 326,000; one can assume that the figure was for the most part made up of Moslems who do not care for the formal identification of religion and nationality. In the autonomous region of Vojvodina, the "Yugoslavs" increased from 47,000 to 167,000; on the other hand, the number of Hungarians declined by 40,000, and that of Croats fell also. In the Republic of Croatia, the percentage of Serbs sank from 14.2 to 11.5 percent, while there were suddenly 8.2 percent "Yugoslavs," a figure more than four times as great as in 1971. In Kosovo, the share of "national Yugoslavs," 0.2 percent, was the lowest percentage in all of Yugoslavia.[32]

Did the tremendous increase in the number of national Yugoslavs come about because the party carried out direct or indirect propaganda to the effect that "Yugoslav" as a national category was "more progressive" in the socialist sense than Croat, Slovene, or Serb? Obviously, this must have played a role. Dušan Bilandžić met with excited denials when he tried to explore this question. The fear of conflict that many citizens might have harbored so soon after Tito's death, the wish to resolve personal dilemmas such as mixed marriages, or a preference for unity and centralism undoubtedly influenced the choice of some respondents. In addition, some groups who are minorities in their area might have sought to protect themselves by "national Yugoslavness." In any event, in Bilandžić's opinion, the huge increase in "national Yugoslavs" shows that "something is wrong in our society."[33] Bilandžić also suggested that the striving for a Yugoslav nation was an "illusion."

The ugly way in which some party activists, notably Serbs from Croatia, conducted polemics against Bilandžić[34] supports the assumption that, now as before, there are many Yugoslav Communists—and perhaps non-Communist Yugoslav patriots as well—who seek to overcome Yugoslavia's national diversity and occasional discord through a supranational "Yugoslavism." The unease over this declarative Yugoslavism so evident in the Bilandžić interview, however, indicates that the traditional nations of Yugoslavia still constitute the basic components of that country, and cannot be pushed into the background or bypassed. Bilandžić is probably correct in saying that "national Yugoslavism" is primarily a product of specific regional or personal idiosyncracies and thus a limited phenomenon. Indeed, developments since Tito's death seem to have strengthened rather than weakened the assertiveness of individual nations, nationalities, and republics.

## The Albanian Question

Nowhere has this assertiveness been expressed more conspicuously than in Kosovo. The events in Kosovo clearly show the limits of national integralism in contemporary Yugoslavia. At the same time, they could also signify an unequivocal and perhaps irrevocable dashing of hopes that national contradictions in the Balkans might be overcome by means of "supranational" socialist doctrine. The very name "Yugoslavia" signifies the

[32] Bilandžić, op. cit.

[33] Ibid.

[34] For example, Jovan Mirić in *Danas* (Zagreb), May 25, 1982.



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*Spring plowing in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, a nationally diverse region of Yugoslavia whose population included an unusually high proportion of citizens identifying themselves as "Yugoslavs" in the 1981 census.*
**—Eastfoto.**

land of the Southern Slavs. The Albanians—of whom more than 2.5 million live in the Albanian Socialist People's Republic and another 1.73 million, according to the 1981 census, live in Yugoslavia—are not Slavs. According to modern scholarship, they are the descendants of the ancient Illyrians. This hypothesis is accepted today by all Albanian scholars and by a large number of non-Albanian Balkan specialists.[35] The Albanians were the last Balkan nation to acquire a modern national consciousness in the 19th century and form a national state. In Tirana, the visitor is always told that the religious diversity of the Albanians (Moslem, Orthodox, and Catholic) hindered the process of becoming a nation. This is given, among other reasons, as the explanation for the massive antireligious campaign of 1967–68 and the designation of Albania as the world's "first atheistic state." It is probably also true that the late coalescence of the Albanians into a modern nation led them at first to prefer the continued existence of the 19th-century Ottoman Empire, which at least tried to protect the Albanian settlement areas against the territorial claims of the new Balkan Christian states of Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro. The "League of Prizren," the first united political association of the Albanians which sought to make the Berlin Congress of 1878 understand their interests, certainly contained this tendency along with an emancipatory one.[36]

The first Balkan War then brought precisely what the Albanians had feared: the victorious young Balkan states appropriated large parts of the Albanian settlement area, with Serbia and Montenegro dividing between them Kosovo and today's western Macedonia. The Albanians of Kosovo fought against this annexation but were unable to prevent it. Of the 1.73 million Albanians in Yugoslavia today, 1.23 million live in Kosovo where, according to the 1981 census, they make up 77.7 percent of the population. In Macedonia, there are 374,000 Albanians making up 19 percent of the population; not quite 38,000 live in Montenegro.

Kosovo is dear not only to the Albanians; it was also the heart of the medieval Serbian kingdom. Many im-

[35] See the report of Professor Aleks Buda at the National Conference on the Formation of the Albanian People, their Language and Culture, "The Ethnogenesis of the Albanian People in the Light of History," Tirana, Albanian Telegraphic Agency, July 3, 1982.

[36] With regard to these developments see Stavro Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878–1912*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967.



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portant Serbian cultural monuments are located here, and the landmark battle of 1389 against the Turks was fought on Kosovo Field. This Serbian defeat forms the subject of the national epic literature. In Prizren, the great memorials of both Albanians and Serbs are found only a short distance apart: in the city is the villa in which the "League of Prizren" met in 1878; two miles up the valley is the monastery on the site where Tsar Dušan, the greatest ruler of medieval Serbia, was buried. It is also beyond doubt that in this early period Kosovo was settled primarily by Serbs. In the western part of Kosovo, that is, along the border with contemporary Albania, Metohija and its cities Peć and Prizren may have always been partly settled by Albanians; but in eastern Kosovo, where Priština is located, the Albanians came to settle only toward the end of the 18th century and later.[37]

These historical points are important because the Kosovo conflict has increasingly become a purely national dispute between Serbs and Albanians, as well as between the authorities of the Republic of Serbia and those of the autonomous region of Kosovo. The rest of Yugoslavia seems to play the role of an irritated and concerned spectator. The authorities of the Republic of Serbia and the Serbian press concentrate their attention to an ever greater extent on the problem of the emigration of the Serbs out of Kosovo. At the request of Serbia, the Federal Parliament has also taken up this problem but obviously has difficulty finding solutions.[38]

Even a casual visitor to Kosovo can easily see that

[37] See Atanasije Urosević, *Toponomia Kosova* (Toponymy of Kosovo), Belgrade, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1975.

[38] *Politika*, Sept. 30, 1982.

*The Dečani Monastery in Kosovo—on the site where Tsar Dušan was buried.*

—EUPRA.



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relations between the two groups of inhabitants are quite tense.[39] Outmigration of Serbs has been a persistent phenomenon there since 1966, when the authorities and police in Kosovo were "Albanianized" after the fall of the internal affairs minister, Aleksandar Ranković. As a result of the Serbian outmigration and the higher birthrate of the Albanians, the population ratio has changed since World War II. In 1953, the Albanians made up not quite 65 percent of the population of Kosovo, while Serbs and Montenegrins together accounted for over 26 percent. Today, the corresponding figures are 77.7 and not quite 15 percent.[40] Thus, Albanian nationalists are tangibly realizing the goal of an "ethnically pure Kosovo," despite federal intervention and massive police pressure. There is little doubt that the outmigration of many Serbs, especially from the villages, is hastened by the behavior of segments of the Albanian population. Although only incomplete statistics on the exact number of Serbs and Montenegrins that have left are available, the Belgrade newspaper *Politika* estimates the migration losses of these two groups in Kosovo between 1971 and 1981 to be about 102,000 persons.[41] The absolute number of Serbs in Kosovo declined during this period from 228,000 to just under 210,000, while the number of Albanians grew from 916,000 to 1.23 million.

The present situation is just a phase in a long process. The governments of Serbia and interwar Yugoslavia—both dominated by Serbs—viewed the annexation of Kosovo after the first Balkan War and World War I as a return of places sacred to the Serbian national past; they attempted to bring Serbs into Kosovo again and to push back the Albanians through colonization. Most Albanians in Kosovo therefore welcomed the breakup of Yugoslavia by fascist Italy and the uniting of Kosovo and western Macedonia to Albania proper, even if they presumably would have preferred to see this "liberation" take place in different circumstances.

In this connection, a former high official of the Yugoslav Communist party, Vukmanović-Tempo, vividly

[39] For reports on a visit to Kosovo in June 1982 see *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 12, 18, 19, and 27, 1982.

[40] *Politika*, Sept. 30, 1982, p. 4.

[41] Ibid.

*Citizens of Albanian origin (including a number in white shawls and caps) are prominent on market day in the city of Peć, in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo. (In the background is the minaret of a mosque.)*

—EUPRA.



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described the precarious conditions in which the Communists had to try to build their resistance movement during World War II.[42] There was always the risk that the few Albanians who found their way to the Communists would begin to discuss unification plans with the Communists of Albania. Quite possibly, it was the substantial dependence of Enver Hoxha's Albanian partisan movement on Tito's Yugoslav partisans that prevented greater complications in this sphere. The scant joy of the Albanians over the reestablishment of Yugoslavia was again expressed in armed resistance after 1944, prompting Tito's government to introduce a brutal police regime in Kosovo that oppressed the Albanian population, despite the formal autonomy of the region. This regime was supported by many of the Serbs and Montenegrins living in Kosovo, some of whom avenged grievances accumulated during the Albanian domination in World War II.

When repression eased after 1966, the feeling of liberation on the part of the Albanians was expressed in the demonstrations of 1968. Subsequently, the Albanians succeeded in creating a national intellectual center for Kosovo in the University of Priština. In addition, a generation of young, nationally conscious teachers for all school levels reached maturity. These people were the instigators of the nationalist revolts of 1981, and they firmly maintain their national positions. The police and military repression, as well as the arrests and convictions of so many young Albanians—often out of all proportion to their transgressions—contribute to hostility toward the Serbian and Montenegrin population. The situation appears insoluble today since all suggested measures can ultimately be undermined by the Albanian population of Kosovo, which reacts to repression with solidarity and a conspiracy of silence.

What do the young Albanian rebels of Kosovo want? One can get some idea of their goals only through personal impressions; the conspiracy of silence also applies to their objectives. They feel themselves to be Albanians, for whom the unification process of the Albanian nation is the determining national experience. A corollary of this is a feeling of indifference to the problems of Yugoslavia. Just as 19th-century Serbs thought about national unity first culturally and then politically, today the Albanians of Kosovo, above all the younger generation, are doing the same. This, however, does not necessarily imply an unconditional desire for union with present-day Albania.

Immediately after the events, Stane Dolanc, a member of the Presidium of the League of Communists

*Dragoslav Marković, a prominent Serbian Communist.*

**—Eastfoto.**

of Yugoslavia and minister of internal affairs, dismissed the notion that the unrest was instigated by Tirana.[43] Subsequently, Albania generally, and Enver Hoxha personally, were accused of "agitating" the young Albanians in Kosovo with irredentist sentiments. Yet, from visits and conversations in Tirana, one gains the impression that this has not been the case. On the contrary, there is unease in Tirana about the developments in Kosovo. The Albanians in Kosovo are perceived to be national "purists" whose intensifying nationalism is unsettling to authorities in Tirana because it is not subject to their control. There is also fear that the Kosovars—who have a freer life, practice their religion, and can travel abroad—might cause unrest in Albania by stimulating desires for similar conditions there. Furthermore, Tirana appreciates the importance of Yugoslavia as one of the few countries with which Albania has contacts, as its most important trading partner, and as a rampart against the Soviets. In principle, so a visitor is always told, Albania wants good relations with Yugoslavia, but naturally cannot remain silent when the "brothers on the other side of the border" are op-

[42] Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, *Revolucija Koja Tece, Memoari* (The Continuing Revolution, Memoirs), Vol. 1, Belgrade, Komunist, 1971, pp. 332 ff.

[43] Tanjug Domestic Service, Apr. 6, 1981, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Apr. 7, 1981, pp. I/5–9.



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pressed by Serbian or Macedonian nationalism.[44]

It would seem that the time for true Albanian irredentism in Kosovo, in the sense of a movement for unification with Albania, has not yet come. Rather, one has the impression that the young Kosovars feel that their mission includes lighting the torch of national unity on a "realistic" basis in Albania proper. Enver Hoxha is respected as a national leader, a sort of "anti-Tito," but hardly as anything more. As long as the current regime and the current system exist in Albania, the Kosovo problem will remain a domestic problem for Yugoslavia. The young Kosovars in no way dispute the fact that they have more freedom and a higher standard of living in Yugoslavia than do their brothers in Albania. They think, however, that they owe it to their Albanian national consciousness to place these advantages in the service of eventual Albanian unification.

The Communist authorities in Kosovo who are Albanian are in danger of falling between two stools. Under the former party secretary Mahmud Bakali, a kind of state-socialist regime was in effect in Kosovo, with capital investments coming from the central government. Today, the much weaker political leadership of Kosovo is under pressure from the authorities of Serbia, who would like to reduce the constitutional prerogatives of the province and who threaten "personnel changes."[45] The Serbian leadership, especially Dragoslav Marković, can and does capitalize on Serbian frustrations unleashed by the Kosovo question. Statements expressive of low esteem for the national achievements of the Albanians are pouring out of Serbia;[46] even the Illyrian ancestry of the Albanians is presented as a political problem (and thus denied) in the Serbian Central Committee.[47] This overt anti-Albanian bias also found its way into the platform on Kosovo adopted at the 12th Congress of the League of Communists.[48]

Thus, the nationality question has become again a rivalry between nationalisms in socialist Yugoslavia, as it had been in prewar Yugoslavia. This development is regarded with concern by many people in Yugoslavia, in and out of the party. In the wake of the 12th party congress in the summer of 1982, there were some criticisms of the political leadership in Serbia on this point.[49] The question remains whether Serbia, which is strong in both population and power, can be circumvented or induced to change its policies. According to some views, the Yugoslav federation, including the party, is not sufficiently strong to bring this about. With regard to Kosovo, the policy of the federation at the present time amounts simply to keeping the situation under some degree of physical control through a massive show of force. A political solution, however, would have to include recognition that the Albanians are the majority in Kosovo, and perhaps even a change of the present constitutional arrangements. Because of the specter of separatism, there is reluctance to give Kosovo republic status. Yet, postponement of a political solution might necessitate greater concessions in the future. Meanwhile, the Kosovo problem reveals the limited room for maneuver at the disposal of the post-Tito leadership of Yugoslavia.

[44] Viktor Meier, "Impressions from a Visit to Albania," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 8, 1982.

[45] Visit of General Nikola Ljubicić, President of the Presidium of Serbia, to Kosovo at the end of June 1982, *Politika*, June 22–25, 1982.

[46] See the publication of Tanjug, *Enver Hodzina Albanija* (Enver Hoxha's Albania), Belgrade, July 1981. In this publication, the "League of Prizren" is portrayed as useless and the Albanian national hero Skenderbeg as a figure of minor historical significance.

[47] See "Illyrian-Albanian Enigma," *NIN*, June 6, 1982.

[48] "Political Platform for Action by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Developing Socialist Self-Management, Brotherhood, Unity and Fellowship in Kosovo," *Materials of the 12th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, June 1982.

[49] In this regard, see Ribičić's allusions in Kumrovec (*Borba*, Sept. 15, 1982) and before the Central Committee (*Politika*, Sept. 25, 1982).



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# Crisis in Kosovo

**By Mark Baskin**

The recent upheaval in Yugoslavia's predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo and the vicissitudes of Belgrade's efforts to restore political order there provide an interesting opportunity to address the issue of ethnicity in that multi-national country. The literature on postwar Yugoslav politics has generally proceeded from the assumption that this issue and related regional particularisms comprise the central, underlying dilemmas of Yugoslavia's politics and society. Pessimistic assessments question the country's very viability and argue that zero-sum, primordial ethnic struggles for power will prevent the firm establishment of legitimacy of the "national" (i.e., federal) government among strategic elites and publics.[1] Optimists see central decision-makers managing conflicts in ways that may ultimately break down the patterns of ethnic identification, and perhaps even result in a broader "Yugoslav" identification.[2] Thus, the ways in which the "crisis in Kosovo" continues to be a major issue on the agenda of Yugoslavia's leadership command great interest.

Within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo has the status of an autonomous province in the Republic of Serbia. As of 1981, Albanians constituted 78 percent of its population of 1,584,588; Serbs, 13 percent; and Montenegrins, 2 percent.[3] Politically dominated by the Serbs and Montenegrins until 1966, the province's Albanians staged major nationalist demonstrations shortly thereafter—in November 1968—demanding republic status for the province within the federation.[4] In the 1970's, there occurred an "Albanianization" of the province's administration; explosive growth of the university in the provincial capital, Priština, as a magnet for all Albanians in Yugoslavia; an increase in direct contacts between the province and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania; and a widening of economic disparity between the province and the rest of Yugoslavia in terms of per capita income.[5] In short, the demonstrations that took place in early 1981 should not have come as much of a surprise.

## The Disturbances of 1981

The "crisis in Kosovo" began on March 11, 1981, with demonstrations at the student center of Priština University that soon turned into a march to the center of the provincial capital with demands for better food and improvement of other conditions facing the large student body. Police used tear gas to restore order.[6] Things grew more tense on March 26, when "hundreds" of students and youths again marched toward the city center to break up the local leg of a Yugoslav youth relay race, then smashed shop windows, overturned auto-

[1] See, for example, A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslavia: In the Twilight of Tito," *The Washington Papers* (Beverly Hills, CA), No. 16, 1974; also Pedro Ramet, "Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, PA), Summer 1981, pp. 369–88. Finally, see the anti-Yugoslav émigré press.

[2] See, for example, Bogdan Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1976; and Gary Bertsch, "Ethnicity and Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* (Philadelphia, PA), September 1977, pp. 88–89.

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[3] "The National Composition of the Population by Communes, Final Results," *Statistički Bilten* (Belgrade), No. 595, May 1982.

[4] See below, pp. 70–71.

[5] See below, p. 65.

[6] The account herein is taken largely from *NIN* (Belgrade), Apr. 12, 1981, pp. 8–12; and *Sta se Dogadjalo na Kosovu* (What Happened in Kosovo), Belgrade, Mala Biblioteka Politike, 1981, pp. 1–24. For confirmation of the validity of the students' complaints, see the comments of former provincial party leader Mahmut Bakali in Tanjug, Apr. 6, 1981, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-EEU*), Apr. 7, 1981, pp. I/10–14, esp. p. I/12.



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


*Armed patrols seen on the streets of Priština, capital of Kosovo, in March 1982.*

**—EUPRA.**

mobiles, clashed with the police, and—more important—propounded openly nationalist slogans: "Kosovo—Republic," "We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs," "We are the children of Skenderbeg, the army of Enver Hoxha," "Union with Albania," "Long Live Marxism—Down with Revisionism," and "Trepča does the work, and the Serbs profit."[7] Even more alarming to authorities were the demonstrations at the beginning of April. Tear gas and tanks had to be used to disperse thousands of nationalist demonstrators in Priština. Smaller-scale demonstrations—complete with marches, slogans, attacks on non-Albanian residents, broken store windows, boycotted schools, and clashes between demonstrators and police—occurred in the Kosovo municipalities of Vučitrn, Kosovska Mitrovica, Glogolac, Djakovica, Prizren, Podujevo, and Gnjilane, as well as Tetovo, Gostivar, Debar, Kičevo, Struga, Ohrid, Kumanovo, and Skopje in the Republic of Macedonia. In intensity and duration, this activity surpassed all prior such disruptions in postwar Yugoslavia.[8] The regime acted authoritatively on April 2, closing the university, denying foreign journalists entry to the province, imposing a curfew, and declaring a state of emergency (*vanredno stanje*).

Having quelled the outward manifestations of trouble in Kosovo, Yugoslavia's rulers faced the more difficult task of sorting out the causes and restoring socialist order in the province. The April 2, 1981, joint communiqué of the Federal Presidency and of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia confidently asserted that Albanian nationalism has "nothing in common with the demands of most in Kosovo."[9] In this interpretation, the problems of Kosovo were not linked to ethnic inequality, but to the perfidy of neighboring Albania, enemies within Kosovo, and the laxness of the local political organization.

On this last point, Djavid Nimani, a local party leader, openly discussed the provincial party organization's inability to cope with the "tempestuous development" of the province, which had "created many difficulties and contradictions."[10] Consistent with this diagnosis, the regime has maintained that an increasingly vigilant party organization was the key to political and economic stabilization and further development of self-management in Kosovo.[11]

To the extent that the optimists are correct, one would have anticipated a successful normalization of Kosovo, based on: (1) a settlement of accounts with Albanian nationalists and with "opportunists" in the provincial party organization; (2) a reevaluation of past developmental strategies and adoption of ameliorative policies; and (3) some sort of policy of reconciliation designed to achieve the political acquiescence of the people of Kosovo or even increase the legitimacy of the regime.[12]

Actual events have not matched this optimistic scenario, whether in the matter of settling accounts with nationalists and "differentiating" (i.e., purging) the provincial party organization, in dealing with the deeper economic and social problems, or in coming to terms with the less tangible problems of ethnic identification. Below, I shall explore developments in each of these areas, providing some of the context in which current problems have arisen.

[7] Bakali, loc. cit. Trepča is a large lead and zinc smelting combine located in Kosovska Mitrovica.

[8] To my knowledge, no monetary estimate was attached to the damage. The then secretary for internal affairs, Franjo Herljević, reported to the Federal Assembly on June 9, 1981, that a total of 16 mass demonstrations in 11 municipalities resulted in 100 autos damaged or destroyed, 400 store windows broken, numerous buildings and apartments broken into, and 9 dead and 257 wounded. See Tanjug, June 9, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, June 10, 1981, pp. I/1–8; also *NIN*, Apr. 10 and July 19, 1981.

[9] Cited in *Sta Se Dogadjalo na Kosovu*, p. 21.

[10] Ibid., p. 22. See also, *Komunist* (Belgrade), Apr. 24, 1981, p. 8.

[11] See the "Political Platform for LCY Action in the Development of Socialist Self-Management, Brotherhood, Unity and Community in Kosovo," Tanjug Domestic Service, Nov. 24, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 27, 1981, pp. I/1–35.

[12] For a discussion of normalization in East European socialist states, see Zvi Gitelman, "The Politics of Socialist Restoration in Hungary and Czechoslovakia," *Comparative Politics* (New York, NY), January 1981, pp. 187–210.



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## Politics of Normalization

There can be no doubt that since April 1981, the Yugoslav regime has engaged in a policy of political differentiation in Kosovo aimed at rooting out Albanian nationalism and at purging and placing under firmer control the local League of Communists organization. One can cite high levels of rhetorical conflict with Albania; invocations that the party is "engaged in multifaceted and dynamic ideopolitical action"; almost weekly uncovering of new enemy groups; administrative punishment of over 1,000 persons; criticism of past formalism and bureaucratism in the administration of Kosovo; resignation of many high-level functionaries; and the disbanding of weak basic party organizations and revitalization of others.[13]

Yet, as late as March 1982, the Yugoslav party's official newspaper could only state that "subjective forces [read "socio-political organizations"] in the province should *begin* to take the offensive."[14] This admonition, a year after the initial demonstrations, suggests an "enemy" far more intransigent than the optimists perceived and indicates that political restoration in the province has presented problems not foreseen by a party seemingly concerned with outward appearances alone.

Indeed, the press is rife with reports of continued dissidence despite the ritual of "differentiation and renewal." For example, we learn that "over a thousand workers" from the Ramiz Sadiku enterprise had participated in the April 1981 demonstrations; that in Albanian-inhabited regions in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia nationalist slogans continue to appear, pamphlets are still distributed, and rumors continue to spread; that large demonstrations occurred in Priština in February, March, and April 1982, with smaller ones continuing to occur throughout the province; that incidents of student discontent and rowdyism continue; that attacks on and threats to Serbs and Montenegrins throughout Kosovo have hastened their outmigration; that some organizations in Kosovo and Western Macedonia conduct business solely in the Albanian language; and that Priština citizens are refusing to pay taxes and bills.[15]

Nor did the 13th Conference of the Provincial Committee of the Kosovo League of Communists, in April 1982, give optimists much encouragement concerning political stabilization. In his report, the committee president, Veli Deva, gave a bleak account of party accomplishments since March 1981—one dotted with "formalism" in democratic life, weakening of the party's militancy, and strengthening of opportunism within party ranks. In short, Deva reported,

*the League of Communists has not been at the center of political life . . . the link with the grass roots has been continuously weakening.*[16]

Moreover, the process of "differentiation" has not penetrated much beyond the very top leadership of the Kosovo party organization. As of September 1981, only 365 of some 4,000 members of the key party organization at Priština University had been purged; and by June 1982, only some 1,200–1,500 of a total of 92,000



*Veli Deva, President of the League of Communists of Kosovo at the time of the 13th Conference of the provincial party committee in April 1982.*

**—Eastfoto.**

[13] *Komunist,* Aug. 13, 1981, p. 8; *NIN,* Apr. 4, 1982, p. 4, and Apr. 7, 1982, p. 15; Tanjug Domestic Service, June 6, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* June 8, 1981, pp. I/10–14.

[14] *Borga* (Belgrade), Mar. 17, 1982, p. 3 (emphasis added).

[15] *NIN,* June 21, 1981, p. 13, Feb. 28, 1982, pp. 10–11, and March 7, 1982, pp. 8–12; *Borba,* Mar. 13, 1982, p. 3, and Dec. 13, 1981, p. 4; *Komunist,* Nov. 20, 1981, p. 10; Tanjug Domestic Service, Dec. 8, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* Dec. 9, 1981, p. I/7; *NIN,* Jan. 17, 1982, p. 11; and *Borba,* Mar. 15, 1983, p. 6.

[16] Tanjug Domestic Service, Apr. 24, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 26, 1982, p. I/6.



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party members in the province had been expelled.[17] In short, one does not see in Kosovo the reassertion of firm political control generally characteristic of the early stages of a successful restoration process.

## Economics of Stabilization

Political stabilization hardly occurs in a vacuum. As an article in *Komunist* of September 18, 1981, suggests, "in the otherwise very complex political situation, the struggle for economic stabilization is as significant as the struggle against political enemies." Thus, while the party leadership may prefer to cope with the crisis through the reassertion of Leninist norms within the provincial party organization and adoption by the party of a unitary, monolithic stance vis-à-vis the society, a variant of the optimistic image holds that the advent of economic abundance will lead Kosovo's citizens to evaluate regime performance less on the basis of shared norms and values and more on the basis of well-stocked stores and full stomachs. Such a "consumerist" strategy might elicit the political quiescence of the population in the short term, and perhaps even provide a basis for support of the regime in the long term.[18]

In evaluating the possibilities of this option, it is important first to bear in mind some structural parameters within which the entire country currently operates. Yugoslavia suffers from recurrent negative trade balances and high foreign debt (estimated at US$20 billion at the beginning of 1983), which precludes the wholesale importation of consumer goods (and, in many cases, raw materials); embarrassingly high inflation (over 40 percent in 1981, and 29.5 percent in 1982); and high unemployment (12 percent in 1981).[19] Even those republics of Yugoslavia not burdened with "nationalist excesses" have had great difficulty in implementing a program of economic stabilization. Such negative trends are bound to affect Kosovo—the least developed region of Yugoslavia—even more severely.

One should also look at Kosovo's past achievements in economic development. Even the most depressing reports about the political situation will nevertheless paint Kosovo as "a unique example of socioeconomic development."[20] There has unquestionably been rapid growth of national income, development of a skilled labor force, and increasing urbanization in the province, and optimists point to abundance of coal and other raw materials there. Yet, the gap separating Kosovo from the rest of Yugoslavia has continued to widen. For example, in 1954, per capita income in Kosovo was 48 percent of that in Yugoslavia as a whole; by 1975, this percentage had dropped to 33. (In the same period, Slovenia's gross material product rose from 188 percent to 201 percent of the national average.)[21] At the end of 1980, Kosovo had slipped further in relative terms—to 27.8 percent of the national level.[22]

Have central policies since 1957—when, as the Communist party admits, "the country was unable to commit itself sufficiently to stimulating Kosovo's development"[23]—prepared the province for an economic "breakthrough"? Since then, significant amounts of capital have been transferred from the developed to the less developed regions (i.e., Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo). Initially, these transfers were in the form of compulsory plan allocations, but the "reform" of 1965 (sponsored largely by the developed republics) abolished the central investment fund and replaced it with the Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of the Underdeveloped Regions. This fund received 1.85 percent of each republic's gross social product for exclusive redistribution to the less developed regions. Kosovo received more than 40 percent of these resources; this federal contribution amounted to more than 70 percent of the province's investment capital and approximately 70 percent of the province's budget in 1971–75.[24]

Despite this federal largesse, in December 1980 (three months before the demonstrations in Kosovo), Mahmut Bakali, then provincial party president, publicly complained that "the resources set aside in the last medium-term plan [for 1976–80] obviously were not sufficient to ensure . . . developing Kosovo as rapidly as possible."[25] In the same month, the Central Committee

[17] *NIN*, Sept. 6, 1981, pp. 8–11; and Belgrade Domestic Service, June 16, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, June 17, 1982, pp. I/14–15. According to a delegate from Gnjilane at the April 1982 provincial League of Communists Conference, "the question of differentiation of Communists . . . is still not being implemented evenly in all basic League of Communists organizations." The municipality party organization in Gnjilane had since March 1981 apparently expelled only 82 members, taken action against 20 others, and admitted 325 new members, many of them young. Tanjug Domestic Service, Apr. 26, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Apr. 27, 1982, p. I/7. (One wonders how many of the new members had participated in the Kosovo demonstrations.)

[18] See Zvi Gitelman, "Power and Authority in Eastern Europe," in Chalmers Johnson, Ed., *Change in Communist Systems*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1970; and Kenneth Jowitt, "Inclusion and Mobilization in European Leninist Regimes," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1975, pp. 69–96.

[19] On the Yugoslav foreign debt, see, e.g., *The Wall Street Journal* (New York, NY), Jan. 18, 1983; also *Danas* (Zagreb), Feb. 8, 1983, p. 4.

[20] "Political Platform for LCY Action," loc. cit.

[21] Martin Schrenk, Cyrus Ardalan, and Nawal A. El Tatawy, *Yugoslavia, Self-Management Socialism and the Challenges of Development*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 287.

[22] Tanjug Domestic Service, Dec. 4, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 10, 1980, p. I/11.

[23] "Political Platform for LCY Action," loc. cit.

[24] *The Policy and Results of the Development of Economically Underdeveloped Republics and the Autonomous Province of Kosovo*, Belgrade, Secretariat of Information, n.d., pp. 34–35; also Schrenk, et. al., op. cit.

[25] Cited by Tanjug Domestic Service, Dec. 4, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 10, 1980, p. I/11.



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of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia approved a measure allowing one-half of northern assistance to be in the form of direct investment by northern enterprises in the less developed regions or of joint ventures ("direct association of resources") of northern enterprises and those in Kosovo.[26]

Realization of these provisions has been termed "an essential precondition" for achievement of the 7.2 percent annual growth rate of social product targeted in Kosovo's 1981–85 economic plan.[27] But one suspects that the decentralizing principles behind these various reforms continue to provide northern elites with incentives to keep their investment capital where it returns the greatest profit, i.e., in their own republics. A full year after the demonstrations, Uroš Šeslija, president of the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce (*privredne komore*), lamented that although over 100 proposals for joint ventures had been made in the previous 14 months, only 15 agreements had been signed and 31 programs approved. As a result of such foot-dragging, "the entire means set aside or pooling resources are not utilized, [so] Kosovo will not be able to count on reaching its planned development in this plan period."[28]

The last two years have provided little good economic news for Kosovo. Uncovered losses of 2.6 billion dinars for 1981 in the provincial economy were 82.4 percent higher than in 1980. Moreover, although aggregate industrial production grew more quickly than expected (at 6.7 percent), half the industrial branches produced less than in the previous year. Similarly, in 1981 investment declined 40 percent, inflation continued at 43 percent, and personal incomes grew by 40.2 percent.[29] Downward trends accelerated in 1982: while total industrial production fell by 3.3 percent, losses grew to 10 billion dinars, and the number of unemployed grew by 12.5 percent (from 72,000 to 82,000).[30]

[26] See the conclusions of the Central Committee meeting, Tanjug Domestic Service, Dec. 5, 1980, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Dec. 11, 1980, pp. I/1–11.
[27] *Komunist*, Nov. 13, 1981, p. 3.
[28] *Borba*, Mar. 12, 1982, p. 3.
[29] *NIN*, Apr. 4, 1982, p. 12; and *Komunist*, Apr. 16, 1982, p. 4.
[30] *Borba*, Jan. 25, 1983, p. 4; *Politika* (Belgrade), Dec. 13, 1982, p. 4.

*A group photo of a 50-member Albanian extended family in Kosovo.*

—EUPRA.



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Kosovo's developmental problems are manifold. Its exceptionally high birthrate of 32 per 1,000 impedes efforts to improve per capita income and has also created a very young population structure.[31] Agriculture grew at only 1 percent a year in 1976–80, with the larger, but neglected, private sector growing even more slowly than the socialized agricultural sector. Able-bodied rural labor has consequently left the land, mostly for cities in Kosovo.[32] Yet, the province's industry has not been able to absorb the surplus of rural manpower.

Several factors explain this inability. In the first place, investment has been heavily skewed toward capital-intensive basic industry—largely mining and power generation. The province's industry is only a little more than half as profitable—and its industrial labor, 30 percent less productive—than the national average. Wages in the social sector are artificially high, which offsets Kosovo's comparative advantage with respect to labor and discourages investment by northern enterprises. As a result, Kosovo's rate of capital accumulation is less than one-half the national average.[33]

These factors have contributed to a dangerously high level of unemployment—the highest in Yugoslavia. Between 1971 and 1981, Kosovo's unemployment level rose from 18.6 to 27.5 percent.[34] The means heretofore used to expand employment in the province neither address the problem squarely, nor provide a sound basis for further advances.

One strategy has been to expand the number of administrators relative to production workers. Thus, whereas only one in seven of Slovenia's labor force is employed in administrative jobs, Kosovo's has one in four employed in such activities.[35] This palliative only aggravates the province's low labor productivity and low level of capital accumulation.

Another way of absorbing the province's surplus labor in the past decade has been to expand Priština University. Thus, 35,000 students currently attend a university founded only in the early 1960's. However, in conception, the University of Priština (in mid-1981 renamed "Kosovo University") represented far more than a means to absorb surplus labor. It has served as "proof" of Albanian equality within Yugoslavia—an institution where Albanian has become the de facto language of instruction (at the expense of the formally equal Serbo-Croatian). Moreover, the university can be viewed as an institution training cadres for productive employment in the economy and one that implants the norms and values of Yugoslav self-management into its students. In all, then, the investment in the province's university might be considered an investment in Kosovo's future productive development.

Unfortunately, it would be difficult to maintain that the university has fulfilled its appointed tasks. First, one cannot ignore the generally low living standard experienced by the majority of the students—the initial catalyst of the 1981 demonstrations. Moreover, the quality of instruction is generally considered quite low. Less than half of the professors possess doctorates, and those who do have generally published little and are not considered serious scholars by others in Yugoslavia. One also wonders—in light of the high ratio of students in the social sciences relative to those in engineering and other technical fields—whether students really receive training for productive employment.[36] Those who do receive technical training often cannot find work in the province because of the unemployment noted above, and those who wish to migrate with their degrees to other parts of Yugoslavia often have difficulty finding work because they are not fluent in Serbo-Croatian.[37] In addition, and perhaps more serious in official eyes, was the neglect of education in the regime's ideology of self-management.[38]

If it has been difficult to link the university's Albanian students to other parts of Yugoslavia, there seems to have been a warm working relationship with Albania. Indeed, before the demonstrations, the now-deposed administration of Priština University considered cooperation with the University of Tirana—in effect since the early 1970's—mutually beneficial and fruitful.[39] Hindsight tells us, of course, that much about the relationship was nonreciprocal and problematic. For example, because of the poor publication record of the Priština University faculty, more than half of the textbooks

[31] Schrenk, et. al., op. cit., esp. the chapter on regional inequality.

[32] "Political Platform for LCY Action," loc. cit.

[33] See *Komunist*, Nov. 6, 1981, p. 13; Laura Tyson, *The Yugoslav Economic System and Its Performance in the 1970s*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, University of California Press, 1980; Martin Schrenk, et. al., op. cit., pp. 172, 298–99. The last source notes that the gap between per capita household income in Kosovo and that for Yugoslavia as a whole is far smaller than the one between agricultural per capita income in Kosovo and that for Yugoslavia. See also Veli Deva's Report to the Kosovo League of Communists Conference, loc. cit.

[34] Schrenk, et. al., op. cit., p. 248; and *NIN*, Feb. 28, 1982, p. 15. Only the Republic of Macedonia comes close to these figures, which might partially be explained by that republic's own large Albanian population.

[35] *Indeks* (Belgrade), No. 2, 1981, cited in Radio Free Europe Research, *RAD Background Report* (Munich), No. 108, Apr. 23, 1981. This is quite typical of developing countries. See Elliott Berg, "Some Problems in the Analysis of Urban Proletarian Politics in the Third World," Center for Research on Economic Development, Discussion Paper No. 48, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan.

[36] *NIN*, Dec. 21, 1980, pp. 15–16; *Komunist*, July 3, 1981, p. 10; Dennison Rusinow, "The Other Albania: Kosovo, 1979. Part I, Problems and Prospects," *American University Field Staff Reports* (Hanover, NH), No. 5, 1980; and *Politika*, Aug. 10, 1981, p. 6.

[37] See Dobroslav Čulafić's report to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ CC), cited by Tanjung, Nov. 17, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Nov. 18, 1981, pp. i/1–17.

[38] *NIN*, Sept. 6, 1981, pp. 8–11.

[39] Ibid., Dec. 21, 1980, pp. 15–16.



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used at the university were imported from Albania. Many of the texts—particularly those for language and history—allegedly portrayed the Yugoslav national liberation struggle "insufficiently," presented maps of Albania that included Yugoslav territory, and were permeated with "dogmatic, statist ideology" that ignored the accomplishments of Yugoslav self-management. Then there were the professors from Tirana who taught in Priština. Although the behavior of most seemed generally correct, some reportedly exceeded the limits of Yugoslav hospitality by criticizing high levels of unemployment in Kosovo or by encouraging students to express their demand for republic status.[40] Finally, some in Yugoslavia now complain that while Tirana was always prepared to send professors to Priština, Titograd, and Skopje, Albania only accepted Yugoslav Albanians of the most dubious political reliability in return.[41]

By itself, easy access to texts and professors from Albania was probably inoffensive to Yugoslavia. However, when combined with poor student conditions and a low educational level at Priština University, this arrangement contributed to making the university a "hotbed of nationalism," according to the regime. Needless to say, the current university administration has discontinued *direct* links between Priština and Tirana universities, and prefers that future relations be regulated by conventions on cultural and educational cooperation negotiated by the two central governments.[42]

As for the immediate future of the Kosovo economy, Yugoslav elites ostensibly seek the development of the manufacturing industry and agriculture. However, the 1981–85 plan for Kosovo still projects a more rapid growth of output for energy (11.8 percent a year) than for agriculture (5.7 percent) or industry (8.5 percent).[43] As Laura Tyson points out, this hardly suggests deep concern for increasing productive employment; rather, it implies that Kosovo will remain a supplier of raw materials and semi-finished products, activity too capital-intensive to increase employment much.[44] If the failure of northern enterprises to invest significantly in Kosovo's manufacturing capacity does little to increase employment, the large number of unfinished projects, or the luxury hotels and large university library being constructed in Priština, will also not add measurably to productive capacity in the province.[45]



*Part of the Kosovo thermo-electric power plant in Obilić, a few kilometers from Priština.*

—EUPRA.

Kosovo's underdeveloped status within Yugoslavia will not be easily changed. The economic "rationality" demanded by northern elites has been sorely absent in their own republics. In Kosovo, this would also require the deferment of prestigious public consumption in the name of productive investment, i.e., it would preclude a consumerist strategy aimed at placating feelings of national disadvantage.

## The Politics of Ethnic Symbols

There is, of course, no a priori reason why Kosovo's economic difficulties should lead to nationalist discontent. Yugoslavs are quick to point out that the Albanians in Kosovo have more freedom and a higher living standard than their more dogmatic brethren across the border, and one might add that the province's Serbs share some common grievances with its Albanians—particularly regarding regional inequality. Indeed, one might expect—perhaps naively—to find in Kosovo a nonethnic, class-based movement that reacted to a high unemployment level, managerial inefficiency, corruption, low productivity, and the relative economic backwardness of the province. Yet, most Yugoslav and Western observers, whether optimists or pessimists,

[40] *Politika*, Aug. 10, 1981, p. 6, and May 25, 1981, p. 5; also *Komunist*, June 5, 1981.

[41] Tanjug, Sept. 29, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Oct. 6, 1981, pp. I/19–20.

[42] Tanjug, July 23, 1982, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, July 24, 1982, p. I/8.

[43] *Komunist*, Nov. 13, 1981, pp. 12–13.

[44] Tyson, op. cit., p. 66. See also the complaints of Nazim Mikulovci, Director of the Trepča combine, that his enterprise continued to be "exploited . . . because we undervalued the primary industries and raw materials and left them to fend for themselves." *Danas*, May 11, 1982, p. 10.

[45] *Komunist*, Nov. 13, 1981, p. 10.



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*A student hall at Priš̌tina University in Kosovo, a heavily Albanian institution, where demonstrations about student conditions in March 1981 escalated into nationalist demands.*

**—EUPRA.**

end up posing essentially the same old question: can the Yugoslav state sucessfully resolve problems based on national conflicts?

Both Serbs and Albanians have a deep emotional and historical attachment to Kosovo. It was the seat of Tsar Dušan's medieval empire and figures strongly in Serbian epic poetry. Albanians claim to have lived there as Illyrians long before the Slavs invaded the Balkans in the 6th and 7th centuries. The founding of the Prizren League there in 1878 made Kosovo "the cradle of Albanian rebirth."[46] Moreover, the Albanians significantly outnumber the Serbs and Montenegrins (a disparity that continues to grow). Thus, a constant of Belgrade's policy—whether royalist or Communist—has been to insure that Serbs remain in the province.

The interwar royalist government considered Kosovo part of "South Serbia," sponsored Serbian colonization of the region, and tried to prevent public expressions of Albanian culture. It was therefore not surprising that at the outset of World War II, Kosovo's Albanian population welcomed inclusion of the region in Italy's puppet state of Greater Albania. Toward the end of the war, as many as 30,000 Albanians in Uroševac, Gnjilane, and Trepča staged an uprising against the Communist-led Partisans, who seemed naturally linked with the Serbs and Montenegrins who had repressed the Albanians before the war. Hostility toward the idea of Yugoslavia was even evident among those Albanians that were active in the Partisan movement. Indeed, some Albanian brigades refused to participate in repression of the uprising.[47] Moreover, when the National Liberation Committee for Kosovo and Metohija met in Albania on New Year's Day 1944, the 49 delegates present adopted a resolution stating that "Kosovo and Metohija form a region in which Albanian inhabitants preponderate; they, as always, still wish to be united with Albania. Consequently, our duty is to the true way which the Albanian people should take in order to achieve their aspirations." Only after strong criticism by some

[46] Peter Prifti, *Socialist Albania Since 1944: Domestic and Foreign Developments*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1978, p. 325.

[47] Ivo Banac, *The Cominformists*, unpublished manuscript; also, Paul Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1968, pp. 75–76, 104–05.



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central party leaders, such as Milovan Djilas and Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, did the local leadership amend such claims and emphasize a more lasting union with the Yugoslav federation.[48]

After the war, the Yugoslav solution for the heavily Albanian, underdeveloped Kosovo region was to include it as an "autonomous province" within the Republic of Serbia. This constitutionally inferior status, akin to that of the autonomous republics within the union republics in the Soviet model, was aggravated by Serbian domination of the region's political life until 1966. For example, in 1945, the Serbian party organization attempted to dissolve the district-level party organization in Kosovo and deal directly with Kosovo town committees, with communications in Serbo-Croatian. Not surprisingly, this dominance by the Serbs also reflected itself in party membership. For example, in 1958, Serbs and Montenegrins jointly comprised 27.4 percent of the population of Kosovo but made up 49.7 percent of local party membership.[49]

The Cominform split in 1948 raised fears in Belgrade that anti-Yugoslav propaganda emanating from Tirana might have appeal among Kosovo's Albanians. Under Aleksandar Ranković, the Serbian-dominated secret police imposed a harsh and unjust rule in Kosovo that, according to a subsequent account, "led to the visible breakdown of national relations, to crude deformations in relation to the Albanian minority, to the breakdown of the [party's] policy on the national question."[50] In the 1950's, the situation was so bad that many Albanians declared themselves Turks and emigrated to Turkey.[51]

The Brioni plenum of the party's Central Committee in 1966 ended Ranković's personal rule over Kosovo and claimed to have adopted measures that "eliminated the causes and consequences of the earlier deformations and created new conditions for the many-faceted affirmation of the Albanian nationality [*nacionalnost*]."[52] At Brioni, the political principles of decentralization, republican/provincial parity in federal-level decision-making bodies, and ethnic affirmation within the republics and provinces were accompanied by the increasing dispersion of economic decision-making power to the republics and provinces. Consequently, Titoist strategies in Kosovo during the 1970's permitted the de facto Albanianization of the province's administration, of its political and security police, as well as of its cultural life.[53]

This was part of a broad strategy designed to include representatives of each unit of the federation in collective decision-making bodies. It was evidently hoped that routinization of inter-republic bargaining would serve to reduce the likelihood of interethnic conflict.[54] As I have suggested elsewhere,[55] such "consociationalism," by institutionally legitimizing the notion of subcultures as the key component of Yugoslav society, may actually have reinforced and strengthened the partial, subcultural interests to the detriment of the general interest. This is more striking in Kosovo than elsewhere. Not only does the province continue to lag behind other regions economically, but it also finds itself with a smaller representation in federal bodies because it is only an autonomous province *within* a republic. Unlike the republics, which possess sovereignty (including the right to secede from Yugoslavia) autonomous provinces are only referred to as "self-managing communities."[56] In this context, the consociational legitimation of subcultures can help create—rather than resolve—ethnic conflicts.

Indeed, many Albanians in Kosovo may have felt that they really had no place in the federation. Already in November 1968, several hundred Albanian students gathered at Priština University's Department of Philosophy and "threatened public order" with speeches, slogans, and Albanian flags. This was followed by a

[48] See Ramadan Marmullaku, *Albania and the Albanians*, London, D. Hurst & Co., 1975, pp. 143–44; also Dušan Bilandžić, *Historija Socijalističke Federativene Republike Jugoslavije, Glavni Procesi* (History of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Highlights), Zagreb, Školjske Knjige, p. 71.

[49] Shoup, op. cit.; and Banac, op. cit.

[50] Hajredin Hodža, "A Self-Management Affirmation of the Albanian Nationality in Yugoslavia," in *Udruženi Rad i Medjunacionalni Odnosi* (Associated Labor and Inter-Nationality Relations), Belgrade, Marksisticki Centar CK SK Srbije, 1979, p. 219.

[51] Nusi Pajazit, "The Character and Particularities of the Approaches to the Study of the Emigration of Nations and Nationalities from the Province of Kosovo," *Iseljeništvo Naroda i Narodnosti Jugoslavije* (Emigration of the Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia), Zagreb, Zavod za migracije i narodnosti, p. 586.

[52] Hodža, loc. cit.

[53] See Rusinow, loc. cit. For example, Albanians now constitute 71 percent of the elected delegates in the Kosovo commune parliaments. *Opstine u SAP Kosovo* (Communes in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo), Priština, Pokrajnski Zavod za Statistiku, p. 15. This is also seen in the changing composition of employment in Kosovo (in percent):

| | Albanians | Serbs | Montenegrins |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1968 | 52.2 | 35.4 | 8.1 |
| 1974 | 59.7 | 31.0 | 5.7 |
| 1980 | 65.0 | 25.6 | 4.2 |

SOURCE: *Statistički Godišnjak SAP Kosovo, 1981* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo), Priština, Pokrainski Zavod za Statistiku, 1981, p. 65.

[54] See Denitch, op. cit.; and Susan Bridge, "Some Causes of Political Change in Modern Yugoslavia," in Milton Esman, Ed., *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 343–468.

[55] "The Secular State as Ethnic Entrepreneur: Macedonians and Moslems in Socialist Yugoslavia," *Michigan Discussions on Anthropology* (1983, forthcoming). See also John de Lamater, "Commitment to the Political System in a Multi-Nation State," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, 1969.

[56] According to the current chief judge of the Federal constitutional court, Alexander Fira, "unlike the socialist republics, whose links to working people and citizens assume the legal form of republican statehood, residence in an autonomous province does not assume such a character . . . an autonomous province is not a state community." *Ustavno Pravo* (Constitutional Law), Belgrade, Privredni Pregled, 1981. 447–48.



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march on the town, smashing of store windows, and police use of tear gas to suppress rioting. The students' fundamental demand? Republic status for Kosovo.[57]

One might argue that, as individuals, Kosovo's Albanians are granted full equality as members of a recognized minority nationality. Yet, constitution and ideology notwithstanding, one must note the casual racism with which the "*Šiptari*" are regarded in Yugoslavia. However much Montenegrins are chided for their laziness and Bosnian Moslems are berated for their stupidity, the "average Yugoslav" sees these negative traits combined with a good measure of cruelty and barbarity when it comes to the Albanians. Indeed, if one were to plot a status hierarchy of Yugoslav ethnic groups, only the gypsies might score lower than the Albanians.[58] When Albanians travel to other republics to find employment, they suffer social ostracism and ghettoization in addition to being offered only low-status, low-paying jobs. The demonstrations in 1981 probably only exacerbated such tensions. For example, Albanian bakers long resident in Croatia and Serbia proper experienced "quiet boycotts" after the demonstrations.[59]

Even migration to Western Europe and North America has its problems. Some Albanian emigrants from Kosovo have come into contact with anti-Yugoslav Albanian and Croatian emigré circles and have engaged in activities ranging from demonstrating against "Yugoslav ethnic festivals" to bombing noncooperative countrymen and official representatives of the Yugoslav government.[60] Indeed, the Yugoslav government does not exaggerate when it claims that some groups seek to create an enlarged Albania that includes not only Kosovo, but also parts of Serbia and Macedonia.[61]

This, of course, raises the issue of the Albanians in Macedonia. Although they make up only 20 percent of that republic's population, they constitute majorities and pluralities in communities bordering on Albania and Kosovo. In World War II, Albanian-populated regions of

[57] Ramet, loc. cit., pp. 374–75; also Stephen E. Palmer and Robert R. King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian National Question*, Hamden, CT, Archon Books, 1971.

[58] Based on the author's personal observations and discussions with numerous persons in Yugoslavia.

[59] *NIN*, June 7, 1981, p. 20; and *Komunist*, June 20, 1981, p. 3.

[60] The author witnessed such demonstrations in Detroit, Michigan, in July 1981. See also *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Dec. 16, 1982, p. 12.

[61] See Ranko Petković, "The Fascist Emigration from Yugoslavia and Its Protectors," *Pregled* (Sarajevo), March 1980, pp. 439–50; and Banac, op. cit.



*Construction on the new library of Pristina University.*

—EUPRA.



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both Macedonia and Montenegro were included in Greater Albania—thus providing Albanian nationalists with a historical precedent to invoke. It has been reported with pride that the Albanians and Turks in Macedonia enjoy full equality with other ethnic groups in terms of the thousands of children attending schools with instruction in their native language.[62] However, in political representation through the delegate system in Albanian-dominated communes in Macedonia—perhaps important only for its symbolic content—Albanians are seriously underrepresented.[63] Thus, if one reflects on the ease with which those Albanians could matriculate in that "hotbed of Albanian nationalism"—the University of Priš̌tina—such linguistic equality may well have contributed to the Albanian nationalism observable in the border communities of Macedonia since March 1981.[64]

While concentrating on the sense of alienation from the Yugoslav community felt by the Albanians of Kosovo and other regions, one should not overlook the sense of persecution and oppression experienced by the Serbs and Montenegrins of Kosovo. The events of 1966–68 that increased mass self-confidence among Kosovar Albanians also led to increased Serbian and Montenegrin emigration from the province. If before 1981 much of this flow appeared to comprise members of the intelligentsia who sought higher living standards elsewhere in Yugoslavia,[65] since then "emigration has taken the form of fleeing."[66] This flight has reportedly been encouraged by letters, threats, contrived firings, beatings and murders, and vandalism of Serbian monasteries and monuments in Kosovo.[67] The Serbs move to places like Smederevo, Kragujevac, Niš, Kraljevo, and Svetozarevo, as well as Belgrade, where they are referred to as "*Vrčani*" and are rumored to suffer new social ostracism for having lived for years with the *Šiptari* (and perhaps also for being productive farmers and workers).[68]

Beyond the personal disruptions involved, this displacement of Kosovo's non-Albanians has caused some questioning of the Yugoslav system itself. According to one account, "loss of faith in legal institutions because of persecution . . . is one of the decisive factors contributing to the people's decision to move. Ineffectiveness is often the cause of that loss of faith."[69] The larger Serbian community in Yugoslavia may perceive the "forced" emigration of Serbs from Kosovo as further proof of a national decline under socialism in Yugoslavia, of a loss of Serbian patrimony. For example, members of several Kosovo veterans' associations now living in Belgrade have called for "more rigorous measures against the enemy. . . ." These veterans, who "struggled under terribly difficult circumstances for the autonomy and equality of the Albanian people [*narod*]" in the "federal community," must feel an acute sense of rejection by those they ostensibly helped.[70] Needless to say, the Serbian veterans argue more vociferously than most for further "differentiation" of Kosovo's leadership—particularly the purging of those Albanians who have remained politically active throughout the entire crisis. It is no wonder that Serbian nationalism seems to be enjoying a revival in Yugoslavia.

## Balance Sheet

If one looks at the major categories of socialist restoration—political and economic stabilization and the development of some acceptable ethnic symbolism—the "crisis in Kosovo" would seem to provide little grounds for optimism. The political differentiation has barely scraped the surface, and although a few nationalists received long jail terms, most have been sentenced for 30–60 days and have returned to warm welcomes not only by neighbors but by local party and state functionaries as well.[71] There seem to be no quick answers

[62] Spirko Spirovski and Danco Kolozegovkis, "The Equality of the Albanian and Turkish Nationalities According to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia and in Practice," in *Udruženi Rad i Medjunacionalni Odnosi*, pp. 235–240; and *Komunist*, June 12, 1981, p. 18.

[63] The following breakdown is given (in percent) for selected communes in Macedonia in the year 1978 (data for population is for 1981):

| | Macedonians | | Albanians | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Population | Delegates | Population | Delegates |
| Gostivar | 18.2 | 43.6 | 62.5 | 44.3 |
| Kičevo | 41.2 | 69.2 | 45.4 | 25.8 |
| Tetovo | 23.5 | 48.1 | 69.8 | 43.7 |

SOURCE: *Statistički Godišnjak SR Makedonija* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia), Skopje, Republički Zavod za Statistiku, 1981, pp. 350–52.

[64] *Komunist*, Mar. 26, 1982, p. 9; and *NIN*, July 19, 1981, p. 17. Albanian nationalism was also observed in these communities in 1968. See Palmer and King, op. cit., pp. 175–83.

[65] Ramet, loc. cit., p. 15.

[66] *NIN*, Nov. 22, 1981, p. 21. Estimates of emigration from Kosovo in the first year since the demonstrations range from 40,000 to 100,000. See *Komunist*, Mar. 19, 1982, p. 3.

[67] *Komunist*, Mar. 19, 1982, p. 3; *NIN*, June 21, 1981, p. 37, Nov. 8, 1981, pp. 33–35, and Nov. 22, 1981, p. 10; and *Borba*, June 6, 1982, p. 4, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, June 9, 1982, p. I/1.

[68] *NIN*, June 21, 1981, p. 37.

[69] Ibid., Jan. 17, 1982, p. 10.

[70] Ibid., Apr. 11, 1982, p. 15, and Apr. 25, 1982, p. 19.

[71] *Rilindija* (Priš̌tina), June 25, 1982, cited in Radio Free Europe, *RAD Background Report*, No. 148, July 12, 1982. The most extensive punishments seem to have just been meted out. A Reuters dispatch of Feb. 15, 1983, from Belgrade reported the sentencing of some 23 ethnic Albanians for terms ranging from one to 14 years for advocating formation of a separate republic of Albania (*The New York Times*, Feb. 16, 1983).



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

*A monument in the central square of Priština commemorates those killed in the 1941–45 "war against fascism."*

—Eastfoto.

to Kosovo's economic problems. And in light of the continuing presence of "the enemy"—i.e., Albanian nationalism—the idea of granting to Kosovo status within the federation as an "Albanian" republic (with the implicit right of the Albanian nation to secede) is not a very palatable constitutional solution.

Moreover, one constitutional crisis seems to beget another. The discussion over the constitutional status of Vojvodina (also an autonomous region in Serbia) that started behind closed doors in 1977 has been conducted quite openly since June 1981. Leaders of the Vojvodina party organization have propounded conceptions concerning the rights of the autonomous provinces quite similar to those of the fallen leaders of Kosovo, who—ironically—are routinely condemned by spokesmen from Vojvodina.[72]

One might even link the "crisis in Kosovo" to the tendency to define other difficult issues in ethnic and constitutional terms. For example, the international loans floated while Tito was still alive are now coming due. This has engendered a foreign-currency crisis that evokes memories of the rising tide of nationalism in the late 1960's, in which Croatian elites sought to retain foreign currency earnings in Croatia. Many fear this issue may again become linked to the politics of ethnic symbols. In fact, one hears of the specter of nationalism throughout Yugoslavia. According to the party's Central Committee, it is "the most dangerous counterrevolutionary tendency today. . . . All nationalisms are operating more or less through legal institutions—most of all in education, culture, and the press. . . ."[73]

In sum, the "crisis in Kosovo" and the "inability" of the regime to resolve the constitutional definition of Yugoslavia might seem a dramatic refutation of arguments such as Stephen Burg's that Yugoslavia's federal center, through its near monopoly of information and control of the federal issue agenda, increased its powers vis-à-vis the regional centers between 1974 and 1980.[74] One might even see the Kosovo events as signifying the disintegration of the federation into a collection of fiefdoms, each ripe for the entreaties of nonbenevolent actors from East and West.

There is, however, much that is exaggerated in such a pessimistic perspective. Despite the official rhetoric of external threat, it seems to be business as usual between Yugoslavia and major foreign powers. While Western countries seek repayment of loans, they have shown no interest in a drastic reorganization of Yugoslavia. Despite post-Afghanistan polemics between Moscow and Belgrade, total trade between the USSR and Yugoslavia continues to rise.[75]

Even with regard to Albania, the rhetoric emanating from Belgrade seems more an attempt to manipulate domestic support than a reflection of real apprehension. While it may increase support for the Yugoslav regime by galvanizing Serbian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian feelings against Albania (and perhaps against Kosovar Albanians, too), it has not prevented the signing of trade protocols with that country, the maintenance of the Belgrade-Tirana air route, or the establishment of rail

[72] *NIN*, May 17, 1981, p. 18–20; June 21, 1981, pp. 10–13, Jan. 3, 1982, pp. 24–32, and Apr. 25, 1982, pp. 10–11.

[73] Cited in *Danas*, Feb. 15, 1983, p. 8.

[74] Stephen Burg, "Decision-Making in Yugoslavia," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March April 1980, pp. 1–20. Also suggestive of increased strength of the center is the effort to recentralize the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, described in William Zimmerman, "The Tito Succession and the Evolution of Yugoslav Politics," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring/Summer 1976, pp. 62–79.

[75] Trade with the Soviet Union as a percent of total Yugoslav imports and exports from 1977 through 1981 was:

| | 1977 | 1978 | 1979 | 1980 | 1981 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Imports | 13.5 | 13.8 | 14.0 | 17.9 | 18.8 |
| Exports | 21.7 | 24.6 | 20.6 | 27.7 | 33.3 |

SOURCE: *Direction of Trade Statistics—Yearbook*, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund, 1982, pp. 401–02.



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links between the Albanian town of Shkodër and the Yugoslav port of Bar.[76] It is, moreover, questionable whether Albania maintains any territorial pretensions against Yugoslavia. However much Tirana may have condemned Yugoslavia's "un-Leninist approach to the national question" in Kosovo, Enver Hoxha at the 8th Congress of the Albanian Worker's Party in November 1981 did not claim Kosovo for Albania but rather argued for a Kosovo republic *within* Yugoslavia.[77] Indeed, the Yugoslav Albanians would seem to be hard for Tirana to digest. Hence, Albanian rhetoric denouncing Yugoslav revisionism and Serbian chauvinism seems designed mostly to bolster the spirits of Albanian domestic audiences, even while warning Yugoslav elites not to repress Kosovar Albanians. It would appear that Belgrade and Tirana have tacitly agreed on the range and limits of rhetoric to be employed.

Internally, the demands from some of Kosovo's Albanians for republic status raise an issue that no one else in the Yugoslav body politic really wants to face. In many respects, the Yugoslav national question has found an equitable, albeit inefficient, solution in consociational federal institutions. With respect to the Albanians of Kosovo, however, the group demanding recognition has never been viewed as loyal to the socialist Yugoslav state. Moreover, when the issue of Kosovo is framed in terms of ethnicity and the constitutional definition of Yugoslavia, the stakes of the conflict are raised to such a level that any patriotic citizen of Yugoslavia would demand nothing less than maintenance of the status quo. The specter of Kosovo's possible secession from the federation makes a "just" resolution of the problems in the province inconceivable. Thus, much of the elite's political rhetoric decrying nationalism in Kosovo and elsewhere can be seen as a means to legitimize the power of the elite as a class, as well the sacrifices ordinary citizens make in their daily lives. In the end, then, a leadership unable to address a major problem efficaciously might be lauded as valiant and beleaguered by a majority of the population.

Although the discontent festers on, the disparity in levels of resources between the central government and the Albanian nationalists is sufficiently great that no real threat of insurrection exists.[78] The ritualized invocation of "continued enemy activity" and calls for "more vigilant differentiation" serve to inform the Yugoslav political community that "political resolution in Kosovo" remains an active agenda item. Recalcitrants in Kosovo receive notice that business is not "as usual" and that their jobs may be on the line. Elites in other republics are put on notice that in order to insure the integrity of the Yugoslav regime, they may have to sacrifice still more investment capital and hard-currency earnings to support Kosovo's long-term development. To an extent, the "crisis" atmosphere may actually strengthen the province's hand in federation-wide bargaining!

What this suggests is not a situation where matters completely elude the manipulation of a central leadership that approaches them with few resources. Rather, events in Kosovo seem to provide an opportunity for different coalitions of actors to express their preferences on a variety of issues—from problems with foreign currency balances to economic reform, corruption, the role of the press, redressing of regional inequality, and the revival of various nationalisms. By confirming and/or discrediting particular policy strategies followed in the past, the Kosovo events provide a basis for public discussion.

The Kosovo crisis also suggests that the "national question" does not present itself on the agenda in a void, independent of decisions by Yugoslavia's governing elites. Previous federal-level agreements concerning nationalism have unquestionably shaped the way in which the issue has most recently resurfaced. Specifically, the principle of equal distribution of the symbol of national equality through the form of eight little party-states (the six republics and the two less prestigious autonomous provinces) has brought unintended results. It has been very inefficient economically, with each republic building its own capacities and resisting inter-republic projects.[79] When the overall parameters of economic life began to narrow, discontent in Kosovo was expressed in terms of ethnic nationalism because ethnic organizations were those most familiar and comfortable to its citizens. There is now a pressing need to "unify the Yugoslav market," but it remains to be seen whether the crisis in Kosovo can help focus attention on the real problems that Yugoslavia faces, rather than on narrower issues defined by loaded terms like "nationalism" and "enemies."

[76] See Zdenko Antić, "Yugoslav-Albanian Economic Relations Broaden Despite Tension," *RAD Background Report,* No. 102, Apr. 29, 1982.

[77] See *Zëri i Popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 2, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-EEU,* Nov. 20, 1981, Supplement.

[78] Apparently, an unusually large number of security forces from other republics remain stationed in Kosovo. See A. Ross Johnson, *Impressions of Post-Tito Yugoslavia: A Trip Report,* Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, January 1982, p. 9.

[79] This has been strongly argued by the distinguished economist Branko Horvat. See "Republican Economics and Republican Sovereignty," *Naše Teme* (Zagreb), No. 12, 1981, pp. 1925–29; and idem, "The Economic System and Stabilization," *Gledišta* (Belgrade), Nos. 7–8, 1981, pp. 130–45.



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# Books

# Brezhnev's Foreign Policy

**By Joseph G. Whelan**

ADAM B. ULAM. *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970–1982.* New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1983.

ON NOVEMBER 10, 1982, the Brezhnev era ended. It is time for a retrospective glance at Soviet foreign policy during his stewardship of nearly two decades. Fortunately, Adam Ulam has done just this—and more; his commentary, beginning in the early postwar years, covers subsequent decades through 1981. In this comprehensive review, he provides the facts as well as the analyses necessary for judging present and future relations with the Soviet Union. Such data were regrettably lacking in 1945, a deficiency that produced misperceptions and error in Western dealings with Stalin's USSR.

*Dangerous Relations* is a historical survey and analysis of Soviet foreign policy since 1945, with particular emphasis on the decade of the 1970's. Structured chronologically, the book places Soviet-American relations in the center of this unique Soviet universe, with exanding concentric circles of Soviet interest in Eastern and Western Europe, China, and the Third World. Thus, Ulam takes the reader through:

- the postwar period of "shattered illusions," when the United States, which had expected to establish a harmonious relationship with the Soviet Union, moved instead to containment and cold war;
- the Dulles era of "rollback," when—in contrast to the predominance of American power in the early postwar period—the United States could less easily alter Soviet behavior, notably in Eastern Europe;
- the period of coercive diplomacy and "peaceful coexistence" with Khrushchev, highlighted by the break with China and crises in Berlin and Cuba; and, in greater detail,
- the emergence of a careful but dangerously expansionist Soviet policy under Brezhnev: the evolution of détente and its advantages and disadvantages for both sides, the impact of Vietnam and Watergate on Soviet-American relations, Soviet expansion into the Third World in a "new imperial phase," crisis and war in the Middle East, an enormous Soviet military buildup carried out in tandem with SALT I and II, and the crises in Poland and Afghanistan during 1979–81.

Ulam covers a lot of territory in this 316-page book. It is rich in insights and rewarding for the open-minded reader. The author provides a penetrating analysis of the *rationale for Soviet expansionism*, a projection of its future, and a prescription for an American and Western reponse. Not all will agree with Ulam's point of view. Nonetheless, he stimulates the reader to rethink perceptions about American behavior toward the Soviets.

INDEED, Ulam's work is a record of American (and also some Soviet) errors. Few would fault his discussion of the overly sanguine American perceptions of the Soviet Union during Wold War II. The subsequent swing toward extreme anti-Sovietism, when Stalin rejected US arrangements for an orderly postwar relationship, was likewise unfortunate. Such erratic behavior reflected American illusions. The United States misread Soviet weaknesses (serious population losses and widespread destruction from the war) as well as its own strengths (a vigorous economy and the strongest military force in the world). As a consequence, the United States failed to apply these resources in its diplomacy.

Moreover, the policy of containment unfortunately established a defensive attitude that prevented the United States from taking advantage of its power, even when this might have affected Soviet behavior—as it had in forcing the Soviets to back down during the Iranian crisis of 1946. A notable example of American hesitation was the response to the unfolding of a repressive Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. Ulam adds:



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*Those initial sins of omission have set, disastrously, the tone of American-Soviet relations down to our own day. Few would claim that even the most astute and patient US foreign policies could have assured an entirely peaceful world. . . . But it is not unreasonable to argue that had this country entered the postwar era with a more realistic appraisal of the Soviet Union . . . that in itself would have saved the democratic world many of the dangers and discomfitures it has experienced over the last thirty-odd years. . . . Had the US, as was then within its power, restrained the Soviet Union from imposing communism upon Poland . . . the Kremlin would be spared its present dilemma.* (pp. 21–22)

Ulam records other American errors: exaggerated expectations with respect to détente; Soviet gains in the "great grain robbery" of 1972; "gaping loopholes" in SALT I and II that have enabled the Soviets to build up their military power; the US "blunder" of going into Vietnam, which worked in favor of the Soviet Union, in both long and short terms. The list goes on.

Sensitive Americans might dispute many of Ulam's judgments, and rightly so, for 20/20 hindsight has the virtue of near infallibility. The American character, political philosophy and traditions, and system of popular rule put the United States at a disadvantage when dealing with a totalitarian power, making Americans especially vulnerable to error in international affairs. In many respects, Americans cannot help themselves, because that is the way they are. In addition, Washington's postwar perceptions of global interests and responsibilities in the Pacific and Far East conflicted with the perceptions of those allies more narrowly focused on Eastern Europe. Foreign policy priorities were thus bound to be different, as indeed they are today. The regional interests of NATO's European members still vary markedly from the global interests perceived by the United States.

Nonetheless, it is useful for Ulam to recall some possible US mistakes, as a guide to future policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. For if American leaders do not know their mistakes, they may be doomed to commit them again.

THE CAREFUL reader will also be rewarded with many valuable insights about Soviet foreign policy, as Ulam reviews, analyzes, and synthesizes developments during recent years, particularly those relating to Soviet penetration of the Third World. According to Ulam, events surrounding the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 put détente "to its first major test" (p. 103). For the war demonstrated the "fragility of the premises" upon which détente was based. Watergate had by then so weakened the Nixon presidency that the American political system was in some trouble. The reluctance of the European powers to permit US use of their facilities for the airlift of military supplies to Israel exposed another serious weakness in an alliance system already in "disarray": the United States could not count on its closest allies in non-NATO contingencies. The oil embargo revealed still another weakness: the vulnerability of Western economic systems caused by overdependence on Mideast oil. All of these elements converged to produce a revised Kremlin estimate of the opportunities it could exploit in the Third World, while still maintaining acceptable relations with the West. In brief, détente survived the October War, but, in Ulam's estimation, from then on "it would be in the Kremlin's view a different kind of détente, one requiring fewer constraints on its part" (p. 111).

And indeed there were fewer constraints as Brezhnev, setting aside the caution that had characterized his earlier Third World policy, aggressively expanded Soviet activities, particularly in Africa. Coinciding with this new "imperial phase" in Soviet history was the collapse in April 1975 of the US position in Vietnam. Ulam examines this humiliating American defeat, skillfully placing it within the larger context of Soviet expansionism. In this respect, the collapse of the American position in Vietnam was a critical event in both Soviet-American relations and Soviet policy in the Third World. It exposed American weakness in and to the Third World; it revealed the limits of American power; it generated a new era of "withdrawal" in American foreign policy; it doomed détente as understood by the United States in the Basic Principles

## Reviewers in This Issue

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of 1972; and it created new opportunities for Soviet penetration of the Third World.

"Hanoi's victory was also Moscow's," Ulam writes. At relatively little cost and less risk the Soviet Union enabled a small Asian country "to demonstrate that in the Third World, at least, the US could not be counted upon to protect its friends, whether militarily or through other means" (p. 128). This gave Soviet leaders "an incentive for redoubling their efforts in other parts of the world that were afflicted by political instability and civil wars" (p. 130).

Opportunities for intervention abounded in the Third World during the mid-1970's, as the fruits of "political unrest" were "ripening." Angola was one such opportunity. Soviet involvement in Angola, using Cuban troops as a proxy military force, proved to be an innovative device to further Soviet expansionism and expose American weakness and paralysis of will in the Third World. For the United States, Soviet intervention in Angola "stripped détente of much of its previously hoped-for meaning"; for the Soviets, it convincingly demonstrated their ability "to secure the world's acquiescence in their new technique of expansion in an area thousands of miles from any region of direct importance to the USSR or its allies." Soviet influence now "became permanent in a strategically vital Afrian country" (p. 139).

"PERMANENT" is a long time, and even Ulam seems to have second thoughts toward the end of his book when he examines the Soviet problem of maintaining an empire. For the Polish crisis (and Afghanistan could be added) revealed "the intractable dilemma" challenging "the entire rationale" of Soviet foreign policy: the dilemma of expanding while at the same time maintaining and controlling an empire (p. 307).

In the postwar era, the Soviet Union successfully exploited the powerful forces of nationalism and anti-imperialism that shook and eventually destroyed Western imperial systems in the Third World. By the 1970's, Soviet purposes, as Ulam sees them, were not only to destroy what remained of the old world order but also to prevent any system of international stability from emerging. "There was to be no détente, if the USSR could help it, between the West and the Third World," Ulam writes, though détente was perfectly acceptable between the Soviet Union and the West (p. 308).

But the Soviet Union faced a serious problem. The same forces of nationalism and anti-imperialism that undermined the Western colonial system had by the 1970's turned against the Soviet Union itself. China's estrangement could no longer be passed off as a "temporary aberration." Like the intra-bloc discord that brought on Soviet military intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the crises in Poland and Afghanistan, this estrangement "had to be seen as a manifestation of an organic ailment of the world Communist system, one which could not be cured by ideological incantations" (p. 308). Hence, Ulam concludes, "abroad, Communism in power is no longer a dependable servant or even an asset to the Soviet Union. It may become a threat, as in the case of China, or a heavy burden, as in Poland." And even in the Third World, the burden of empire, "rationalized" in non-ideological terms, imposes a heavy cost "incommensurate with the real gains"—gains that may, as in the case of Egypt, turn out to be ephemeral (p. 310). Thus, Soviet expansionism has its limits; and the forces of nationalism and anti-imperialism exact a heavy price.

Ulman concludes his book with an analysis of the driving force behind Soviet expansionism, and a prescription for the West. The driving force is simply an irrepressible desire to "protect" the Soviet state. Soviet adherence to ideology may have diminished to the point of cynicism. But for practical, if not for ideological reasons, the Soviets cannot abandon the Marxist-Leninist tenet of ineluctable struggle between capitalism and communism, epitomized by the United States and the Soviet Union. To discard this old formula, and halt attempts to destabilize the capitalist world and expand the Soviet sphere, would "pose a grave danger to the cohesion of the Soviet system itself." There is no turning away from this course of Soviet expansionism, any more than there can be an end to the struggle with capitalism. Thus the internal security of the regime "is inextricably bound up with the advance of its external power and authority" (p. 311). For this reason, Soviet foreign policy has never been de-Stalinized.

ULAM's prescription for Western nations and Japan is to recoup their "strength and vitality," to unify their efforts, and to conduct their foreign policy with statesmanship. This last is "the essential ingredient of a new and viable international order" (p. 315). Indeed, according to the author, much of the Soviet Union's success in the past 20 years stems more from self-inflicted wounds among the "democratic community of nations" than from Soviet actions. Western deficiencies have made it much easier for Soviet leaders to seek answers to their pressing internal problems through expansion abroad. In brief, containment revived is Ulam's prescription for dealing with the Soviet Union. His is



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essentially the original Kennan thesis of containing the Soviet Union with strength, turning it away from "foreign expansion and piling up of arms" and redirecting it inward toward "domestic and intra-bloc reforms."

Ulam's is a hard appraisal of Soviet foreign policy—past, present, and future. He sees Soviet expansionism as *the* evil force in the world. This expansion can be stopped not through proselytism, but only through the use of power that permits the Soviets no other choice.

Some readers may come away from this book with an overall impression that while the Russians are not ten feet tall, they are at least eight feet tall; that they are not necessarily restrained by the burdens of empire at home and the limits of power abroad; and that they may have a formula for successfully managing and directing international forces to serve their special imperial ends. Ulam acknowledges the effects of nationalism and anti-imperialism in pointing to Soviet problems within Eastern Europe, with China, and with Egypt; but he seems to minimize such problems. In fact, an implicit assumption runs through the book that somehow the Soviets have better control of their own destiny than do the Western allies and Japan, and that the forces of international politics, especially in the Third World, can be better harnessed to Soviet political purposes.

Soviet success in the Third World during the mid-1970's supports this assumption; but a review of Soviet failures in the Third World during the late Khrushchev and early Brezhnev years, and of the steady downturn in Soviet fortunes there since the invasion of Afghanistan, suggests that the Soviets are not assured success. The forces of nationalism and anti-imperialism, as Ulam himself points out, will continue to have an effect in the Third World, and even within the Communist bloc. Even some Soviet observers of the Third World have lowered their expectations and suggested difficulties ahead. At the 26th party congress in 1981, in sharp contrast to the 25th congress five years before, Brezhnev clearly signaled Soviet doubts. Andropov, too, has been restrained in commenting on Soviet policy in the Third World. The crisis in Poland is yet another indication of the burden of empire, right in the Soviets' own backyard. Readers who take the long-term view of world history may also doubt the certainty of Soviet success—even while sharing Ulam's prescription for the use of Western power to check Soviet expansionism.

Such differences aside, Ulam is to be commended for this survey and analysis. Specialists will find it a stimulating and often provocative review of the postwar period. And general readers, unlike Americans in the early postwar period, will have many of the facts needed to comprehend Soviet foreign policy.



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# Iran's Revolutionary Left

**By Sepehr Zabih**

MICHAEL E. BONINE and NIKKI R. KEDDIE, Eds. *Modern Iran: The Dialectics of Continuity and Change.* Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 1981.

FARHAD KAZEMI. *Poverty and Revolution in Iran: The Migrant Poor, Urban Marginality and Politics.* New York, NY, and London, New York University Press, 1980.

FRED HALLIDAY. *Iran: Dictatorship and Development.* London, Penguin Books, 1979.

NIKKI R. KEDDIE. *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran.* New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press, 1981.

EDOUARD SABLIER. *Iran: La Poudrière* (Iran: The Powder Keg). Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, 1980.

PAUL BALTA and CLAUDINE RULLEAU. *L'Iran insurge: 1789 en Islam? Un tournant du monde* (Iran in Revolt: 1789 in Islam? A World Turning Point). Paris, Editions Sinbad, 1979.

ERVAND ABRAHAMIAN. *Iran Between Two Revolutions.* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1982.

THE 1979 IRANIAN Revolution was the culmination of one year of active mobilization by a wide spectrum of political groups, and at least several more years of planning and isolated acts of armed struggle. Leftist as well as Islamic groups took part. Iran's old-guard, pro-Moscow Communist party, the Tudeh, helped organize the oilfield and other strikes of late 1978. Several other well-organized leftist groups also participated, of which the best known are the People's Mojahedin and the People's Fida'iyin. The former professes a hybrid ideology of Marxism with an Islamic face; the latter, a more "routine" radical Marxist creed. These groups became involved in urban guerrilla warfare in the mid-1960's, and played a significant role in the final insurrectionary assault on the Pahlavi system in February 1979. As soon as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the clergy seized power, both radical left guerrilla organizations prevailed upon the new regime to purge the country's conservative military ranks. This removed one possible source of opposition to the well-armed Mojahedin and Fida'iyin militias. But the Tudeh, fearing its larger rivals on the left, soon convinced the regime to disarm the radical militias as well.

By 1981, the mullahs and the Mojahedin were engaged in all-out confrontation. In June, Mojahedin leader Mas'ud Rajavi was forced into exile, and his organization went underground. The Fida'iyin, meanwhile, had splintered irreparably, most of its members joining the Tudeh. The winner of all this political infighting thus appeared to be the Tudeh, which had thrown its lot in with the clerical regime.

However, as of early 1983, it is the turn of the Tudeh to face the government's wrath. A wave of arrests has reportedly started, including party leader Nureddin Kianuri in its net.[1] The repression of the Tudeh may be related to the government's displeasure at signs of Soviet resumption of military aid to Iraq, as well as to an internal upheaval within the mullahs' ruling circle. Whether the clergy has now turned decisively against the last major leftist element of Iran's revolutionary coalition remains to be seen.

THE EARLY participation, persistent fragmentation, and ultimate decimation of the Left in Iran's revolution all have long historical roots. In 1953, the Tudeh had vainly tried to support the National Front of Mohammed Mossadegh against the Shah. But, during the next major internal crisis, in June 1963, the pro-Soviet Tudeh party was conspicuously absent from the rebellion. The main reason for Tudeh passivity was that Soviet-Iranian relations had

[1] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), Feb. 17, 1983, p. I/7.



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just entered a normalized or even friendly stage, beginning in 1962. As a result, the Tudeh lost much of its original appeal. The regime, in turn, came to accept the Tudeh as merely a nuisance, not a serious security threat.

Instead, the Shah's security service concentrated its attention on the new radical groups that emerged after 1963. Radical left acceptance of armed struggle as a necessary means to popular insurgency was in part based on analysis of the failure of the unarmed 1963 uprising. Similarly, recognition of the value of political agitation among religious and often less articulate sectors of the lower middle classes served the new leftist organizations well. When the proper opportunity to utilize these lessons finally occurred in 1978–79, leftist groups that had learned from this experience played a role in changing an attempted peaceful transfer of power to Shahpur Bakhtiar's fleeting centrist regime into a violent radical insurrection.

The pro-Soviet Tudeh, by contrast, had lost much of its credibility as a genuine popular revolutionary organization, and was no longer the exclusive leftist group. Suffering from these two liabilities, the Tudeh had no choice but to throw its support to the Islamic Republic, despite the ideological and practical tightrope that doing so entailed. Thus, while the Tudeh lauded the new regime's "anti-imperialism," i.e., anti-Americanism, it nonetheless refused to join in condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It acquiesced in the regime's brutal repression, not only of every non-Tudeh leftist group, but also of ethnic dissidents like the Kurds and Baluchis whose cause the Tudeh had championed in the past.

The above provides at least an outline of the relevant events. But a more complete understanding of the Left's contribution to Iran's Islamic upheaval requires answers to some fundamental questions. How, precisely, did the radical leftist organizations challenge the monopoly of the Tudeh? What social strata of the society responded more readily to their appeal? How did they manage to radicalize the anti-Shah coalition, part of which had planned a peaceful transition of power? What concrete steps were taken by these radical groups in the critical period between the Shah's departure and the triumph of the revolution: from January 20 to February 11, 1979? And finally, why did they fail to secure even a limited share of power in the Islamic Republic? This, of course, is a tall order, but attempts to fill it have been under way for quite a while.

BECAUSE the political upheaval leading to the revolution lasted over a year, Iran specialists around the world began to write at a furious rate even before the utlimate triumph of anti-Shah forces. Manuscripts had to be updated while in press; others had to be rewritten in a hurry to reflect the very latest changes on the Iranian scene. Writers who had long pronounced the bankruptcy of the old regime proved prescient when it fell. Others, taken by surprise at the turn of events, engaged in a variety of rationalizations to explain away their failure to predict, even in a general sense, what was unfolding in that volatile country.

Among Western authors and journalists, the French have several advantages in covering recent Iranian political developments. One is that most Iranian intellectuals who participate actively in politics are either French-educated, or intensely familiar and impressed with French politics. Another advantage is that as representatives of a non-superpower, Frenchmen were spared the suspicion of working with intelligence organizations. Additionally, some of them were always sympathetic to leftist and other opposition groups during the latter part of the Shah's reign. The fact that France had traditionally given political asylum to opponents of the old regime was also critical. Armed with these advantages, French writers had much easier access to Iranian sources, particularly in the latter part of 1978–79. With the passage of time, however, both the quantity and quality of English-language literature on contemporary Iranian politics have greatly improved.

Yet the full story of the revolution and its aftermath remains to be told. In particular, the revolutionary Left—which constituted a significant component of the broad coalition that overthrew the Shah's regime—has not received much detailed attention. The closest thing to a comprehensive study using original sources is Ervand Abrahamian's recent volume. The other, more general treatments merely touch upon leftist groups and radical ideologies. Moreover, because the rapid unfolding of events in Iran has outpaced even journalistic authors, all the books reviewed here offer essentially historical rather than truly contemporary accounts.

THE PEAK of leftist influence in Iran came early, during the post–World War II years. This period exerts a continuing fascination for students of leftist movements in the Third World. One recent contribution to the subject is Abrahamian's chapter "The Strengths and Weaknesses of Labor Movements in Iran, 1941–1953" in the anthology edited by Michael Bonine and Nikki Keddie. Unfortunately, the book as a whole is an all-too-typically outdated, uneven, and disjointed university conference collection. But Abrahamian has established his credentials as an expert on leftist and radical



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groups in modern Iranian history, and his piece deserves attention.

Of particular interest is Abrahamian's analysis of the social and educational background of pro-Tudeh union leaders, because it reveals the diversity of groups and individuals susceptible to the appeal of communism. The author provides a good account of the genesis, evolution, ideology, and tactics of this movement, with particular emphasis on the oil industry, then under British control. The establishment of the Central Council of Federated Trade Unions (CCFTU) and its activities in the oil industy and in other industrial concentrations are accurately described. Additionally, Abrahamian covers a number of significant strikes, riots, and leftist/rightist conflicts, occasionally involving pro-British tribal groups in the southern provinces of Iran.

Abrahamian notes that some tensions did exist between the leadership of the Tudeh and its affiliated trade union movements, on ideological as well as tactical matters. Thus, for example, in the famous oil strike of July 1946, the party and the unions did not represent a united front against the government and the British oil company. Since the Tudeh was part of a coalition government at the time, it was eager to terminate the strike and prove its loyalty. Shortly afterward, the trade unions stood by when a government-instigated tribal uprising forced the Tudeh out of the ruling coalition.

In a few concluding pages, the author describes the total disarray of the CCFTU after the fall of Mossadegh in 1953. He notes that nearly 3,000 union organizers were jailed until they publicly recanted. The labor movement, or at least the Communist-dominated segments of it, was completely subdued until the 1978 revolutionary upheaval. This is remarkable, considering that in the intervening years the industrial working class expanded measurably as a result of significant industrialization in the country as a whole. Given this record, one must be skeptical of the author's unsubstantiated assertion that it was the intervention of this class, in mid-1978, that tipped the scales against the Pahlavi regime (p. 535).

A similar account of the rise and fall of Iran's postwar leftist labor movement can be found in Farhad Kazemi's *Poverty and Revolution in Iran.* This book, despite its title, deals only briefly with the actual revolution. Rather, it offers a broad historical analysis of the politicization of rural migrants, treating Iran as a political science case study.

Kazemi's discussion of the trade union movement and labor radicalism challenges the assertion of Harvard's Samuel Huntington, who maintains that Third World unions are less radical because they are often outgrowths of the establishment rather than protests against it. Kazemi demonstrates that in the Iranian case, the unions were in fact responsive to radical appeals (p. 106). Beginning in World War II, the pro-Soviet Tudeh came to dominate the industrial working class. By 1953, at their peak, Tudeh-affiliated unions claimed a membership of 400,000, or two-thirds of this entire class.

In describing this expansion of Tudeh influence, Kazemi does not adequately explain why the unions were attracted to a self-proclaimed pro-Soviet party while the USSR occupied the northern half of Iran. Nor does he show the extent of government success in sponsoring state-controlled unions as a means of deradicalizing the working class. But what is perhaps most disappointing is his failure to provide a systematic analysis of the competition that non-Tudeh leftist groups, some of them active as urban guerrillas, have posed for the Soviet-connected party since the mid-1960's.

THE ECLIPSE of the Tudeh and the rise of rival guerrilla organizations were the major changes on the Iranian left during the quarter century following Mossadegh's demise. The Tudeh's decline began with the suppression of independent labor unions after the royalist counter-revolution of 1953. This sequence is well covered in a chapter of Fred Halliday's *Iran: Dictatorship and Development.* Though published just after the revolution, this book remains valuable both for its historical perspective and for its wealth of factual documentation about Iran's peculiar economic development.

In 1953, Halliday shows, 12 years of union activity were completely crushed. Under the Shah, trade union movements subscribing to Marxist ideology were not permitted. Instead, government-sponsored unionism became the rule. According to Halliday's data, by 1978 there were over 1,000 such unions. Halliday also shows that beginning in the mid-1970's, despite strict prohibition by the Shah's security organization, strikes became fairly common. But they were poorly organized, and on a small scale. Moreover, even this limited labor unrest was largely unrelated to the Tudeh.

A second major reason, besides government repression, for the decline in Tudeh power was the party's slavish commitment to the Soviet line. Throughout the 1960's, Moscow increasingly favored the Shah's regime. As a result, Iran's leftist opposition gravitated away from the Tudeh, and toward more radical groups. Old-line Tudeh members in exile also suffered from the disarray within the international Communist movement during that period. In 1965, Halliday reveals,



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tensions boiled over when three alternate members of the Tudeh Central Committee denounced the Soviet Union and formed a short-lived splinter group called the Revolutionary Organization of the Tudeh.

Altogether, according to Halliday, the Tudeh had become an insignificant political force. This view is echoed by Nikki Keddie's *Roots of Revolution,* in a brief section devoted to Iran's leftist opposition (pp. 231–38). Yet the reemergence of the Tudeh during the 1978 revolution suggests the need to qualify this scholarly consensus.

Neglect of the Tudeh's recent activities is remedied, to some extent, by the two French writers under review. Edouard Sablier's *Iran: La Poudrière* devotes a fair amount of attention both to the background of the Left and to its activities during the revolutionary turmoil. He reveals that the Tudeh leadership was divided about the religious dimension of the revolutionary movement. In the fall of 1978, Tudeh First Secretary Iraj Eskandari, in an interview with *Problems of Peace and Socialism* published in Prague, showed misgivings about the establishment of a theocratic state in Iran. In November 1978, *L'Humanité,* the organ of the French Communist Party, quoted Eskandari about the huge popular movement which was developing in Iran, without once mentioning Khomeini's name. By mid-January 1979, disagreement within the leadership of the party about Khomeini resulted in the retirement of Eskandari as first secretary and his replacement by Kianuri. This, the author rightly believes, signaled the complete reversal of the party's policy toward Khomeini. The new secretary declared the party's support for Khomeini and called upon its militant cadres to rise up in arms and deal the final blow to the Shah's regime (pp. 294–5).

Sablier attaches considerable significance to the Tudeh's role in the final uprising in February. He believes that the party had managed to retain its infrastructure intact, and that it was the Tudeh—with its influence on the trade union movement—that led the devastating general strikes. Little attention is paid to other urban guerrilla groups, which played an equally if not more significant role.

In his discussion of the Tudeh under the Islamic Republic, Sablier examines the semi-clandestine status of the party, claiming that a major concern of its leaders is to gain legal recognition. But despite its consistent support for Khomeini, the party has been denied this recognition, and moreover has been frequently attacked as godless and foreign-dominated. Kianuri and other party leaders, in response, have merely noted that "the positive aspects of the Khomeini revolution are so important as to make its negative ones negligible." Nevertheless, Sablier contends that the party's strength within the unions remains formidable, and that the Iranian Communists, like the Russians, expect the regime of mullahs to self-destruct as a result of its own inadequacies and internal frictions (p. 302).

Another French "instant analysis" of the revolution, Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau's *L'Iran Insurge* places less emphasis on the Tudeh and more on the Fida'iyin and Mojahedin. After a routine historical survey, the authors get to some more interesting contemporary details. They suggest that the Tudeh never really recovered from its major setback in August 1953, when it was unable to act decisively on behalf of Mossadegh. Consequently, in 1978 the party was faced with a massive popular uprising in which it had little or no leadership role. Indeed, part of the Tudeh's own leadership was still in exile. Early in the fall of 1978, a very small group of Tudeh cadres decided to create a front organization within Iran. This was the Democratic Union of the Iranian People. But this group found itself in competition with a variety of other leftists, including the Fida'iyin and Mojahedin guerrillas and even some self-proclaimed Maoist or Trotskyite groups.

Thus, in the spring of 1979, the traditional Marxists remained on the periphery of the popularly based upheaval. They discovered that the revolution was fast moving toward a theocratic regime, to which they were opposed for fundamental ideological and political reasons. And even within the Iranian Left, the pro-Soviet Tudeh, according to this account, was almost totally overshadowed by the more radical guerrilla organizations.

WHO WERE these organizations, and how did they emerge to challenge the Tudeh? Halliday gives a good description and documentation of the history, organization, and ideological evolution of the two major groups, the Fida'iyin and the Mojahedin. In discussing their strategy of guerrilla warfare, he includes four important texts written by leaders of the Fida'iyin. These are: *On the Necessity of Armed Struggle and a Refutation of the Theory of Survival,* by Parviz Pouyan; *Armed Struggle: Strategy and Tactics,* by Massoud Ahmadzadeh; *What a Revolutionary Must Know,* by Ali Akbar Safayi Farahani; and *Armed Struggle: The Road to the Mobilization of the Masses,* by Bijan Jazani. But Halliday's discussion of the *social* characteristics of these organizations suffers from unavailability of sufficient data, even though he had considerable access to these groups both before and after the revolution.

Some insight into this question can be gained from Nikki Keddie's



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*Roots of Revolution.* The author sees a link between student groups both at home and abroad and the evolving political opposition to the regime. On university campuses, the Marxists and religious leftists, according to the author, were the dominant and most politicized groups. Abroad, the leftist Confederation of Iranian Students held sway from the 1960's on.

Keddie's most interesting contribution is drawn from another Abrahamian study of the leftist guerrilla groups in Iran,[2] from which she quotes extensively. This account, quite sympathetic toward these groups, nevertheless reveals some of the political and ideological dilemmas they encountered concerning the best method of overthrowing the regime. Keddie also provides some original material including a letter from Mojtaba Taleghani, the late Ayatollah Taleghani's son, defending a purely Marxist doctrine and rejecting Islam. But Keddie's focus is on the Islamic rather than the Marxist opposition to the Shah. As a result, her book is of limited value to an understanding of the social background, organizational patterns, and political dynamics of the Iranian Left.

Abrahamian's *Iran Between Two Revolutions,* by contrast, attempts to answer more questions about the Left and the revolution than any other work under review. Using a "neo-Marxist" approach, which maintains that the phenomenon of class struggle should be understood in specific historical context, he deals extensively with the organization and class bases of the Tudeh party. His attempt at sociological analysis of the Mojahedin and Fida'iyin guerrilla organizations, like Halliday's effort, is less successful, in this case because the sample is limited to several hundred guerrillas who died before the revolution.

More fruitful, again as in Halliday's book, is Abrahamian's examination of the political thought of these guerrilla groups. He shows why they rejected the National Front and its offshoots as "petty bourgeois and still dedicated to the phenomenon of peaceful change." Radical criticism of the Tudeh is likewise fully and often perceptively analyzed.

Of particular interest is Abrahamian's discussion of the Mojahedin's ideological development, which complements Halliday's concentration on the Fida'iyin. At first, the Mojahedin respected Marxism, but rejected materialism and viewed Islam as their inspiration. But by early 1975, some of their leaders talked about synthesizing Marxism with Islam, and in May of that year most of the leaders who were not in jail actually voted to declare the organization Marxist-Leninist. This group went as far as declaring Islam the ideology of the middle class, while Marxism was the "salvation" of the working class (p. 495).

On this issue, then, the Mojahedin were divided even before the revolution. Afterward, they resumed debating their attitude toward Marxism-Leninism. Attitudes, as we now know, were determined as much by the ambiguous Soviet policy toward the Islamic Republic as by the Mojahedin's long-standing rivalry with the Tudeh on the one hand and the Fida'iyin on the other.

It is difficult to pin down a consistent Mojahedin position concerning Marxism. All one can say is that, before the revolution, most cadres of this organization were basically Marxist, whereas during the revolution, they professed less attachment to Marxism and more to Shi'i radicalism. Once the Mojahedin and Khomeini turned against each other, some cadres (particularly those involved in armed struggle against the regime) reverted to an essentially Marxist position. However, it is important to note that by Marxism, these cadres have always meant only the feasibility of embracing socialist concepts of social justice, egalitarianism, and public control of the means of production—all of which they believed were compatible with radical Islam.

While Abrahamian's coverage of the pre-1979 revolution and the Left is extensive and meticulously documented, the reader is unfortunately left in suspense about the outcome of these political and ideological divisions. Also lacking is a careful examination of the actions of these guerrilla organizations, which—as the author rightly indicates—delivered the regime its coup de grace. Why was it that Islamic armed groups gained the upper hand shortly after the revolution? Why did the Tudeh fail to advocate abolition of the armed forces, as the Mojahedin, and initially the Fida'iyin, were demanding? Indeed, to this writer, the tactical coalition of leftist groups to defeat and disarm the Iranian military was the most important issue in the final stages of the revolution. A discussion of the February 9–11 insurrection must also show the critical role professional Tudeh members played in alerting the provisional government to the risk of allowing the Mojahedin and Fida'iyin to retain armed cadres. We know that the Tudeh later on joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guards to prevent precisely that.[3]

Indeed, in the very midst of revolution, a heated debate concerning the ideological orientation of all leftist groups was under way. Abrahamian's final chapter, on the February insurrection, makes no attempt to consider this important issue. Instead, it is a brief chronicle

[2] Ervand Abrahamian, "The Guerrilla Movement in Iran," *MERIP Reports* (Washington, DC) No. 86, March-April 1980.

[3] Sepehr Zabih, *Iran Since the Revolution,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, chs. 6 and 8.



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of events, neither original nor sufficiently comprehensive. Had the author incorporated even a short analytical postscript, this very significant work would have been of even greater value.

AS THIS ESSAY shows, a complete study of the Left in the Iranian revolution remains to be undertaken. On the nature and quality of leftist appeal, we have only a partial view. A more systematic effort using newly available source material is now required. The reviewed works do shed some light on the challenge to the Tudeh party as the traditional organization of the Left. What remains unanswered is the degree of success of this challenge, and the relationship between Iran's Left and the Soviet attitude toward the Islamic Republic.

For several decades, the Left justified its support for the Soviet Union on the basis of Soviet opposition to Iran's ruling classes, even after the 1962 Soviet-Iranian rapprochement. At the outset of the revolutionary upheaval, as Sablier notes, the Soviets showed considerable prudence. Moscow went so far as to express a preference for an absolute monarchy in a neighboring country over an adventurist regime influenced by reactionary elements of the religious hierarchy. However, with the collapse of the Shah, the Soviets were faced with a reality that—according to Sablier—above all caused concern about their own Muslim population. Since 1979, the Soviet Union has therefore supported the new Iranian ruling class, denying Iranian leftists the most compelling reason for their pro-Soviet stance. Thus, over the past 30 years, Iran's domestic Left has had to live down opportunist Soviet support for whatever regime actually held power in Teheran.

Yet neither this embarrassment, nor the challenge of more radical leftist groups, has totally crushed Iran's Tudeh. On the contrary, the party made a comeback during the revolution, at the expense of other leftist organizations. In the spring and summer of 1979, when ethnic separatist uprisings broke out all over Iran, the new regime relied on the Tudeh to crush these uprisings, which were aided and abetted by non-Tudeh leftist groups.[4] This was another major policy reversal for the Tudeh, which had aligned itself with ethnic insurgencies in the past. Even so, a majority of the Fida'iyin came out in support of the Tudeh, and therefore of the Soviet Union, in early 1981.

Still, though the Tudeh at first fared better than its leftist rivals, it was not adequately rewarded for its dogged support of Khomeini's theocracy. This may be in part explained by Soviet ambivalence toward the Islamic Republic, compounded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iraqi-Iranian war. But a better explanation is the inherent mistrust with which the Islamic regime views the party. If the Tudeh could easily turn against former leftist comrades-in-arms, what guarantees that it will not also turn against the new Iranian religious ruling class? Additionally, a regime that has monopolized all power in its hands can ill afford more than pro forma toleration of non-Islamic forces. The prospects are therefore for the Tudeh prop to be knocked out, as the Islamic Republic consolidates its foundations. Already the party is starting to suffer the same fate as the Mojahedin and the anti-government faction of Fida'iyin.

Thus the predictions of Halliday, Kazemi, and other experts that the Left would maintain a vital role in Iran's new regime have so far been proved wrong. Revolutionary committees and radical guerrilla organizations did try to exploit the country's turmoil in order to recruit migrant factory workers. In reality, though, the underprivileged class (known by the Islamic term "*mostazafin*") helped keep the Shi'i fundamentalists in power. During the critical period of June 1981-June 1982, this class fully identified with the Khomeini regime, just when more politicized and secular groups including some skilled workers began to desert him.

Eventually there may be a realignment of all parties of the Left, as they return to protest and, potentially, armed struggle against the dictatorship of the fundamentalist mullahs. The common bond of the entire Left with the secular center is that neither was rewarded for helping to topple the Pahlavi regime. Instead, they successively became the targets of systematic and often violent purges by the Islamic regime. The lessons of this political failure may play a critical role in future Iranian politics, just as the lessons of the failed 1963 religious uprising prepared the way for the revolutionary era of today.

[4] Ibid., pp. 84–9.



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# Notes & Views

# Estimating Soviet Defense Spending

**By Donald F. Burton**

Among the most important data produced by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are its estimates of the economic dimensions of the Soviet defense effort. Two such estimates are regularly provided: one in dollars, and one in rubles.[1] The first measures American "equivalents" of Soviet defense programs; the second measures the impact of particular defense programs inside the Soviet economy.

The CIA's estimates of the *dollar* costs of Soviet defense activities are used in all branches of the United States government to measure the overall size and direction of Soviet defense programs in resource terms. Some go so far as to equate resource inputs with military capability, and interpret them as direct measures of the Soviet military threat. Military and intelligence experts who reject this interpretation still view the dollar figure as a useful general resource measure.

CIA estimates of Soviet defense spending in *rubles* may be of even greater importance. They underlie US government assessments of the political and economic burden of defense in the USSR, the capabilities of the Soviet economy for sustaining the current military buildup (and, conversely, economic incentives for seeking arms restraints), and the priorities that Soviet leaders attach to individual military programs.

Given the secrecy that cloaks the actual Soviet defense budget, and its importance to US policymakers, it is not surprising that CIA estimates have been a matter of contention from their inception in the late 1950's.[2] Criticisms have come from both directions: some arguing that these estimates are too high, and others thay they are too low. Further controversy was fueled by the CIA's drastic revision of its ruble estimates in 1976, which abruptly changed perceptions of the Soviet defense burden, of the commitment of Soviet political leaders to defense, and of the comparative efficiency of Soviet defense industries.

This essay undertakes to comment on some recent criticisms of CIA estimates of Soviet military spending. The most adventuresome of these are raised by Professor Steven Rosefielde of the University of North Carolina, who attacks both dollar and ruble estimates with equal vehemence in *False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup*.[3] His own dollar estimates, if accurate, imply that the current magnitude of Soviet

[1] The most recent unclassified versions of these estimates are: US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter CIA), *Soviet and US Defense Activities, 1971–80: A Dollar Cost Comparison*, SR–81–10005, Washington, DC, January 1981; and *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970–75*, SR–76–10121U, Washington, DC, May 1976.

The estimates are also reported regularly in testimony before various Congressional committees, and are used by the Secretary of Defense in his annual defense posture statements. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also uses the CIA estimates and, indeed, participates in the cost analysis that enters into their preparation. See also Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, *Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1981*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee—US Congress, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, esp. Part 7, pp. 266–83 (testimony of Henry Rowen, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council).

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[2] See, for example, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, *CIA Estimates of Soviet Defense Spending*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence—House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1980, pp. 32–42 (testimony of Dr. Abraham S. Becker, Rand Corporation).

[3] New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1982.



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arms procurements is more than twice that perceived by the US intelligence community. New criticism from the opposite quarter has been raised by Franklyn D. Holzman, Professor of Economics at Tufts University, who argues that the CIA dollar-cost estimates overstate Soviet defense activities by a wide margin.[4] William T. Lee's disagreement with the CIA is of longer standing. He derives his own, higher ruble estimates of Soviet defense spending primarily from an interpretation of official Soviet statistics on production and distribution of machinery products.[5]

Both Lee and Rosefielde see Soviet defense spending growing much faster, and taking a larger share of gross national product (GNP) and of machinery production, than do the CIA figures. If they are right, the impact of defense on the Soviet economy is far heavier, and the military commitment of the Kremlin political leadership much stronger, than CIA assessments suggest. At the same time, this could imply that the ability of the Soviet economy to sustain the current military buildup is substantially lower than the CIA believes, and that economic and political incentives for arms control agreements are correspondingly greater.

Without presuming to discuss such far-reaching inferences from estimates of Soviet defense spending, it may be of use to look in some detail at the methodology employed by the CIA, and at these three major recent critiques. I would argue that the CIA estimates are more soundly based than those of any of the three outside critics identified here. If so, then the actual magnitude and pace of the Soviet defense effort are neither as low as suggested by Holzman nor as high as suggested by Rosefielde and Lee, but rather fall somewhere in between.

FIRST, LET US LOOK at the CIA estimating procedures. The CIA's dollar estimates of Soviet defense activities are estimates of what it would cost in the United States to produce and man a military force of the same size and with the same weapons inventory as that of the USSR, and to operate that force as the Soviets do. The estimates are derived by means of a building-block methodology. Briefly, the method involves defining the set of activities which make up the US defense effort, estimating the magnitudes of comparable Soviet activities in physical terms, and applying US prices to the Soviet activities. Military pay and allowances, for example, are derived by applying US pay and allowance rates to estimates of Soviet military manpower broken down by job category. Weapons systems and other military equipment are valued at the cost of producing the basic designs of the Soviet systems in the United States, using US production technology, practices, and costs. The concept is not that of producing a carbon copy of the Soviet weapon, but allows for modification of the design to accommodate US production technology. Operations and maintenance costs are intended to reflect Soviet rather than US operating and maintenance practices.

The most recent official CIA estimates indicate an average annual real growth of about 3 percent in overall Soviet defense activities over the period 1971–80, as measured in dollar costs. The estimates exceed comparable US defense outlays by about 40 percent for the period as a whole, and by about 50 percent in the years since 1975. The estimated costs of Soviet weapons procurements, exclusive of manpower and operating costs, grew at an even faster average rate: almost 4 percent per year, exceeding US expenditures by about 65 percent for the decade and fully 80 percent for the period 1976–80. The CIA projects a continuation of these trends at least into the late 1980's, based on the assumption that the Soviets will follow through on observed development and procurement programs currently under way, and on a detailed estimation of their dollar costs.[6]

Like its dollar-cost estimates, the CIA's estimates of Soviet defense spending in rubles derive from a detailed building-block methodology. (Indeed, both cost estimates start with the same set of estimated physical indicators of Soviet defense activities.) About half this total estimate is calculated directly in rubles—personnel costs; research, development, testing, and engineering (RDT&E); many operational costs; and a few weapons categories where Soviet cost-estimating relationships (CER's) are available. Most weapons costs, however, are estimated initially in dollars, and converted by means of ruble-to-dollar ratios. Contrary to the impression created by some critics, the sample of prices of Soviet military goods used in developing these ratios is large, with prices available for numerous weapons in virtually all categories.

The ruble estimates are drawn initially in the transaction prices prevailing in the USSR in 1970. For comparison with GNP and for other economic analyses, however, the initial estimate is adjusted to a factor-cost valuation. This is because Soviet prices are established administratively rather than by market forces, and thus

[4] Holzman's arguments are presented in two articles entitled "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense?" *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Spring 1980, and "Assessing Soviet Military Spending," ibid., Spring 1982.

[5] *The Estimation of Soviet Defense Expenditures: An Unconventional Approach*, New York, NY, Praeger Publishers, 1977.

[6] A recent press report claims that new CIA estimates show a slight downturn in the rate of growth of Soviet defense spending in the last few years. How this might affect dollar-cost estimates for those years, and expectations regarding the future course of Soviet defense programs, remains to be seen. See *The New York Times*, Mar. 3, 1983.



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often do not reflect the true relative scarcities of goods and services in the Soviet economy. The factor-cost valuation is obtained by adjusting price values to reflect the average costs of factors used up in production.

The CIA ruble and dollar estimates of Soviet defense activities are both calculated anew each year to incorporate any new information, analyses, and methodologies developed during the previous year. If the year has been a "productive" one, numerous revisions of the previous year's estimates and projections result. In effect, the new estimates reconstruct history each year at the weapons-system level, just as the new projections revise the forecast for the future.

The most famous of these revisions occurred in 1976, when CIA ruble estimates were doubled. Some press reports at the time attributed this revision to the acquisition of a detailed accounting of the Soviet defense budget.[7] This was not the case. The revision was actually the result of an analysis of new price information—from numerous sources—plus new information on research and development. These two factors were responsible for about 90 percent of the change. The remaining 10 percent resulted from earlier dollar-cost revisions that had already been reported.

To understand these major changes, it is helpful to review the state of CIA knowledge of Soviet prices and pricing policies on the eve of the revision. Initial CIA estimates of Soviet defense spending date back to the late 1950's. Like all CIA estimates of Soviet economic activities at the time, they were calculated in ruble prices of 1955, the year of a major price reform. Then, as now, the ruble-cost estimates for the bulk of Soviet military hardware procurements were derived from dollar-cost estimates by means of ruble-to-dollar conversion factors. The size of the sample of weapons prices in rubles, however, was but a small fraction of that used today. Moreover, it contained no prices for missile and space systems, which were not yet in production in 1955 but constituted a significant portion of procurement by the late 1960's. Finally, earlier estimates assumed that military hardware production was not subsidized, but priced according to the same rules as civilian products.

In the early 1970's, the CIA changed the price base of its estimates of Soviet economic activities, first to 1967 prices and later to 1970 prices. Published Soviet data permitted direct new estimates of civilian activities, but military hardware estimates required the use of price deflators—since post-reform ruble prices for weapons were not yet available. In the absence of better information, the CIA used the modest price increases announced for agricultural machinery and motor vehicles to convert its 1955-ruble weapons prices to later-year prices. Unfortunately, this adjustment was made in ignorance of two critical elements of information. The first was the provision in the 1967 price reform that put military products on the same pricing basis as civilian goods.[8] The importance of this information was the revelation that military production had in effect been subsidized. Thus the 1955 factor-cost estimates had understated military spending. Moreover, the conversion transmitted this downward bias to estimates in later-year prices. The second critical mistake was the failure to take into account the inflationary impact of increases in input costs, changes in pricing rules, and other institutional factors on prices of new machinery products.[9] Weapons systems are particularly susceptible to these inflationary effects, inasmuch as they are repriced each year.

As evidence on actual post-reform prices for military equipment accumulated, it became obvious that they were significantly higher than earlier estimates. Perhaps the most important new evidence concerned shipbuilding costs, which had more than doubled between 1955 and 1970. New prices on other weapons systems and components suggested comparable differences across the range of Soviet weapons. By 1974, the volume of new price data was sufficient for the CIA to start a major research effort to revise existing ratios on the basis of direct evidence. The effort was only given further impetus in 1975 by the acquisition of some data—most of it at a very high level of aggregation—covering two years of Soviet defense spending. The new data showed actual expenditures almost twice as high as estimated. Moreover, the planned growth rate for those two years was just over 4 percent, almost half again the long-term rate of CIA estimates. The final piece of the puzzle fell into place in 1975 with the receipt of information revealing that estimates of military RDT&E expenditures were much too low, and permitting more confident estimates.

By late 1975, the revision of ruble-to-dollar ratios and of estimated military RDT&E expenditures was complete. Calculated independently, the results were consistent with the levels and growth rate implied by the newly acquired aggregate information. The new estimates for total spending in 1970 were about double the

[7] See, for example, ibid., May 19, 1976.

[8] Pëtr V. Sokolov, Ed., *Politicheskaya ekonomika: sotsializm—pervaya faza kommunisticheskogo sposoba proizvodstva* (Political Economy: Socialism—the First Phase of the Communist Method of Production), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1974, as translated in Joint Publications Research Service, *USSR Report* (Arlington, VA), JPRS 63693-2, December 1974, at p. 287.

[9] New information on the extent and anatomy of price inflation in Soviet machinebuilding is contained in Fyodor Kushnirsky, *Price Inflation in the Soviet Machinebuilding and Metalworking Sector*, Falls Church, VA, Delphic Associates, January 1983.



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previous estimate; those for military hardware increased by about 150 percent. As a result, CIA estimates of the share of defense in Soviet GNP increased from 6 percent to 11–13 percent. Further, the annual growth rate of estimated defense expenditures increased from 3 percent to 4–5 percent. Since then, the CIA's estimates have been revised each year to incorporate new evidence on Soviet forces and weapons, a large body of new ruble-price information, and new cost analyses.

The most recent ruble estimates still show a long-term upward growth trend since the late 1950's of some 4–5 percent per year in real terms.[10] (The rate is faster than that in dollar prices because of the greater weight that the ruble valuation gives to faster growing elements, and the tendency of Soviet procurements to shift over time toward higher-technology weapons in which th US has a comparative advantage.) While the pattern of growth is monotonically upward in direction, annual growth rates display a slightly cyclical behavior, reflecting the phasing in and out of major development and procurement programs. Attempts to relate these fluctuations to internal economic shortfalls, political successions, or external events have thus far revealed no significant correlations. As the growth of the Soviet economy has slowed, the share of GNP taken by defense has gradually increased: from 10–12 percent in the early 1960's, to 11–13 percent in the 1970's, and 12–14 percent in the 1980's. Moreover, the cost implications of weapons programs currently underway portend a continuation of this long-term growth rate through the remainder of the 1980's—and an increasing share of GNP devoted to defense—unless some of those programs are curtailed or abandoned.

ROSEFIELDE charges that CIA methodologies for estimating the costs of Soviet weapons systems have a systematic downward bias, which results in a severe understatement of both the growth rate and current level of Soviet military hardware procurement. The source of this bias, he contends, is a failure to take into account the growth in complexity, capabilities, and costs of new Soviet weapons systems over the past two decades. Rosefielde's argument follows from his characterization of CIA costing methods. He asserts that most CIA estimates are derived by means of general cost-estimating relationships (CER's) that specify Soviet weapons in terms of just a few "performance" characteristics—such as "size, weight and velocity"—and relate them to the cost experience of US industry in producing weapons systems. He describes this approach as a "composite analogue technique," which, in concept, converts Soviet weapons systems into US systems with the "performance" characteristics of the Soviet systems.

Rosefielde faults such an approach for failing to take into consideration changes in weapons technology and costs over time. He argues further that most CER's used by the CIA were developed in the early-to-mid-1970's, and thus reflect the technology of US weapons of about 1970 vintage. The use of such "fixed vintage" CER's, he claims, fails to catch any of the increases in costs that have resulted from the rise in quality of Soviet weapons. This leads him to interpret CIA estimates of procurement costs as indices of the growth in the *quantities* rather than in the values or costs of Soviet weapons procurements.

To replace what he terms the CIA's "fixed vintage parametric estimates," Rosefielde makes his own "variable vintage parametric estimates" of the dollar costs of Soviet weapons by applying a cost-growth factor to the CIA estimates to account for technological change. For this purpose, he uses a factor of about 6 percent per year for the 1960's and 1970's, reflecting the "typical" annual real cost growth estimated for US weapons systems (p. 265). Rosefielde reasons that the rate of technological change in Soviet weapons over the period was at least as high. Assuming the CIA estimates to be valid for the year 1970 and applying his adjustment factor of 6 percent a year, he arrives at an estimate of Soviet procurement costs for 1960 that is a little more than one-half the CIA estimate for that year. Moreover, Rosefielde's method would yield current-year (1982) Soviet costs that are twice the CIA estimate, and a rate of growth in Soviet weapons costs over the years 1960–82 that is 2.5 times as great as that estimated by the CIA.

Rosefielde's charges do not stand up to scrutiny. To start with, his argument proceeds from a misrepresentation of CIA analysis, with respect to both concept and method. The CIA concept for valuation in dollars is the cost of reproducing the Soviet weapons system in the United States, with alteration of the basic Soviet design limited to that required to adapt it to US manufacturing technology. Rosefielde's "composite analogue" concept, in contrast, represents the cost of a hypothetical weapon of American design with but a few performance characteristics in common with the Soviet weapon.

More important, Rosefielde erroneously asserts that most of the Agency's cost estimates are derived by simple composite analogue techniques reflecting the designs of US weapons in production circa 1970. In fact, the CIA uses a variety of cost-estimating methodologies, all of which are designed specifically to capture the technology and design of *Soviet* weapons

[10] Joint Economic Committee, op. cit.



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systems, including changes over time. Virtually all major Soviet systems are costed using detailed technical analyses of the weapons themselves, general Soviet CER's derived from the costs estimated by such detailed methods, or general US CER's that have been adjusted to reflect differences between US and Soviet design technologies. When general CER's are used, they are either generation-specific or include the date of initial operational capability (IOC) as a parameter. An example of generation-specific CER's is the set used in costing Soviet warships, which was developed from detailed separate cost analyses of Soviet designs of the 1950's, the 1960's, and the 1970's. Similarly, the general CER for those few air frames not costed by more detailed methods includes an IOC parameter, along with statistical cost relationships for weight and speed.

Rosefielde's contention that CIA methodology fails to account for cost growth resulting from technological changes is also off target. The estimates for succeeding generations of virtually all categories of major Soviet weapons systems imply cost growth over time that is as fast or faster than that experienced in the United States. For example, estimated costs for new models of Soviet tactical aircraft grew at an average rate of 7 percent a year over the period 1950–82, one-sixth faster than the costs of comparable US aircraft over the same period. As a result, the average estimated costs of Soviet tactical aircraft increased from about two-thirds that of US counterparts in the early 1950's, to somewhat more than that of US aircraft in the 1980's. Application of Rosefielde's variable vintage parametric methodology (i.e., superimposing an additional 6 percent on top of the CIA's 7 percent growth rate) would result in costs for Soviet aircraft in the early 1960's of about one-third of those of US aircraft of the same vintage, and costs for new Soviet aircraft of the 1980's, more than three times those of US fighters with comparable capabilities.

The fact that the CIA does not use fixed vintage CER's would seem to render further discussion unnecessary. However, Rosefielde's portrayal also reveals an incomplete understanding of the change in weapons technology over the past 30 years, and the extent to which even fixed vintage CER's can capture that change. Rosefielde defines his fixed vintage CER as one that has been drawn from the design and production experience of a given period in time. A 1970-vintage CER, for example, derives from experience in manufacturing the weapons in production that year. He hypothesizes that such CER's are biased when used to cost models of other vintages, inasmuch as they ignore technological changes in the design of weapons systems over time. The direction of bias, he contends, is such as to overstate the costs of earlier models and to understate the costs of later models. While Rosefielde makes no statement about the extent of this bias, his formulation of variable vintage CER's for costing Soviet weapons implies a belief that fixed vintage CER's fail to capture *any* of the cost change resulting from changes in technology from one vintage to another.

The extent and direction of bias resulting from fixed vintage CER's actually depend upon the degree to which the specified parameters account for actual costs, and the degree to which relationships in the vintage year can be extrapolated to other years. A cursory examination of US aircraft costs can serve to test Rosefielde's contention that fixed vintage CER's fail to capture any of the cost growth that results from technological change. The principal technological changes in tactical aircraft systems over the past 30 years can be summarized as increases in aircraft sizes, speeds, and number and sophistication of avionics systems. Succeeding models of US tactical aircraft grew—on average—1.5 percent a year in structural weight, 1.7 percent a year in speed, and about 15 percent a year in avionics costs between 1950 and 1980. Actual overall cost growth averaged about 6 percent a year.[11] A general "1970-vintage" CER for US aircraft can be estimated by relating the costs of aircraft in production in 1970 to their weights and speeds. Application of the resulting CER's to the new models of aircraft entering production over the entire period yields estimates that grow at an annual rate of about 3 percent. In other words, underspecified as it is, the 1970-vintage CER manages to capture half the cost growth that actually occurred over the period as a result of technological change. While this example shows a case of underestimation (compared to the 6 percent observed growth of costs), it takes but limited imagination to conceive of conditions in which fixed vintage CER's might overstate rather than understate actual cost growth.

THE METHOD based on "variable vintage parameters" that Rosefielde uses to estimate Soviet procurement spending in rubles is similar to the one he uses to estimate dollar costs. Both estimates start with the CIA's direct cost estimates, and employ adjustment factors to correct for a presumed CIA failure to consider real cost growth resulting from product change. The ruble and dollar adjustment factors differ, however, in derivation and magnitude. The derivation of the ruble adjustment factor is more imaginative in both concept and calcula-

[11] For a general discussion of growth in the cost of US tactical aircraft, see Ellen A. Cherniavsky and Edward T. Timperlake, *TACAIR Performance/Cost Analysis: Trends Over Time*, Arlington, VA, The Analytic Sciences Corporation, 1981.



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tion, as it entails an unorthodox view of the behavior of Soviet machinery prices over time. Because the ruble adjustment factor is larger than the dollar adjustment factor, the resulting estimates depart even further from those of the CIA. Rosefielde's methods imply annual growth rates in Soviet weapons outlays about three times as great, and a current (1982) level of Soviet procurement expenditure some two and one-half times as great, as those estimated by the CIA.

Rosefielde's rationale for his variable vintage parametric methodology can be summarized as follows. The methodology begins with an acceptance (in principle, though not—it turns out—in practice) of an earlier CIA estimate for 1960 and a revised CIA estimate for 1970 as valid approximations of actual Soviet procurements in those years. Next, he assumes that Soviet weapons prices were essentially stable over the period 1955–70, and that the coverage of the two CIA estimates coincides. This permits him to conclude that the difference between the two estimates represents real growth. His next step is thus to subtract the 4-percent growth rate in current CIA estimates for 1960–70 from the 12.9-percent growth rate implied by its earlier estimates for 1960 and 1970, to obtain a figure of 8.9 percent for the rate of real growth that he claims is attributable to technological change. As indicated earlier, Rosefielde interprets the CIA's constant-price series as valid indices of the *quantities* of weapons procured by the Soviets. So, to estimate procurement expenditures for years after 1970, he assumes that his technology growth factor for the 1960's is equally applicable for subsequent years, and uses it to convert the CIA's "quantity indices" into constant-price value series (pp. 151–56). However, there are serious problems with all three assumptions underlying Rosefielde's methodology: the interpretation of CIA expenditure estimates as quantity rather than value indices, the belief that the CIA's earlier estimate for 1960 can be meaningfully compared with its current estimate for 1970, and the assumption that Soviet machinery prices have been generally stable.

We have already seen that the CIA's dollar-costing methodologies do not fit Rosefielde's "fixed vintage paramateric model," but are designed specifically to reflect differences in weapons system technologies. Further, the dollar-cost estimates for succeeding generations of Soviet weapons show cost growth as fast or faster than that of comparable US systems. The available evidence on actual prices of Soviet weapons suggests a ruble-cost growth even faster than that in dollars, presumably reflecting higher costs in adapting to new technology in the Soviet economy. This faster growth is incorporated into the CIA's ruble estimates through the use of changing ruble-to-dollar ratios. Thus, while the CIA estimates may still be in error, they already contain substantial growth attributable to technological change. Rosefielde's interpretation of the CIA's ruble estimates as mere quantity indices is simply not valid.

Rosefielde's comparison of the CIA's earlier estimate with its revised estimate is flawed on several counts. To begin with, the CIA disavows the earlier estimate, because it was based on outdated physical and technical assessments and on simple methodologies long since replaced by more detailed methods. The small size of the sample of available weapon prices underlying the 1955-price ruble-to-dollar ratios imparts an even wider margin of uncertainty to the earlier estimates. The comparison is further invalidated because the coverage of the two estimates is not the same. They employ different accounting rules in defining and classifying procurement activities. In addition, the figures Rosefielde uses in his calculation are not CIA estimates as he claims. The 18.5-billion-ruble figure that he uses for 1970 is William Lee's estimate, not the CIA's. He justifies this with an assertion that the CIA agrees with Lee. This is not so, as we shall see.

Finally, Rosefielde's acceptance of the official Soviet contention that machinery prices have been falling over time is unique among students of Soviet pricing. Western and Soviet economists who have written on the subject consider such behavior inconsistent with the rise of about 4 percent a year in industrial wage rates, comparable increases in costs of industrial raw materials, even sharper growth in capital/output ratios, and low rates of productivity growth in the rest of the economy. Rosefielde's acceptance of the official Soviet position that machinery prices have been declining some 1–2 percent a year appears to rest on faith in Soviet inclination and ability to police the pricing of new products in the face of inflationary pressures. He disputes the growing body of empirical data on inflation in civilian machinery prices compiled by scholars of both East and West.[12] With respect to military goods, he apparently chooses to ignore the evidence that subsidies were removed in the price reform of 1967, with the conversion of defense industrial enterprises to full economic accountability (*khozraschët*).

WILLIAM LEE'S overestimates of Soviet defense spending are based upon a different but likewise flawed methodology. Western scholars and intelligence analysts have long harbored the hope of deriving credi-

[12] Kushnirsky, op. cit.; James E. Steiner, "Disguised Inflation in Soviet Industry," in *Journal of Comparative Economics*, September 1982; and Robert E. Leggett, "Measuring Inflation in the Soviet Machinebuilding Sector, 1963-73," in ibid., June 1981.



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ble estimates through analysis of published Soviet financial and economic statistics. This has given rise to recurring attempts to isolate defense in such official data as the state budget, national income accounts, machinery production statistics, and those portions of Soviet input-output tables that have been released. The analytical approach common to all these attempts is the derivation of defense outlays as a "residual," by first identifying (or estimating) and then subtracting values for *non-defense* elements from control totals for the given accounting items. Unfortunately, all such attempts face frustrating data problems. These are compounded by a weakness inherent in the residual technique: when the unknown value is but a small part of the total account (as is often the case with defense), even minor errors in the total transmit large percentage errors to the residual. For example, when the residual value sought is only 10 percent of the account total, a 5-percent error in the latter transmits a 50-percent error to the residual.

The residual approach that has lately received the most attention is one that attempts to estimate defense hardware production from Soviet statistics on the gross value of output (GVO) of the machinebuilding and metalworking (MBMW) industries, and from various sources of data regarding the distribution of civilian machinery. The methodology is straightforward in concept: assemble a series of annual GVO values on a commodity basis and substract all non-defense production to arrive at a residual, which should comprise machinery output produced for defense. However, application of the methodology requires complete, accurate, and compatible series of statistics on GVO, intermediate use, foreign trade, investment goods, public and private consumption, and capital repair. There remains a wide divergence of opinion among Western observers on how close the available Soviet data come to meeting these criteria.

The foremost proponent of the machinery residuals approach is William Lee, who makes it the cornerstone of a larger estimate of total Soviet defense spending. Lee adds the announced Soviet defense budget figure (projected forward at previous growth rates for the years after 1970, when the announced figure stopped growing) plus an estimate of military RDT&E to his military hardware residual to arrive at his totals. He characterizes the former two components as rough approximations subject to substantial error. His high and low estimates for military hardware, by contrast, fall within a range of 10 percent, at least for the period 1968–75. The resulting 1970 estimates both for total defense outlays and for military hardware spending alone turn out to be roughly comparable to those estimated by the CIA direct costing method. But Lee's time series for total spending grows more than twice as fast—and that for military machinery, more than three times as fast—as the counterpart CIA estimates. As a result, by 1975, Lee's estimates exceed the corresponding CIA figures by about one-third and two-thirds, respectively. To be sure, Lee's estimates are calculated in Soviet "comparable prices"; but even deflation of his estimates to put them on the same constant-price basis as the CIA estimates leaves the two series beyond reconciliation. Like Rosefielde, Lee attributes the difference to CIA neglect of real cost increases resulting from growth in the technology and complexity of Soviet weapon systems over time.[13]

Other scholars have studied the same body of evidence as Lee and come to very different conclusions regarding the viability of the residual method, given the uncertainties of the available data on MBMW. The findings of one such study, by Robert J. Abbott of the CIA, are contained in an unpublished paper entitled "Estimating Soviet Spending for Military Hardware from Machinebuilding and Metalworking Statistics," dated September 1978. Abbott's estimates, which span the years 1966–75, are at sharp variance with Lee's regarding both confidence intervals and absolute spending levels. The upper and lower limits of his estimates for 1966, 1970, and 1975 differ by 11, 14, and 23 billion rubles respectively, compared with differences ranging from 1 to 3 billion rubles in Lee's estimates. Abbott's "best estimates" of spending levels for 1966 and 1970 are less than two-thirds—and for 1975, about one-half—of Lee's.

Aside from widely differing margins of uncertainty for each of the non-defense accounts, the most important differences between the Lee and Abbott estimates appear to concern the overall control totals for the MBMW sector, and the shares of that sector's output going to inter-industry use. Lee's control totals exceed Abbott's by 5 to 10 billion rubles in 1970 and by 18 to 30 billion rubles in 1975. These differences could be explained in part by the fact that Abbott had the advantage of new input-output data not yet available to Lee.

Abbott's results suggest that a substantial portion of military machinery is hidden in the published totals for final-use accounts with civilian titles (e.g., fixed capital investment) or is not included in published figures for the MBMW sector at all. He concludes that our knowledge of Soviet statistics will have to improve if the machinery-residuals approach is to yield useful results. As for Lee's particular contribution, one must conclude

[13] To date, the CIA has chosen not to provide comparable ruble balances to match with the resource-category, mission, and branch-of-service comparisons that it draws in dollars, which for some purposes may be more important than the aggregate balance.



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that substantially different results can be obtained using the very method he favors.

HOLZMAN'S CRITICISM that CIA dollar estimates *overstate* the magnitude of Soviet defense activities is wide-ranging, but it focuses on the CIA's handling of so-called index-number effects. The index-number problem is common to all international comparisons of economic activity. It arises from the fact that countries have different relative scarcities and, hence, different relative prices of goods and services. Economic theory teaches that people or countries faced with different sets of relative prices tend to use comparatively more of those goods and services that are relatively cheap and less of those that are relatively dear. The greater the difference in relative prices and the more substitutable the goods and services—either as factors of production or as final products—the stronger the tendency. To the extent that relative prices and structures of consumption differ, measurements of the relative magnitudes of the activities will differ depending upon which country's system of prices is used. Further, the index more favorable to a given country will tend to be that drawn in the prices of the other. The normal practice in bilateral comparisons is to evaluate the activities of each country in both sets of prices and to accept the two measures as bounding the true relation. In search of greater precision, some economists attribute significance to the geometric mean of the two calculations.

The acknowledged implication of index-number effects is that the CIA's dollar-cost comparisons tend to overstate the relative size of Soviet defense activities, since the same results would theoretically be achievable in the United States for fewer dollars—by substituting goods and services that are cheaper in dollars for those chosen by the Soviets because they are cheaper in rubles. In other words, since Soviet activities would, given US scarcities, reflect a less efficient selection of goods and services than those of the United States, their size constitutes less of a threat than the dollar-cost balance would seem to indicate.

The CIA's approach to the index-number problems as regards defense outlays is the traditional one—to estimate the costs of US defense activities in rubles, and then draw comparisons in the currencies of both countries. This approach indicates an overall balance for 1980 of 1.3 to 1 in favor of the USSR in ruble terms, as compared with a Soviet margin of 1.5 to 1 in terms of dollars. The results conform to expectations, at least with respect to the direction of the index-number effects.

Holzman faults the publications and Congressional testimony of the CIA for not giving sufficient prominence to the ruble comparisons, and for failing to use the geometric-mean calculation as its principal measure of the defense-activities balance between the US and the USSR. He points out that the latter would reduce the current Soviet advantage implied by the CIA estimates from the commonly perceived 50 percent to a less alarming 40 percent. More important, however, he quarrels with the CIA's ruble estimate of US defense activities, arguing that it seriously understates the true cost of reproducing such activities in the USSR and, thus, imparts an upward bias to the defense-spending gap.

Holzman's argument derives largely from the observation that the index-number spread of 1.15 (measured by dividing the ruble-price ratio into the dollar-price ratio) implied by CIA defense comparisons is much smaller than that implied by its comparisons of GNP as a whole (1.49), or of such major sectors as consumption (1.54) and investment (1.30). The same disparity in relative prices that contributes to the index-number spreads in the non-defense sectors should also be present in the military sector—i.e., Soviet labor (manpower) is cheaper relative to capital (equipment), and low technology cheaper relative to higher technology, as compared to the same relationships in the US. As a result, Holzman finds it difficult to believe that the index-number spread for the two defense sectors is so low.

In theory, a disparity between index-number effects in the military and civilian sectors of the two economies should be attributable to differences in relative prices and/or substitutabilities. But the Soviet practice of conscripting most of its military manpower should accentuate the differential between manpower and equipment prices, exerting pressure for even larger index-number effects in the military sector. Moreover, the range of equipment prices in the military and civilian sectors is comparable in both economies. This leaves differences in substitutability to explain the disparity. Indeed, the CIA contends that, in modern military technology, the substitutability range of men and equipment (and of high and low technology in equipment design) is narrower than in the civilian sector.

Holzman, however, has a different explanation. He theorizes that CIA estimates understate the cost of US defense activities in rubles because of a basic flaw in the methodology used in converting the non-personnel portions of the US defense budget. He reasons that in the absence of direct estimates of the costs of producing US weapons in the Soviet Union, the CIA must use the same ruble-to-dollar ratios used to convert the dollar costs of producing Soviet weapons in the United States. Because these ratios are developed on a weapons-category basis from the available sample of ruble prices, they reflect the mix and technology of *Soviet* weapons.



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This methodology properly accounts for differences between US and Soviet choices of weapons categories, but Soviet-weighted conversion factors fail to capture index-number effects within each category. Holzman cites several studies from other economies to show that the downward bias of such aggregation, when combined with improper price ratios, can be substantial indeed in estimating overall index-number effects. He concludes that the true index-number spread for defense should be comparable to that for the two economies as a whole. This implies that an unbiased comparison, in rubles, would show the defense activities of the two countries to be about the same. The Soviet advantage indicated by the geometric mean of ruble and dollar comparisons would drop from about 40 percent to 25 percent.

The CIA would admit that its ruble estimates of US defense spending are subject to a much wider range of uncertainty than are its estimates of Soviet spending, in either rubles or dollars. But the CIA would deny that it uses the methodology ascribed to it by Holzman and, hence, that its estimates are subject to the systematic bias that he correctly attributes to such a methodology. He is correct in assuming that the CIA has no direct cost estimates for producing US weapons in the USSR. Obviously, the CIA cannot go to Soviet defense-industrial enterprises for estimates of the costs of producing US weapons. Even the available Soviet CER's are not applicable, inasmuch as they reflect Soviet rather than American design. It is also true that the conversion of US financial data is done at a fairly high level of aggregation—at present only some 70 expenditure categories are used. However, the ruble-to-dollar ratios are *not* the same as those used to convert like categories of Soviet weapons from dollar costs to rubles, but are adjusted upward to take into account the higher technology typical of US weapons systems and the comparative US advantage in this respect. Thus, while the adjustments are undoubtedly subject to error (which may be substantial in some categories), the bias is not systematic in either direction, at least not for the stated reason.

WE ARE LEFT with the conclusion, having gone through these three recent critiques of CIA estimates of Soviet military spending in detail, that all three are seriously flawed. Neither the two critics who claim that CIA estimates are too low, nor the one who claims that those estimates are too high, has presented a convincing case. This finding should provide some basis for greater confidence in the CIA's own estimates—which fall midway between the two extremes.



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# Checklist of Communist Parties, 1982

EDITORS' NOTE: As a service to scholarship, we present, by arrangement with Robert Wesson and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford, CA, the 1982 version of the "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts." This Checklist continues a series presented in the Hoover *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (hereafter *YICA*) since 1976, and jointly published with *Problems of Communism* since 1981. The current list is a slightly modified version of that which is to appear in the 1983 edition of the *YICA*. The authors and editors welcome corrections, additions, or amendments. Such contributions may be addressed to The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA.

**By Robert Wesson**

It is no easy task to arrive at criteria for enumeration of the world's Communist parties. While the criterion of recognition by Moscow (utilized in previous checklists) provides some semblance of order, it is not fully satisfactory. In a large majority of non-Communist-ruled countries, there exist two or more rival parties claiming to represent the workers and to stand for true Marxism-Leninism. Some of these look for guidance to the Soviet Union, others to China, Albania, the memories of Trotsky's Fourth International, or even more exotic referents. In contrast to the Third International or Comintern in Lenin's day, there is no worldwide organization of Communist parties of any consequence today except perhaps the directorate of the magazine *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (published in English as *World Marxist Review*), based in Prague and limited to pro-Soviet and independent parties.[1] Since 1960, it has been impossible to assemble a world Communist conclave, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union seems long since to have given up trying. Even international front organizations—such as the World Peace Council—prosper only by downplaying their connections with communism.

Yet, Communist parties around the world continue to communicate in a common vocabulary and to employ roughly the same organizational structure—comprising a general secretary, first secretary, or chairman; a small executive committee commonly called "politburo"; and a larger coordinating central committee. The appeal of Leninism seems increasingly to lie in its lessons on how to organize a Communist party to grasp and wield power. As for its teachings regarding the remaking of society, Marxist-Leninist thinking today seems more an attitude than a doctrine. The essential unity of the movement seems to be a discontent with the way things are and a tendency to blame all evils on the "bourgeoisie"

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[1] See Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1982, pp. 57–62.



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and the "world capitalist system," and, above all, on "imperialism" (which this view closely identifies with the United States).

From this perspective, Communist parties might have been expected to benefit from the setbacks to the West during 1982—recession, financial and trade problems, etc. Rather remarkably, the Marxist-Leninist cause hardly prospered during this year of adversity for its antagonists. To the contrary, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe suffered severe economic setbacks, communism remained on the defensive in Asia, and the West European Communist parties lost influence and suffered confusion of purpose. Soviet prestige fell in the Middle East and Africa. Only in the Americas did there appear to be some improvement in Communist positions.

A Checklist cannot, of course, cover all aspects of such a complex reality. What we have set out to do is to provide a listing for the end of 1982 of the most significant party (or parties in a few cases) operating in some 100 countries or distinct regions of countries (e.g., West Berlin and the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Réunion), which seem to have a Leninist organization and outlook. In the first column, we list the geographic entity, providing an English transliteration of party name acronyms wherever the given "Communist" party is not called "Communist Party of. . . ." In the subsequent columns, we present a mid-1982 estimate of the country's or region's population; estimated or claimed party membership; the name of the most prominent party official (where known); any congress or congresses held by the party during 1982; a rough indication of the party's orientation (pro-Moscow, pro-Beijing, moderate independent, or radical independent) and its legal status; and finally, the party's fortunes in the most recent national elections.

Party membership figures reflect numbers claimed by the given party or—where no membership figure has been claimed or where the claim seems exaggerated—estimates by contributors to the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*. Most Communist party membership estimates or claims remained relatively stable in the past year, exception for a continuing long-term growth in party rolls in the majority of Communist-ruled societies.

Communist parties continue to govern in 16 countries. A number of other countries, most notably South Yemen and Afghanistan, are ruled by Leninist-style parties that maintain particularly close relations with Moscow but are not yet treated by the Soviets as full "Communist" organizations (whether for reasons of principle or international political tactics). Elsewhere, very few Communist parties participated in governments during 1982. Four Communists held portfolios in the French government of François Mitterrand, Communists received portfolios in the civilian government established in Bolivia, and a Communist served as one of the two captains regent in San Marino. On the other hand, members of the Communist/non-Communist Finnish People's Democratic League withdrew from Finland's government coalition.

Of the parties listed, many are either illegal, or operate under severe political limits. The number is higher in this year's Checklist, primarily due to the new inclusion of five new illegal parties—the Bahrain National Liberation Front, Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea guerrilla party, the Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist), the Communist Party of North Kalimantan, and the Communist Party of Malaya (in Singapore). The only party whose status actually deteriorated markedly was that of Bangladesh, which was outlawed (with other parties) by the martial law regime established in early 1982. Periodic government crackdowns make the formal legality of the Iraq Communist Party meaningless. The listing of the Nepal Communist Party as illegal is a correction of an error in the 1981 Checklist. In Argentina and Bolivia, the Communist Party regained legal status.

Looking at Africa and the Middle East, we find no ruling Communist parties, strictly speaking. What Moscow refers to as "vanguard revolutionary democratic parties" continue to rule in Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Yemen/Aden—as well as in Afghanistan.[2] Because of the closeness of ties between the Yemen Socialist Party and the Soviet bloc, we have included it in this year's Checklist, although the differences between it and other "vanguard parties" are marginal. The insignificant Communist Party of Lesotho has been dropped from the list.

The Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola continues to suffer from guerrilla insurgency and incursions by South Africa directed against bases of Namibian rebels. During 1982, there were reports that Angolan national leaders in Luanda were purged and replaced by Marxists loyal to the Moscow line. In Ethiopia, even the presence of Soviet arms and advisors and Cuban troops did not enable Addis Ababa to extinguish the smoldering Eritrean secessionist movement, and the ruling Commission to Organize the Working People of Ethiopia has made little progress in its efforts to form a broad political party. The governing Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) also experienced spreading anti-government insurgency and a troubled economy. The regime responded by passing out arms to the rural

[2] On the distinctions drawn by Soviet commentators, see Wallace Spaulding, "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement,'" ibid., March-April 1982, pp. 77–82.



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## CHECKLIST OF COMMUNIST PARTIES AND FRONTS

| Africa and the Middle East | Mid-1982 population[a] | Communist party membership | Party leader[b] | Congress, if any | Orientation/ legal status[c] | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature[d] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Algeria (PAGS) | 20,030,000 | 400–500 est. | Sadiq Hadjeres | — | M/# | (1976) |
| Bahrain (NFL/B) | 380,000 | Negligible | Yusuf al-Hassan | — | M/O | |
| Egypt | 44,740,000 | 500 est. | | — | M/O | (1979) |
| Iran (Tudeh) | 41,203,000 | No data | Nureddin Kianuri | — | M/+ | 0.3 (1980); none |
| Iraq | 14,034,000 | 2,000 est. | 'Aziz Muhammad | — | M/# | — (1980): none |
| Israel (Rakah) | 3,916,000[e] | 1,500 est. | Meir Vilner | — | M/+ | 3.4 (1981); 4 of 120 |
| Jordan | 3,246,000 | Under 1,000 est. | Fa'iq Muhammad Warrad | — | M/O | |
| Lebanon | 3,177,000 | 14,000–16,000 est. | George Hawi | — | M/+ | —(1972); none |
| Morocco (PPS) | 22,230,000 | 1,500–4,000 est. | 'Ali Yata | — | M/+ | — (1977); 1 of 264 |
| Nigeria (SWPP) | 82,396,000 | No data | Chiake Anozie | — | M/# | (1979) |
| Réunion | 521,000 | 10,000 claim | Paul Verges | — | M/+ | — (1981); none in Paris[f] |
| Saudi Arabia | 9,795,000 | Negligible | Abu al-Rahim Salih | — | M/O | |
| Senegal (PIT) | 5,991,000 | No data | Seydou Cissoko | — | M/+ | (1978) |
| South Africa | 30,021,000 | No data | Yusuf Dadoo | — | M/O | (1977) |
| Sudan | 19,868,000 | No data | Muhammad Ibrahim Nugud | — | M/O | (1981) |
| Syria | 9,423,000 | 5,000 est. | Khalid Bakdash | — | M/+ | 3.0 (1981); none |
| Tunisia | 6,842,000 | 100 est. | Muhammad Harmel | — | M/+ | 2.1 (1981); none |
| Yemen/Aden (YSP) | 2,022,000 | No data | Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani | — | M/* | |

| The Americas | Mid-1982 population | Communist party membership | Party leader | Congress, if any | Orientation/ legal status | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Argentina | 28,593,000 | 65,000 est. | Athos Fava | — | M/+ | |
| Bolivia[g] | 5,633,000 | 300 est. | Jorge Kolle Cueto | — | M/+ | — (1980); none[h] |
| Brazil[i] | 127,734,000 | 6,000 est. | Giacondo Gervasi Diaz | 7th, Dec. 13 | M/# | — (1982); none[j] |
| Canada | 24,469,000 | 2,500 est. | William Kashtan | 25th, Feb. 13–15 | M/+ | .05 (1980); none[k] |
| Chile[l] | 11,323,000 | 20,000 est. | Luís Corvalan | — | M/O | |
| Colombia | 26,631,000 | 12,000 est. | Gilberto Vieira | — | M/+ | 1.2 (1982); 4 of 313 |
| Costa Rica (PVP) | 2,396,000 | 3,500 est. | Manuel Mora Valverde | — | M/+ | 3.2 (1982); none |
| Cuba | 9,771,000 | 434,143 claim | Fidel Castro | — | M/* | — (1981); all of 499 |
| Dominican Republic (PCD) | 6,013,000 | 5,000 est.[m] | Narciso Isa Conde | — | M/+ | 7.1 (1982); none |
| Ecuador | 8,537,000 | 500 est. | Rene Mauge | — | M/+ | 3.2 (1979); none |
| El Salvador (BRP)[n] | 4,617,000 | 60,000 est. | Facundo Guardado y Guardado | — | M/O | (1982) |
| Guadeloupe | 305,000 | 3,000 est. | Guy Daninthe | — | M/+ | 38.6 (1981); 1 of 3 in Paris[f] |
| Guatemala (PGT) | 7,537,000 | 750 est. | Carlos Gonzalez | — | M/O | (1982) |
| Guyana (PPP) | 870,000 | No data | Cheddi Jagan | 21st, Jul. 31–Aug. 2 | M/+ | 20.4 (1980); 10 of 65 |
| Haiti (PUCH) | 6,054,000 | 350 est. | Rene Theodore | — | M/O | (1973) |
| Honduras | 4,103,000 | 1,500 est. | Rigoberto Padilla Rush | — | M/# | (1981) |
| Jamaica (WPJ)[o] | 2,295,000 | No data | Trevor Munroe | — | M/+ | — (1980); none |
| Martinique | 302,000 | 1,000 est. | Armand Nicolas | — | M/+ | 6.4 (1981); none in Paris[f] |
| Mexico (PSUM)[p] | 71,330,000 | 201,000 claim | Pablo Gómez | 1st, Mar. 13–17 | IM+ | 5.8 (1982); 17 of 400 |
| Nicaragua (PSN)[q] | 2,643,000 | 250 est. | Domingo Antonio Sanchez Salgado | — | M/+ | |



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| The Americas (cont'd) | Mid-1982 population | Communist party membership | Party leader | Congress, if any | Orientation/ legal status | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panama (PPP) | 2,011,000 | 600 est. | Rubén Dario Souza | — | M/+ | — (1978); none |
| Paraguay | 3,347,000 | 3,500 est. | Antonio Maidana (if alive) | — | M/O | (1973) |
| Peru | 18,631,000 | 10,000 claim | Jorge del Prado | 8th Ext., Jan. 27–31 | M/+ | 2.8 (1980); 2 of 60 in the Senate |
| Puerto Rico (PSP)[r] | 3,187,566 | 150 est. | Juan Mari Bras | — | M/+ | 0.3 (1980); none |
| Suriname | 356,000 | 50 est. | Bram Mehr | — | IR/+ | |
| United States | 232,195,000 | 20,000 claim | Gus Hall | — | M/+ | 0.01 (1980); none |
| Uruguay | 2,961,000 | 5,000–10,000 est. | Rodney Arismendi | — | M/O | (No elections since 1971) |
| Venezuela | 18,427,000 | 3,000–5,000 est. | Jesús Faría | — | M/+ | 1.4 (1978); 1 of 195[s] |

| Asia and the Pacific | Mid-1982 population | Communist party membership | Party leader | Congress, if any | Orientation/ legal status | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan (PDPA) | 15,328,000 | 80,000 claim[t] | Babrak Karmal | Natl. Conf. Mar. 14–15 | M/* | |
| Australia (CPA) | 15,011,000 | 2,000 est. | Judy Mundey | 27th, June 12–14 | IM/+ | — (1980); none |
| (SPA) | | 1,500 est. | Pat Clancy | — | M/+ | — (1980); none |
| Bangladesh | 93,040,000 | 2,500 est. | Mohammed Farhad | — | M/O | — (1979); 1 of 300 |
| Burma (BCP—White Flag) | 36,166,000 | 3,000 claim | Thank Ba Thein Tin | — | B/O | (1978) |
| China | 1,008,175,288 | 39,000,000 claim | Hu Yaobang | 12th, Sept. 1–11 | B/* | |
| India (CPI) | 723,762,000 | 585,000 claim | C. Rajeswara Rao | 12th, Mar. 21–28 | M/+ | 2.6 (1980); 12 of 544 |
| (CPM) | | 270,000 claim | E. M. S. Namboodiripad | 11th Conf. Jan. 26–31 | IM/+ | 6.2 (1980); 37 of 544 |
| Indonesia | 157,595,000 | Under 400 est. | Jusuf Adjitorop | — | B/O | |
| Japan | 118,519,000 | 400,000 est. | Tetsuzo Fuwa | 16th, July 27–31 | IM/+ | 10.4 (1980); 29 of 511 |
| Kampuchea (KPRP) | 5,882,000 | No data | Heng Samrin | | M/* | 99.0 (1981); all 117 |
| (DK) | | No data | Pol Pot | — | B/O | (1981) |
| Korea/North (KWP) | 20,586,000 | 3,000,000 claim | Kim Il-song | — | IR/* | 100 (1982); all 615 |
| Laos (LPRP) | 5,377,000 | 35,000 claim | Kaysone Phomvihan | 3rd, Apr. 27–30 | M/* | |
| Malaysia | 14,661,000 | 3,000 est. | | — | B/O | (1978) |
| North Kalimantan | 1,421,000 | Under 200 est. | | — | B/O | |
| Mongolia (MPRP) | 1,759,000 | 76,240 claim | Yumjaagin Tsedenbal | — | M/* | 99.0 (1977); all 354 |
| Nepal | 15,715,000 | 4,000 est.[v] | Man Mohan Adhikari | — | B/O | |
| New Zealand (CPNZ) | 3,120,000 | Under 100 est. | | — | IM/+ | (1981); none |
| (SUP) | | 200 claim | Gordon Harold ("Bill") Anderson | — | M/+ | 0.5 (1981); none |
| | | | | — | M/O | |
| Pakistan[w] | 93,106,000 | Under 200 est. | Aziz Nasir | | | |
| Philippines (CPP–ML) | 51,574,000 | 5,000 est. | Rodolfo Salazar | — | B/O | |
| (PKP) | | 200 est. | Felicisimo Macapagal | — | M/O | |
| Singapore (CPM)[x] | 2,472,000 | 200 est. | | — | B/O | — (1980) |
| Sri Lanka | 15,398,000 | 6,000 est.[y] | Kattorge P. Silva | — | M/+ | 1.9 (1977); 1 of 168[z] |
| Thailand | 49,823,000 | 1,200 est. | Pracha Tanyapaibul[aa] | 4th, Mar.–Apr. | B/O | |
| Vietnam | 56,430,000 | 1,727,784 claim | Le Duan | 5th, Mar. 27–31 | M/* | 97.9 (1981); all 538 |



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| Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union | Mid-1982 population | Communist party membership | Party leader | Congress, if any | Orientation/ legal status | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania (PPSh) | 2,792,000 | 146,363 claim | Enver Hoxha | — | IR/* | 99.9 (1979); all 250 to Democratic Front |
| Bulgaria | 8,940,000 | 825,876 claim | Todor Zhivkov | — | M/* | 99.99 (1981); all 400 to Communist-approved slate |
| Czechoslovakia | 15,369,000 | 1,584,011 claim | Gustáv Husák | — | M/* | 99.0 (1981); all 350 to National Front |
| East Germany (SED) | 16,738,000 | 2,202,277 claim | Erich Honecker | — | M/* | 99.9 (1981); all 500 to National Front |
| Hungary (MSzMP) | 10,714,000 | 811,833 claim | János Kádár | — | M/* | 99.3 (1980); all 352 to Patriotic People's Front |
| Poland (PZPR) | 36,229,000 | 2,488,000 claim | Wojciech Jaruzelski | — | M/* | 99.5 (1980); all 460 to National Unity Front |
| Romania | 22,510,000 | 3,150,000 claim | Nicolae Ceauşescu | — | M/* | 98.5 (1980); all 369 to Socialistic Democracy and Unity Front |
| USSR | 269,876,000 | 17,800,000 claim | Yuriy Andropov | — | M/* | 99.9 (1979); all 1,500 |
| Yugoslavia (SKJ) | 22,689,000 | 2,200,000 claim | Nikola Stojanovic | 12th, June 26–30 | IM/* | — (1978); all 308 to Socialist Alliance |

| Western Europe | Mid-1982 population | Communist party membership | Party leader | Congress, if any | Orientation/ legal status | Percentage of vote; seats in legislature |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 7,510,000 | 15,000 est. | Franz Muhri | Extraord. Jan 30 | M/+ IM/+ | 0.96 (1979); none 2.13 (1981); 2 of 212 |
| Belgium | 9,881,000 | 14,000 est. | Louis Van Geyt | 24th, Mar. 24–28 Ext. Dec. 19 | | |
| Cyprus (AKEL) | 642,000 | 12,000 est. | Ezekias Papaioannou | 15th, May 13–16 | M/+ | 32.8 (1981); 12 of 35 Greek Cypriot seats |
| Denmark | 5,125,000 | 10,900 est. | Jorgen Jensen | — | M/+ | 1.1 (1981); none |
| Finland | 4,816,000 | 50,000 claim | Jouko Kajanoja | 20th, May 14–15 | M/+ | 17.9 (1979); 35 of 200[bb] |
| France | 54,174,000 | 710,000 claim | Georges Marchais | 24th, Feb. 3–7 | M/+ | 16.2 (1981); 44 of 491 |
| Greece | 9,743,000 | 73,000 claim | Kharilaos Florakis | 11th, Dec. 15–18 | M/+ | 10.9 (1981); 13 of 300 |
| Iceland (AB) | 233,000 | 2,200 est. | Svavar Gestsson | — | IM/+ | 19.7 (1979); 11 of 60 |
| Ireland | 3,533,000 | 500 est. | Andrew Barr | 18th, May 14–16 | M/+ | — (1982); none |
| Italy | 57,353,000 | 1,720,000 claim | Enrico Berlinguer | — | IM/+ | 30.4 (1979); 201 of 630 |
| Luxembourg | 366,000 | 600 est. | René Urbany | — | M/+ | 5.0 (1979); 2 of 59 |
| Malta | 376,000 | 150 est. | Anthony Baldacchino | — | M/+ | — (1981); none |
| Netherlands | 14,349,000 | 15,000 est. | Elli Izeboud | 28th, Nov. 26–28 | IM/+ | 1.8 (1982); 3 of 150 |
| Norway (AKP) | 4,113,000 | Under 1,000 est. | Paal Steigan | — | B/+ | 0.7 (1981); none |
| (NKP) | | Under 600 est. | Hans Kleven | — | M/+ | 0.3 (1981); none |
| Portugal | 10,056,000 | 187,000 claim | Alvaro Cunhal | — | M/+ | 16.7 (1980); 41 of 250 |
| San Marino | 22,000 | 300 est. | Ermengildo Gasperoni | — | IM/+ | 25.0 (1978); 16 of 60 |
| Spain | 37,940,000 | Under 100,000 est. | Gerardo Iglesias | — | IM/+ | 3.8 (1982); 4 of 350 |
| Sweden (VPK) | 8,331,000 | 17,000 | Lars Werner | — | IM/+ | 5.6 (1982); 20 of 349 |
| Switzerland (PdA) | 6,407,000 | 5,000 est. | Armand Magnin | — | M/+ | 1.5 (1979); 3 of 200 |
| Turkey | 48,105,000 | Negligible | Ismail Bilen | — | M/O | |
| United Kingdom (CPGB) | 56,095,000 | 18,500 claim | Gordon McLennan | — | M/+ | 1.1 (1979); none |
| West Germany (DKP) | 61,697,000 | 48,856 claim | Herbert Miles | — | M/+ | 0.2 (1980); none |
| West Berlin (SEW)[cc] | 1,900,000 | 7,000 est. | Horst Schmitt | — | M/+ | 0.7 (1981); none |



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LEGEND OF ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| **AB** | People's Alliance |
| **AKEL** | Progressive Party of the Working People |
| **AKP** | Communist Workers' Party |
| **BRP** | Popular Revolutionary Block |
| **CPA** | Communist Party of Australia |
| **CPGB** | Communist Party of Great Britain |
| **CPI** | Communist Party of India |
| **CPM** | Communist Party (Marxist) [of India] |
| **CPM** | Communist Party of Malaya |
| **CPNZ** | Communist Party of New Zealand |
| **CPP-ML** | Communist Party of the Philippines (Marxist-Leninist) |
| **DK** | Democratic Kampuchea |
| **KPRP** | Kampuchean Revolutionary People's Party |
| **KWP** | Korean Workers' Party |
| **LPRP** | Lao People's Revolutionary Party |
| **MPRP** | Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party |
| **MSzMP** | Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party |
| **NFL/B** | National Liberation Front of Bahrain |
| **NKP** | Norwegian Communist Party |
| **PAGS** | Socialist Vanguard Party |
| **PCD** | Dominican Communist Party |
| **PdA** | Party of Labor |
| **PDPA** | People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan |
| **PGT** | Guatemalan Party of Labor |
| **PIT** | Party of Independence and Labor |
| **PKP** | Philippines Communist Party |
| **PPP** | People's Progressive Party [Guyana] |
| **PPP** | People's Party of Panama |
| **PPS** | Party of Progress and Socialism |
| **PSN** | Nicaraguan Socialist Party |
| **PPSh** | Albanian Party of Labor |
| **PSP** | Puerto Rican Socialist Party |
| **PSUM** | Unified Socialist Party of Mexico |
| **PUCH** | Unified Party of Haitian Communists |
| **PVP** | Popular Vanguard Party |
| **Rakah** | New Communist List |
| **PZPR** | Polish United Workers' Party |
| **SED** | Socialist Unity Party |
| **SEW** | Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin |
| **SKJ** | League of Communists of Yugoslavia |
| **SPA** | Socialist Party of Australia |
| **SUP** | Socialist Unity Party |
| **SV** | Socialist Left |
| **SWPP** | Socialist Working People's Party |
| **VPK** | Communist Left Party |
| **WPJ** | Workers' Party of Jamaica |
| **YSP** | Yemen Socialist Party |

[a] Estimates from US Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook—1982*, Washington, DC, April 1982, except where indicated by individual footnote.

[b] The person named is the most prominent party official; in the case of ruling parties, the secretary general, first secretary, or comparable figure in the party.

[c] For orientation, the letters stand for the following: B—pro-Beijing; M—pro-Moscow; IM—independent, moderate; IR—independent, radical. Regarding legal status, the symbols indicate the following: *—ruling; +—legal; #—unrecognized; and 0—proscribed. The term "unrecognized" covers a variety of situations, from legality but insufficient voter support to qualify for national elections, to informal or sporadic repression.

[d] An em-dash indicates the Communist party was legal and presumably participated in the election but the percentage of the vote received is not known. Where the party did not participate just the year of the last national election is given in parentheses.

[e] This figure does not include an estimated 1,300,000 living in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war.

[f] As an overseas department of France, eligible for 3 seats in the French National Assembly.

[g] Oscar Zamora heads a small Maoist splinter of the Communist Party of Bolivia.

[h] Results of this election were overthrown by military coup on July 17, 1980, but reinstated in October 1982.

[i] A Maoist offshoot of the Communist Party of Brazil is also of some importance.

[j] Several Communists were elected under other labels.

[k] The Communist Party of Canada/Marxist-Leninist, headed by Hardial Banes and based largely in Quebec, won 0.13 percent of the vote in 1980; the party has an estimated 500–1,000 members.

[l] The radical Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) may have more adherents but is hardly organized as a Communist party.

[m] This is an estimate for total membership in a dozen or more Communist groups.

[n] The Communist Party of El Salvador, headed by Shafik Handal, has a relatively small following.

[o] The Jamaican Communist Party, also pro-Moscow, is less important.

[p] A coalition of leftist parties, including the Communist Party of Mexico.

[q] The ruling party of Nicaragua, the Sandinist Front of National Liberation (FSLN), is organized on the Cuban model and has close ties with Cuba and other Communist governments, but does not acknowledge itself to be a Communist party. It has an estimated 40,000 members and is headed by a nine-member directorate.

[r] The Puerto Rican Communist Party, also pro-Moscow (indeed, Moscow officially recognizes it), is somewhat smaller.

[s] Overall, the Venezuelan Left garnered 9.0 percent of the vote in 1978. The Movement to Socialism (MAS) won 11 seats; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), 4; the People's Electoral Movement (MEP), 3; the Venezuelan Communist Party, 1; and the Communist Vanguard, 1.

[t] The figure is obviously inflated; membership is estimated at 11,000.

[u] The result of the population census, conducted on July 1, 1982. See *The New York Times*, Oct. 28, 1982.

[v] An estimate for all pro-Beijing factions.

[w] The local Communist party has become part of the National Progressive Party.

[x] A small wing of the Communist Party of Malaya operates among Singapore's Chinese population.

[y] This estimate includes some 1,000 members of a Maoist faction.

[z] In a January 1981 by-election, the SLCP won 1 seat in the 168-member parliament.

[aa] Possibly a nom de guerre for Thong Chaemsi.

[bb] The figures are for the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), a coalition that includes both Communists and non-Communists.

[cc] The Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin is considered by Western observers to be a subsidiary of the ruling SED in East Germany.

population in certain areas and by seeking financial aid and investment from the West, even while retaining a Marxist-Leninist orientation and alliances with Warsaw Pact countries.

Several African countries ruled by parties with Marxist-Leninist ideological leanings—e.g., the Congo and Guinea—began to look to Western countries for economic assistance, while Togo, Ghana, and others



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solicited aid from both East and West. China, after years of relative withdrawal, resumed a more active role in Africa—making donations and signing cooperation agreements with several countries, in rivalry with the Soviet Union.

The Bahrain National Liberation Front has been included in the Checklist for the first time this year because of repeated signs of its treatment by Communist parties as a virtual equal—e.g., it was mentioned as one of eight Arab parties participating at a gathering of "communist and workers' parties" in May.[3] Also new on the list is the Palestine Communist Party, established in February 1982, with the apparent aim of supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Checklist contains a significantly larger estimate of the strength of the Communist Party of Lebanon, based on a 1981 claim by party official George Hawi that membership had increased seven- or eight-fold since the late 1960's. In Iran, the Tudeh party, despite its continued general support for the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had to tolerate government liquidation of hundreds of leftists and to see the Islamic Republic begin to turn on the Communists themselves.

In South America, continuing recession and looming financial crises generated radicalism and anti-US agitation, but did not add much to the strength of Communist parties. Sporadic police measures taken against the Communist parties of Argentina and Brazil may have reflected fears of growing Communist influence. In Mexico, the Communists seemed to be expanding their membership and influence through the Unified Socialist Party (PSUM), although 120,000 seems more reasonable as a membership figure than the claimed 201,000. Disorders in newly democratic Ecuador and Peru gave the Communists opportunities for leadership. The Communist Party of Peru is believed to have expanded its membership, but it was the ultra-radical Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement—which combines Marxism with nostalgia for the Incas, who ruled before the Spanish conquest—that caused the most stir. In Bolivia, the fall of the military dictatorship placed leftist Hernan Siles Suazo in the presidency, which permitted the hitherto banned Communist Party of Bolivia to become a legal political force. Siles named Communists as ministers of labor and of mines and reopened and expanded relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The Venezuelan Communist Party seemed to have strengthened its position as a leading factor among contending leftist parties, as the country itself shifted toward the nonaligned movement then headed by Cuba's Fidel Castro. The dictatorship in Suriname turned to apparently close affiliation with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. Despite this shift of potential strategic importance in the nation's political orientation, the Communist Party of Suriname remained insignificant.

In Central America, the balance was mixed. The Sandinista government of Nicaragua, under increased external pressure from guerrillas, moved away from a pluralist model and nearer to the Cuban model of political organization. The government of El Salvador was strengthened by the very large turnout in the March elections, but after a period of relative inactivity, the guerrilla forces of the Popular Revolutionary Block (BRP) redoubled their activity toward year's end. (This year's *Checklist* gives an estimate for the BRP rather than for the minuscule Communist Party of El Salvador). In Honduras, leading Communists were arrested, and Costa Rica's president Luis Alberto Monge Alvarez branded the local party as subversive and pro-Nicaraguan. The new government of Efrain Rios Montt in Guatemala, using a policy of "rifles and beans," appeared to have had some success in restoring government authority in many formerly guerrilla-held villages.

Cuba continued to pursue "revolutionary internationalism"—maintaining military forces in several African countries in 1982. Havana provided guidance or assistance to numerous visiting Latin American party leaders, and it was clear that Castro, not the leader of the Soviet Communist Party, continued to be the chief figure of Latin American communism. Cuban prestige recovered from the setbacks of 1981, largely as a result of the Falkland/Malvinas war, in which Cuba strongly supported Argentina; the latter reversed its anti-Castro stance and signed a trade agreement with Havana.

In North America, the Communist Party of the United States played on fear of nuclear war, misgivings about US foreign policy (especially in Latin America), opposition to increased defense spending, and unhappiness with unemployment and reductions in social programs. It claimed to have increased its small membership. Similar issues, plus US-Canadian trade frictions, helped several of the Canadian Communist parties, although they were divided between the Communist Party of Canada in English-speaking Canada and rival parties of separatist inclination (most notably the Communist Party of Canada/Marxist-Leninist) in Quebec. The Workers' Communist Party, also centered in Montreal, virtually disintegrated at its December congress.

In Asia, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

[3] See *As-Safir* (Beirut), May 26, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC), June 2, 1982, pp. 1–6. Also listed were the Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Saudi, and Syrian Communist parties. A Radio Moscow broadcast of June 13, 1982, also referred to this gathering as a meeting of "Communist and Workers' Parties." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), June 14, 1982, p. H/10.



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(treated by Moscow as a "vanguard revolutionary democratic party," but included on the Checklist because of its Leninist nature and subordination to the Soviet Union) clings to power only thanks to massive Soviet military support (estimated at some 152,000 personnel, including 90,000 infantrymen and another 50,000 in support units) in an unending war against Muslim insurgents. The PDPA's claimed membership of 80,000 seems highly inflated, and we estimate party membership to be only 11,000. Civil war also rages in Kampuchea, where the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party, backed by Hanoi and Moscow, rules much of the country, but is steadily harassed by the (pro-Chinese) Democratic Kampuchea forces led by Pol Pot and smaller, non-Communist groups loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and former premier Son Sann.

The Vietnam Communist Party held its 5th Congress in late March 1982 in an atmosphere of gloom and self-condemnation, but nothing was done to rejuvenate the aging leadership (the top five members of the Politburo averaged 74 years of age) or to devise bold policies to counter declining morale, poor party organization, inefficiency of cadres, and serious economic shortcomings. Vietnam's leaders continued to blame China for their country's plight, and to be effusively loyal to Moscow.

The 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party convened in early September 1982. Party leaders adopted a new constitution, removed Hua Guofeng from the Politburo, and elected Hu Yaobang party general secretary. A new Central Advisory Commission was founded, with Deng Xiaoping as chairman. The party has tried to streamline both the bureaucracy and its own ranks, so far with only limited success. The CCP mended fences with the French Communist Party and responded favorably to Moscow's calls for negotiations to resolve long-standing Sino-Soviet differences. China's foreign policy grew critical of the US regarding Taiwan and trade and emphasized relations with African and other Third World countries.

The Korean Workers' Party, with a claimed three million members, continued to foster loyalty to Kim Il-song and his concept of "juche"—a mixture of national pride and self-reliance. But there have been indications of unhappiness in both the party and army with Kim's attempts to entrench his son Kim Chong-il as heir apparent. In international affairs, North Korea continued to play off the USSR against China; leaders from Pyonyang and Beijing exchanged visits.

The 76,000-strong Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party carried out shake-ups in the ministries of defense, justice, and public security, and in the Academy of Sciences. Mongolia continued to back the Soviet Union, and despite signs of a Sino-Soviet thaw, repeatedly attacked China for its handling of ethnic minorities.

In India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Japan, the Communists were legally active, but failed in efforts to form coalitions with other left-wing parties or otherwise increase their influence. In the first three countries, strong pro-Moscow and pro-Beijing movements remained opposed to one another. In Australia and New Zealand, too, Communists remained divided; their chief impact on society came through high positions held by party members in labor unions.

In Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines, Communist groups engaged in sporadic guerrilla activities. Military units and police have managed to prevent them from establishing permanent base areas. In Thailand, the insurgent movement showed signs of unraveling toward year's end.

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the most striking development was the death of Leonid Brezhnev and the naming of 68-year-old Yuriy Andropov to replace him. The ailing Brezhnev had become a clear liability to the Soviet system—incapable of coping with a sagging economy, mounting social problems, the intricate situation in Eastern Europe, and the challenges of international political developments. It is believed to have been Andropov who devised the formula of Polish "self-invasion," i.e., a military coup by the top officers of the Polish military with the help of special units of the security police. Once named general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Andropov began a vigorous campaign to tighten discipline at home and to foster West European doubts about nuclear weapons deployment and US reliability.

The rise of Solidarity and the December 1981 imposition of martial law in Poland has had a dramatic impact upon the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). Because of the resignation of disillusioned members and ongoing purges of party rolls, the PZPR now claims only 2,388,000 members, some 552,000 less than in 1980. Even this reduced figure probably grossly overstates current party membership.

In Romania, the cult of Nicolae Ceaușescu continues in force with frequent reshuffling of government officials, but with a markedly diminished publicity for foreign policy positions contrary to Soviet interests. The Albanian Party of Labor experienced a major reshuffling of the cabinet in the wake of the December 1981 suicide of Premier Mehmet Shehu. There were also confusing claims in Tirana about an aborted invasion from the sea, and great tension with Yugoslavia related to the 1981 upheaval of ethnic Albanians in the Yugoslav autonomous province of Kosovo. Nevertheless, Tirana scorned Soviet and US offers to reestablish relations and also reaffirmed its hostility to China.



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**Checklist of the "National Liberation Movement"**

Wallace Spaulding—contributor of the "Checklist of the 'National Liberation Movement,'" published in the March-April 1982 issue of *Problems of Communism,* and of a follow-up letter in the May-June issue—reports that during 1982, there was no indication of major change in the way that Moscow views the world "national liberation movement" or in the line-up of the parties and movements deemed to comprise its various categories. In his judgment, last year's listing and discussion do not require updating. Three organizations from that list—the Bahrain National Liberation Front, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and the Yemen Socialist Party—have been included in this year's "Checklist of Communist Parties" because they appeared to the compilers of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* to be full-fledged Communist parties in everything but name. **—Eds.**

In addition to the continuing unrest in Kosovo, Yugoslavia faced its worst economic crisis since 1945, with a foreign debt equivalent to about US$20 billion, 30 percent inflation, and almost 15 percent unemployment. The new Federal government formed in May under Milka Planinc has yet to impose central authority on the federal republics and autonomous provinces. Amidst a quiet but perceptible de-Titoization, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia found itself torn by factional struggles.

In Western Europe, the Communist parties found that their policies stressing "unity of the Left" and supporting the "peace movements" failed to yield major political gains. In all national elections held during the year, the Communist parties proved unusually weak—for example, losing 19 of the 23 seats formerly held in Spain.

The triumph of the French Left in 1981, which brought Communist participation in the Mitterrand government, also produced heightened inflation, increased unemployment, and severe weakening of the franc. When the French Communist Party convened its first congress in three years (in February 1982), it was internally divided and perhaps at its lowest point since the early 1930's. The PCF claims 710,000 members, but 500,000 seems a more reasonable estimate. The party's dilemmas were highlighted by its strong support of the USSR on Poland even while its cabinet members were compelled to back Mitterrand's condemnation of martial law in Poland.

The Italian Communist Party remained the largest party in Italy, with nearly a third of the seats in parliament. But it was unable to move forward. It also found itself in a bitter feud with the Soviet Communist Party, especially over the Polish question. The PCI's fellow "Eurocommunist" party, the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) experienced even more severe problems. A pro-Soviet Catalan Communist Party broke away from the PCE in April, taking some 7,500 members, and in September, a pro-Soviet Party for Communist Unification and Recovery also split off from the PCE. The striferidden PCE suffered a major defeat in the October national elections, and soon thereafter, Santiago Carrillo was forced to resign as secretary general in favor of Gerardo Iglesias.

The strongly pro-Soviet Portuguese Communist Party retained extensive influence in political life, with 41 of 250 parliamentary seats, but it was unable to prevent Prime Minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão's decision to halt further nationalization of industry and to encourage private enterprise. In Greece, the Communist Party (KKE) remained split between the larger pro-Soviet faction and the "Eurocommunist" KKE-Interior splinter. The former, with 13 of 300 seats in parliament, had taken policy positions similar to those of Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, but his moderating stance on withdrawal from NATO and his refusal to allow KKE participation in the government has driven the party into opposition.

The Belgian party, demoralized by its poor showing in elections of November 1981, tried to redefine its directions in terms of a "Belgian road to socialism." The Danish party was plagued by internal dissent and resignation of several prominent members. The Netherlands party attempted to shift sharply from Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy to advocacy of a "parliamentary democratic-socialist form of government." Withdrawal of SKDL ministers from the Finnish government was noted above. The West European Communist parties were rent by factionalism and seemed unable to find viable solutions within their rigid ideologies for the problems of modern industrialized societies.



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# International Communist Fronts, 1982

## By Wallace Spaulding

There were no significant organizational changes in the major international Communist front organizations during 1982. Table 1 below lists the 10 most salient of these organizations and incorporates some new information regarding membership and affiliates.

One can get at least some indication of who is important in these organizations by identifying who spoke on their behalf before the June 24–25 sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee of the United Nations General Assembly's 2nd Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD II).[1] The World Peace Council (WPC) was represented by its ubiquitous president, the Indian Communist Romesh Chandra; the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), by Secretary General Miklos Barabas, a Hungarian with long experience; the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), by Secretary General Nuri 'Abd-al-Razzaq Husayn, an Iraqi Communist (at least as of 1972[2]); the International Union of Students (IUS), by President Stepan Miroslav, an experienced organizer from Czechoslovakia; the International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), by President Kaarle Nordenstreng, a Finnish professor; the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), by President Karoly Toth, a Hungarian Reformed bishop; the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), by the French Communist Joe Nordmann, an experienced hand; and the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), by Jean-Marie Legay, a French national who had been "promoted" from president to secretary general during the first half of 1982.[3] It is of particular interest that the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was represented by Secretary General Ibrahim Zakariya, from the Sudan, rather than by its president, Sandor Gaspar. Given Gaspar's status as a leading Hungarian Communist, he would have seemed a "safe" spokesman for the Soviet viewpoint in Moscow's eyes, but it is possible that certain statements he made at the 10th WFTU Congress in Havana in February may have been interpreted as being "soft" on Poland.[4]

Beyond reelecting Gaspar as president and promoting Zakariya from "acting" to official secretary general, the WFTU Congress also expanded the number of vice presidencies from three (with incumbents from Czechoslovakia, Benin, and India) to six (adding officials from Cuba, Cyprus, and Lebanon.)[5] This step may reflect a trend among the fronts to develop a smaller decision-making body above the Bureau level. Thus, there was a similar expansion of vice presidential slots in the case of AAPSO by late 1981 (when vice presidents from Palestine, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and the USSR were noted in addition to those from Cyprus, Guinea-Bissau, and Iraq);[6] the convening of an unusual meeting

[1] See UN Documents A/S-12/AC 1 (Ad Hoc Committee, 12th Special Session), PV's (Procés Verbaux) 5–8, (New York, NY), June 28–Aug. 13, 1982. The Women's International Democratic Federation was represented by Vice President Valentina Nikolayeva-Tereshkova rather than by its president, Freda Brown, or its secretary general, Mirjam Vire-Tuominen; however, the group earlier had protested the refusal by the United States to issue visas to "its delegation" to the opening of SSOD II, and these two officials—both members of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC)—may also have been among the seven members of the WPC refused visas. *Peace Courier* (Helsinki), July 1982, p. 9.

[2] *Baghdad Observer*, July 11, 1972.

[3] *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 19–20, 1982.

[4] He suggested that trade unions in "socialist" countries should not become mere instruments of any government or party and should protect their members against bureaucratic excesses; he also said that "no one can interfere" in Polish events "from abroad." See MTI, Budapest, Feb. 11 and 17, 1982, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), Feb. 11, 1982, p. F/6, and Feb. 17, 1982 pp. F/1-3.

[5] *Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Feb. 20, 1982.

[6] *10th Meeting of the AAPSO Presidium*, Cairo, AAPSO Permanent Secretariat, 1982, pp. 129, 130, and 145.

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**Table 1: International Communist Front Organizations**

| | Year Founded | Head-quarters | Claimed membership | Affiliates | Countries |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) | 1957 | Cairo | No data | 87 | |
| Christian Peace Conference (CPC) | 1958 | Prague | No data | | At least 80 |
| International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) | 1946 | Brussels | Ca. 25,000 | | Nearly 80 |
| International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) | 1946 | Prague | Over 180,000 | | Over 120 |
| International Union of Students (IUS) | 1946 | Prague | Over 10,000,000 | 117* | 109* |
| Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) | 1945 | East Berlin | Over 200,000,000 | 131* | 116* |
| World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) | 1945 | Budapest | Over 150,000,000 | Over 270* | 123* |
| World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) | 1946 | Paris | Ca. 450,000 | Ca. 33 | Over 70* |
| World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) | 1945 | Prague | Ca. 206,000,000* | Ca. 90* | |
| World Peace Council (WPC) | 1949 | Helsinki | No data | | Over 135 |

*New information.

SOURCES: Figures are from Richard F. Staar, "Checklist of Communist Parties and Fronts, 1981," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1982, p. 74, as updated by information from the following sources: for the IUS—CTK (Prague), Aug. 11, 1981; WIDF—*Women of the World* (East Berlin), No. 4, 1981; WFDY—*World Youth* (Budapest), No. 8, 1982; WFSW—*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Dec. 6, 1982; and WFTU—*Flashes from the Trade Unions* (Prague), Feb. 20, 1982.

of World Peace Council (WPC) vice presidents in April 1982;[7] and addition of vice presidents from Portugal and Angola to those from Argentina, Chile, Cuba, North Korea, India, the Sudan, the USSR, and Vietnam at the June General Assembly of the WFDY.[8] As for the WPC, Georgiy Zhukov replaced the deceased E. K. Fedorov as the Soviet vice president, and Severo Aguirre del Cristo replaced Elena Gil Izquierdo in Cuba's vice presidential slot; however, no one has yet been named to replace the deceased WPC vice presidents from the US (Abe Fineglass) and East Germany (Albert Norden).[9] It might also be noted that by the end of 1982, the Englishman Frank Swift had replaced the Australian John Benson as WPC executive secretary.[10]

In policy terms, the major focus of front activity continued to be to promote the Soviet "peace line," which stresses the alleged US "threat" to world peace, most specifically the projected deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe and the development of the neutron bomb. This issue fueled major campaigns in the first half of 1982 and again at year's end. It was the focus of a meeting of the WPC's Presidential Committee Bureau in Copenhagen in January; of the Dialogue for Disarmament and Détente sponsored by the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces (a WPC front) in Vienna in January-February; of the International Lawyers' Peace Conference sponsored by the IADL in Frankfurt in March; and of the WPC's Moscow meeting of vice presidents and other leaders in April.

The presence of certain US delegates at the World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life in Moscow in May apparently helped prevent the gathering of 600 delegates from taking a completely unbalanced stand in support of the Soviet line.[11] Though sponsored by the Russian Orthodox Church and having such anti-Communist participants as Billy Graham, this meeting was addressed by leaders of the WPC (including its definitely non-religious chairman, Romesh Chandra), and it refused to allow a Dutch leader to make a public statement about East European dissidence.[12] More general efforts to promote the Soviet peace line occurred at the WFTU congress; at the 11th General Assembly of the WFDY in Prague in June; and at a joint meeting of AAPSO, CPC, IOJ, IUS, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), WFDY, WFTU, and WPC in Prague in March.

The last-mentioned gathering was specifically pointed toward SSOD II, scheduled for June and July. The July issue of the WPC's *Peace Courier* mentioned four massive peace rallies that had taken place the previous month, aimed at influencing SSOD II—in New York (with "close to a million participants"); in Bonn ("at least 400,000"); in London ("250,000"); and in Göteborg ("over 100,000"). Although the *Peace Courier* account painted these rallies as having taken a line consistent with that of the WPC (and hence of the USSR), the events actually were a mixed bag, including criticism of Soviet as well as Western armaments. Despite this more balanced nature of the rallies, Soviet Peace Committee Chairman Georgiy Zhukov did not hesitate to describe the Bonn rally simplistically as "several hundred thousand people . . . directed against the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Western Europe."[13] Testi-

[7] *Neues Deutschland*, Apr. 8, 1982.
[8] *World Youth* (Budapest), No. 11–12, 1982, pp. 4, 6.
[9] *New Perspectives* (Helsinki), No. 5, 1982, p. 2.
[10] *Daily Telegraph* (London), Dec. 3, 1982.
[11] *The Times* (London), May 18, 1982.
[12] Ibid.; also *Link* (New Delhi), June 20, 1982, p. 17.
[13] *Lidova Demokracie* (Prague), Oct. 25, 1982.



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mony from the front representatives apparently failed to win over SSOD II, and the meeting could best be described as "inconclusive."[14]

Although the fronts seemed temporarily distracted from their emphasis on denuclearization of Western Europe following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in early June, there were peace marches to and from the USSR in July and August and even a WFDY-sponsored Baltic cruise for peace in August. The September meeting of the WFTU's Bureau in Prague linked the issues of deployment of US medium-range missiles in Western Europe and "the extermination campaign of Israeli Zionism" as major points of concern, and by the time of the November meeting in Lisbon of the WPC's Presidential Committee, the nuclear weapons issue had returned to its former preeminence. In early October, incidentally, New Delhi saw a rather unusual Soviet-line peace demonstration, involving "over half a million" participants. It was officially sponsored by India's two major Communist parties plus four minor leftist parties, and the initiative for this demonstration attributed back to the February Havana WFTU congress.[15]

As for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the September massacre in the Beirut Palestinian refugee camps, the response by the fronts was immediate. Less than a week after Israeli forces entered Lebanon, the WFDY General Assembly elected a Lebanese president for the first time. In late July, all major fronts except the IADL, the CPC, and the WFSW issued a joint appeal to the UN Security Council to condemn the Israeli invasion and find a solution that would place the Palestinians under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In mid-August, there was a meeting in Nicosia of an International Commission to Investigate Israeli Crimes against the Lebanese and Palestinian Peoples—a gathering chaired by IADL Vice President John Platts-Mills (of the United Kingdom), and one with strong WPC input. The emphasis on the Middle East apparently peaked in September with a WPC conference in Vienna devoted to "the just struggle of the Palestinian people and the patriotic forces of Lebanon," a meeting of the CPC Secretariat with similar emphasis, and AAPSO's Asian Security Conference in Hanoi, which also focused on the Israeli invasion.[16]

During 1982, the fronts also gave considerable, if secondary, importance to promoting the concept of nuclear-free "zones of peace," zones whose very location seems to block American access to Western Europe and the Middle East.[17] The WFDY sponsored a Mediterranean Youth Peace Conference in Athens in January 1982, with the theme of making the Mediterranean Sea a "zone of peace." New Delhi was the site of two conferences pursuing similar aims for the Indian Ocean: a multi-front gathering in April and one sponsored by the IADL in September.

Another theme receiving enough emphasis by the fronts during 1982 to place it in this secondary category was support for the Salvadoran revolutionaries, especially during the period surrounding the March elections in El Salvador. Salvadoran solidarity committees in various countries claimed credit for worldwide rallies protesting US policy toward that country, held on the eve of the elections. The theme was continued by the allegedly WPC-sponsored 3rd Conference for Peace and Sovereignty in Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean held in April in San Jose; and in May, an umbrella organization for the aforementioned national Salvadoran solidarity committees was announced in Mexico City.[18]

A final theme of secondary importance in 1982 activities of the fronts would appear to be the "depredations" of transnational corporations. This recurrent theme was the subject of an AAPSO conference in Addis Ababa in April-May.

At a third level of importance were such perennial themes as "solidarity" with the "peoples" of South Africa, Namibia, Guatemala, Honduras, Puerto Rico, and (Greek) Cyprus, and with the "progressive" regimes in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Grenada, Kampuchea, and Nicaragua; and support for a "new international economic order." More transitory themes during 1982 were the condemnation of the "NATO interventionist policy" in Poland and of British activities in the Falkland Islands, as well as support for the leftist trade unionists on trial in Turkey.

[14] *UN Chronicle* (New York, NY), September 1982, pp. 3–4.

[15] *New Age* (New Delhi), Oct. 10, 1982.

[16] There had, of course, been attention paid by the fronts to the Middle East prior to the Israeli invasion. For example, one could detect an emphasis on the region in the apparent WPC domination of a February conference in Aden demanding sanctions against Israel and de facto abolition of the Sinai multilateral force.

[17] Pressure for a nuclear-free Scandinavia was notable in late 1981, when a Soviet diplomat stationed in Denmark was discovered to have been funding the peace movement in that country at a time when it was engaged in just such a campaign. See J. A. Emerson Vermaat, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December, 1982, p. 55.

[18] Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, US House of Representatives, *Soviet Active Measures*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, July 13–14, 1982, p. 52; and *La Nación*, (San Jose), Apr. 2, 1982.



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# Correspondence

*NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors,* Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 400 C Street, SW, Washington, DC 20547, USA.*

## MORE JOURNEYS IN RUSSIA

TO THE EDITORS: In reading Alexander Kazhdan's excellent review article, "An Unsentimental Journey Across Russia" (*Problems of Communism,* July-August 1982), I found several matters that invite elaboration or correction.

By way of background, I might mention that my work as a consulting geologist and a specialist in Soviet affairs has taken me to all parts of the Soviet Union, from L'viv to Nakhodka, and from the Arctic Ocean to the borders with China and Afghanistan. I have been the guest of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of the Petroleum Industry, the Ministry of Geology, and the Ministry of the Gas Industry. I have worked on several projects (including the Siberian pipeline project) with various Russian, Japanese, and other groups. Moreover, my name, although of German origin, also has a Russian spelling "Mayerov," and I have several cousins living in what used to be East Prussia.

While Kazhdan is generally correct in his discussion of the issue of nationalities in the USSR (on p. 68), neither he nor Elizabeth Pond take adequate account of what many of the Soviet Union's Central Asians discuss among themselves. Specifically, despite rivalries and animosities among the Dags, Uzbeks, Turkmen, and other Central Asian races, they do have one powerful thing in common—Islam. These groups have some of the highest birthrates in the Soviet Union. Many of them wear quite openly little badges with Stalin's portrait on them. I have asked many of them why they do so, and invariably, regardless of which Central Asian nationality the respondents represent, they reply, "To indicate my unhappiness with the present regime." What this means in terms of the future, I do not know, but I think that the rapid growth of Islamic peoples in this area is a factor that should be taken into consideration. Numerous problems with Islamic races were encountered after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There have been many reports of actual confrontation between Russian and Ukrainian officers, on the one hand, and Central Asian troops on the other.

Turning to another matter, Kazhdan writes (on p. 69): "My personal experience is that not only is a woman's salary consistently equal to a man's salary for the same job, but often women are purposely promoted because of their sex." While the latter is true, Kazhdan is incorrect in stating that there is equality in salaries. In all of my wanderings through the Soviet Union since I first began working in this area in 1968, I have heard literally thousands of complaints from women that they are not paid the same wages as men in equivalent positions. For example, during one winter in Yakutsk (1974) I encountered a woman physician (of Yakut nationality) with 11 years of experience who was married to a physician (of Great Russian origin) with 8 years of experience. Each was in charge of a wing of the hospital. His salary was 240 rubles a month; hers, 160. In my work with the various Soviet ministries, I found the differential in pay between men and women of equivalent experience and in equivalent jobs to be between 30 and 40 percent. One institute director earned 540 rubles a month, whereas his wife, director of another institute, received 360 rubles a month. Both had received their doctorate from Moscow State University in the same year and had equivalent work experience. (In fact, the wife had more professional experience, because the husband had spent two years in the army).

Kazhdan's favorable comments on centralized heating in the Soviet economy are also misleading. First, I should point out that central heating is limited to large towns and cities, but is not common in smaller towns and villages. Nor is there "constant warmth" with such heating (p. 69). I have been in many flats where it was only 3 or 4 degrees Celsius (38 to 40 degrees Fahrenheit) in mid-winter. During the winter of 1979–80, many of the major gas lines burst because of an abrupt drop in temperature in December to 51 degrees below zero Celsius. It was late February before all the gas lines were restored. The many, many letters to *Pravda,* complaining constantly about the freezing cold in the flats speak for themselves. However, my main point is that, even when the system is running at peak efficiency, it is almost impossible to keep warm in many regions. I found this particularly true in such cities as Leningrad (the older buildings), Novosibirsk, Yakutsk, and Khabarovsk.

Regarding the Soviet black market and its operators (p. 70), I would stress that many administrators at high levels in Soviet ministries operate and/or support the black market system. I know of one deputy minister who openly bought a 1969 Pontiac that had been confiscated by Soviet authorities. He paid a mere 1,300 rubles for it, whereas a common citizen would have had to turn over more than 16,000 rubles.

A. A. MEYERHOFF
Tulsa, Oklahoma

MR. KAZHDAN RESPONDS: I am flabbergasted, even flattered, by the vivid reaction that my short and modest review article has produced. I ascribe Mr. Meyerhoff's reaction to the intense desire of observers in the West to arrive at a more precise understanding of life in the Soviet Union. In order to clarify my concept of that rival superpower, let me respond briefly to the points he raises.

Mr. Meyerhoff has touched upon three points: centralized heating, the issue of nationalities, and economic discrimination



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against women. Turning to the first of these, what is the gist of my "favorable comments on centralized heating"? I wrote about two radically opposed systems of social organization, which I call the "atomization" and "ant-heap" models. It seems to me wrong, dangerously wrong, to view all assets as arrayed on one side and all the liabilities on the other. Centralized heating, public transportation, a massive military machine and some other items are unquestionably assets at the disposal of the centralized Soviet state, assets for which, as I wrote, the population pays a very high price. Even though central heating is limited to large towns, and even though in some emergency cases this heating does not work, this no more disproves my thesis than, say, the existence of a couple of thieves in the United States disproves the predominance of private property there.

Again, what was the gist of "the nationalities issue" in my review? Elizabeth Pond, so it seems to me, has emphasized one side of the problem—the conflict between the minor nationalities and the elder brother. Far from denying this conflict, I stressed the other side, namely various factors—including "rivalries and animosities" among minor nationalities—that help the elder brother in his domination over them. (By the way, "little badges with Stalin's portrait on them" sound like loyalty rather than disloyalty). Does Mr. Meyerhoff's passage on Islam add something to the problem? I do not think so. I fear that the idea of the Islamic threat to the Soviet imperium, so popular in the West, is—today at least—a legend, a *pium desideratum,* not a reality. When the Crimean Tartars were expelled from their hearthstones, who tried to support their demands for justice—the non-existent united Islamic front? or a handful of Russian and Jewish dissidents?

Finally, Meyerhoff disagrees with me regarding the question of equal salaries regardless of sex, and he quotes several cases where men were paid higher salaries than their better-qualified wives. I am ready to take all these cases for granted, but Mr. Meyerhoff forgot to prove that the husbands were paid better *because* of their sex.

A word on the principles of the Soviet system of salaries is in order. The Soviet system of wages is imposed by the state and therefore inflexible. In principle, no boss is able to set wages arbitrarily (of course, the ambiguity of Soviet society creates various loopholes, but this is a separate question). Several factors determine the amount of the salary. The foremost factor is the position. For example, every professor or every school teacher throughout the country is paid the same amount of money, unless this amount is corrected by several additional factors. These include: years of experience, the category of the institution, and the area in which the institution is located. A professor with ten years of academic experience will get a little more than a professor with five years. The category of the institution does not always matter. Even though universities are divided into three categories, professors are paid the same wages. However, the difference in salary of administrators can be substantial (see Meyerhoff's example). Persons working in certain "hardship areas" also receive higher wages.

I have neither the room nor the intention here to deal with all details of this system. But what I would stress is the fact that a boss has no right to assign an arbitrary salary to an employee: if someone is hired, his or her salary will depend on a series of prearranged conditions and not on the results of an interview. This system is corrected (or distorted) by various bonuses and rewards, which are distributed by bosses in a more arbitrary way. But even these depend more upon the so-called "significance" of the institution than on the sex of the employee. I agree with Mr. Meyerhoff completely that this system does not create equal opportunities for all citizens and that very often the less effective employees are better paid than the more effective ones. However, the discrimination is far from being sexually determined.

ALEXANDER KAZHDAN
Washington, DC

## CORRECTION

The following three corrections should be made on p. 23 of Archie Brown's article, "Andropov: Discipline *and* Reform" (*Problems of Communism,* January-February 1983). First, Oleg Bogomolov is director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System. Second, the group of which Georgiy Shakhnazarov is president is the Soviet Association of Political Sciences. Finally, fn. 20 should read: "See 'Politics and Science,' *Pravda,* Jan. 10, 1965."



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